

**THE CONCEPT OF LEGITIMACY IN EDUCATIONAL POLICY-MAKING:
ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS OF TWO POLICY EPISODES IN HONG KONG**

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**A Thesis submitted in fulfilment of
the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
in
University of London Institute of Education**

February 1987

ABSTRACT

The Thesis seeks to explain the policy-making process using a *legitimacy* notion as an alternative to various kinds of *rational* models. *Legitimacy* here takes its broadest sense as the recognised or accepted norm or belief that something is appropriate.

Based on two ethnographic case studies of policy-making "episodes" in Hong Kong education, the writer argues that policy-actors, in this case policy-advisory bodies, do not necessarily act according to a "means-end" rational model, or interact with one another because of conflicts in interests or power; but that each advisory body has developed within itself some sub-culture which identifies certain legitimacy to making policies.

In the first Episode, a policy body on higher education was forced to reject an overall policy proposal which was based on manpower forecasting; or else the body's legitimacy generated from "expert judgement" might be undermined. In the second Episode, an OECD panel caused difficulties because it adopted a "participatory approach" which tended to upset the conventional legitimacy in policy-making. Along similar lines, the writer attempts to explain more briefly a number of dramatic junctures during the two Episodes using the legitimacy explanation as a parallel to the rational model of policy-making.

The writer infers that conflicts occur when certain actor is forced to submit to a different kind of legitimacy. The actors have to strive hard to maintain their original legitimacy, or else they may lose their status in making policies. In so doing, the subject under attention is less the policy output than the policy process. The issue again is not so much a matter of the power to make policies, but the way policies are to be made. Overall, it is the process, and not the product, of policy-making that legitimates or de-legitimizes the actor.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

It is expectedly a difficult task to acknowledge all those who have contributed to the study. It becomes particularly difficult when most of the "informants" have been promised anonymity. In fact, most of the information sources have to be coded in the text. This, in a way, is unfair to the "informants" because in the ethnographic convention, they are "teachers" and not "subjects" of the researcher. It is even more so in this case when most of the "informants" are "old-hands" in real policy-making. Under such circumstances, acknowledgements to these "teachers" have to be replaced by apologies for not being able to mention their names.

Special gratitude should be paid to Professor Gareth Williams and Professor Peter Williams who have undertaken the pains of supervising such a student who works at a distance and on pressing schedules and uses varying means of communication. I am deeply appreciative of their patient and inspiring supervision, their openmindedness to different schools of thoughts and their extremely useful support. Being a teacher myself, I must say I have learned equally much from their scholarship as well as from their styles of teaching.

The study has been made possible only with the support of the staff of the two departments: the Department of International and Comparative Education (of which the then Department of Education in Developing Countries form a part) and the Department of Economic, Administrative and Policy Studies in Education, both of the University of London Institute of Education.

Much support has come from Professor M.A. Brimer, Head of Department of Education, University of Hong Kong. It was Professor Brimer who, when I left my career as a school principal, illuminated my way to the academic field.

A small part of the expenditures in this study was met by research grants from ULIE and HKU. Leave arrangements by HKU have made the overseas interviews possible.

Special thanks go to Sef Lam who took pains during the Chinese New Year Eve to read through the final drafts.

The idea of doing a PhD at 39 and at the risk of losing a job and spending all our savings was very much due to the unfailing encouragement from my wife, Sau Ha. It will be inaccurate to say she supports me: we share the same will! Thanks also go to Kong Miu and Kong Sen who tolerated so many weekends and evenings without their father's company.

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Note:

Interview and unpublished documentary sources are coded in the text when referenced. The decoding system is not available in this volume.

ABBREVIATIONS

BoE	Board of Education
CRE	Committee to Review Post-Secondary and Technical Education (1980-81)
CUHK	The Chinese University of Hong Kong
ED	Education Department, Hong Kong Government
EXCO	Executive Council
HKAL	Hong Kong Advanced Level Examination
HKCE	Hong Kong Certificate of Education Examination
HKEA	Hong Kong Examinations Authority
HKHL	Hong Kong Higher Level Examination
HKTC	Hong Kong Training Council
HKP	Hong Kong Polytechnic
HKU	University of Hong Kong
JSEA	Junior Secondary Education Assessment
LEGCO	Legislative Council
OECD	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
SCHE	Special Committee on Higher Education (1964-)
SCMP	South China Morning Post
SSPA	Secondary School Places Allocation Scheme
TEITD	Technical Education and Industrial Training Department
T.I.	Technical Institute
UMELCO	Unofficial Members of the Executive and Legislative Councils
UPGC	University and Polytechnic Grants Committee
VTC	Vocational Training Council

INTRODUCTION

In 1982, an OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development) panel which was invited to review Hong Kong's education system expressed in its report the following impression about educational policy-making in Hong Kong:

There is a pervasive feeling that responsibility and knowledge about what is happening lies elsewhere; but no-one is sure where this is, or who holds the master plan (Perspective, 1981:15-16).

This is a correct reflection of a general feeling. Consultation is never lacking, but no one knows who makes the final decisions. White papers are often preceded by Green Papers for public comments, but no one knows who writes the former which are usually drastically different from the latter. There have been major policy exercises which were supposedly based on intensive studies, but what studies, no one seems to know. Even very crucial decisions such as the institution of 9-years compulsory education came out of an unknown process.

1. The Two Episodes

In fact, the OECD review mentioned above was itself a case with a number of unknowns. The OECD exercise was an overall review of the Hong Kong education system. A four-man panel organized by the OECD spent two weeks in Hong Kong, one in 1981 and another in 1982, and carried out

extensive visits and interviews. The Government gave the exercise much publicity and it aroused wide public interest. However, the Government showed signs of reluctance to publish the panel's report, even though it was eventually published. Why was the OECD panel invited? Did the Government intervene in the review exercise? Was there in fact a problem in publishing the report? What made the Government eventually change its mind? All these remain unanswered from the point of view of the public who after all lent enthusiastic support to the review.

The OECD review, however, was not the only event that was unexplained. In 1980, about a year before the OECD review, the Hong Kong Government announced the appointment of a Committee to Review Post-Secondary and Technical Education (hereafter abbreviated as the CRE). This Committee was headed by Kenneth Topley who was to be made Hong Kong's first Secretary for Education six months later when the Committee fulfilled its terms of reference. Again, the exercise was given full publicity. Six months passed. Nothing came out of the Committee and, apart from fragmentary rumours in the newspapers, nothing was heard since. Again, what happened remains unknown to the public.

Similar incidents are numerous. The two *Episodes* above, which are the subject of research in this study, are only recent examples of the more comprehensive exercises which cover large areas in the education sector.

Such unknown and unexplained events in educational policy-making lend themselves to various explanations. They

could be identified as part of the colonial conspiracy, or signs of bourgeois coercion, or they could easily fall under other environment-deterministic interpretations. However, without serious research efforts, such explanations can hardly be more than guesswork.

2. *Points of Curiosity*

Apart from the individual policy exercises, there are also other points of curiosity. Hong Kong is well-known for its free market economy. Friedman (Friedman and Friedman, 1980) repeatedly quoted Hong Kong as the model of a free market. Yet Hong Kong practises manpower forecasting which is supposed to be most inappropriate to a free market. Why should manpower forecasting function in a free market?

In fact, Hong Kong is also keen in adopting other technical planning techniques that seem to play significant roles in policy-making. While elsewhere planners complain that their efforts are often superseded by political interactions (e.g. Hallak, 1980:83), Hong Kong planners seem to be in a much better position. Visitors to Hong Kong sometimes exclaim that Hong Kong is a "planners' paradise" (CSB01; CSW01). Why should a colony be a "planners' paradise"?

Moreover, one may be astonished by the extensiveness in which consultations are conducted by the Hong Kong Government. Why should a Crown autocracy bother to seek consultations?

Even environment-determinism may find difficulties in

explaining these curious points.

The writer's experience with Hong Kong's education policies has led to the conviction that educational policy-making can be better understood only through studying the process, to see what really happens during the course of policy-making.

Meanwhile, it could be seen from the literature that even in a democracy, the policy-making process is not always that transparent. Or, even if we know all the details of the process, it is still open to interpretations and explanations. Much is left undone particularly in the field of education.

Under these circumstances, the writer is tempted to think that the uniqueness of Hong Kong - the free market autonomy and the structural autocracy - may carry some advantages. Seeing how policies are made in an extreme case may shed light on the more general cases. For example, Hong Kong never claims that it plans its economy. Its reason for adopting manpower forecasting may explain in more general terms the popularity of manpower approaches in other economies. Moreover, Hong Kong is not a democracy in the prevalent Western sense. The extensive consultations in Hong Kong may hence provide explanations other than one of democracy.

3. Aim and Nature of the Research

The aim of the present study is to understand the policy-making process. It is not primarily intended to

solve policy problems. It does not follow the current policy-agenda laid down either by the government or by its opponents. The subject of the study is not even a current controversy. Neither the policy-makers nor their opponents would find much in this study that would help strengthen their positions, as are the cases suggested by Trow (1984) and Coleman (1972; 1976; 1978). In fact, the research, its findings and interpretations might mostly be foreign to the Hong Kong community.

However, the subject of study is basic to policy-making. It pertains to a basic analysis of the dynamics of policy-making process and hopefully to the enrichment of our knowledge in this respect. It belongs to the camp of "researchers" in Husen's "two cultures" (1984:8). The study therefore bears all the characteristics of an academic research: it is not meant to inform urgent policy changes; it does not seek endorsement from policy-makers and it is to be judged on the basis of academic scrutiny.

Nevertheless, the basic nature of the research does not preclude its relevance to the practical scene. There is in Hong Kong an excessive belief in the formal structure, in the system and procedures of policy-making which in reality contribute only modestly to the shaping of public policies. If the study can succeed in revealing and explaining the real dynamics in educational policy-making, it might help people to re-adjust their conceptions and attitudes towards educational policy-making. In other words, if the study

could eventually add to the body of knowledge about educational policy-making, then Weiss' notion of *policy enlightenment* may prove encouraging. That is, the research results may serve to shape the "climate of opinion" that would, in the long run, affect policy-making (Weiss, 1977:534; 1979:429; 1982:290).

4. *Delimitation*

Before embarking on the substance of the study, it is necessary to do some delimitation.

First, the study represents research into the *policy process* and not the *content*. That is, the attention is not on *what* policies there are or *how good* the policies are, but on *how* policies are made.

Second, the study is not intended to cover the entire policy process. The study concentrates on the *decision-making* or *policy-making* stage in the policy-process. It is the stage when the policy-maker has to make selection from among options and formulate recommendations. Different authors present the policy-making process in different ways and use different names for this particular stage in the process: "decision" (Jenkins, 1978:16-17) "recommendation and adoption" (Lasswell, 1963:93), "issue analysis" (May and Wildavsky, 1978), "options analysis" (Hogwood and Gunn, 1984:4), or "forecasting and recommendation" (Dunn, 1981:44-48). In terms of educational policy-making, it corresponds to Jennings stages of "discussion and debate" and "legitimation" (1977:39-40).

Alternatively speaking, the *policy-making process* occurs in the black box of "political system" in Easton's systems model (Fig 0.1 below).

Figure 0.1 The Easton Model

(Source: Easton, 1965:112; modified by Jenkins, 1978:18)

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This is the process where policy inputs are converted into policy outputs (Easton, 1979: Chaps 8 & 9). In particular, the *policy-making process* in this thesis refers to the last stage in Easton's conversion process, where *issues* become converted into *policy outputs* (Ibid.:73).

5. Policy-making and Environment: An Assumption?

The relationship between the larger environment and the policy-making process has been mentioned earlier. This can best be represented by the following diagram:

Figure 0.2 Environments, Decisions and Policies

(Source: Dye, 1972:Chap 11; 1981:325-33; adapted in Jenkins, 1978:50; see also a further version in Dunn, 1981:46)

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At one extreme, one may say that public policies are completely determined by the policy-making process, i.e. by the government structure, the policy-making machineries, the participants in policy-making, the "rules of the game", and so forth. The emergence of a policy is therefore somehow incidental, if not accidental. It depends on the special features of the political situation at the time the policy is made. In this case, a study of the policy-making process will be crucial, because the process is the sole determinant of public policies.

At the other extreme, one may also say that public policies are totally determined by the socio-economic and

political environment. Under certain political, social and economic environment, public policies of certain nature are bound to emerge, regardless of the finer structures in the government, the policy-making machineries or the feature of the policy-participants. According to this argument, studying the policy-making process becomes meaningless, because policies are not determined by the policy-making process.

The present study does not assume any particular relationship between the three elements in Fig. 0.2. As mentioned earlier, it is the conviction here that the relationship between the three elements can only be understood through genuine research, and such a research should start empirically from the policy-making process which is more observable than the environment.

6. The Chapter Arrangements

Chapter One is a description of the background in which the two episodes occurred. It will introduce the system, its evolution, the policies and the policy-making bodies of Hong Kong education. Special attention will be paid to some of the special features which are relevant to the two *Episodes* under study.

Chapter Two is devoted to the methodological deliberations during the research. There is an attempt to borrow from the rigours of ethnographic research and to adapt them to research in policy-making. That this chapter is placed before, and not after, the chapter on theory is a

reflection of the methodology adopted in the research: that theories come in during the course of the research and not before the design of the research.

The chapter on theory, Chapter Three, surveys all the models encountered during the research. They are largely classified using the notion of *rationality* as a frame of reference. There is then a discussion of the notion of *legitimacy* as a possible alternative to the conventional models. There is also a brief survey of the different views on the multiplicity of models.

Enthnographic type of research usually yields "thick descriptions". Thus, Chapters Four and Five provide detailed accounts of the two *Episodes* as perceived before and after the research. Each of the *Episodes* is then analysed using two separate models: the *rational model* and the *legitimacy model*.

The conclusions come in Chapter Six. This chapter attempts to deepen the legitimacy notion developed so far by applying it to more policy events and by comparing it with other conventional theories of the policy-making process. The thesis ends with some extrapolation of the research findings to Hong Kong in general.

CHAPTER ONE

BACKGROUND

0. Introduction

This first chapter faces three tasks: first, to introduce the Hong Kong education system and the evolution of its education policy; second, to introduce the institutions of policy-making in Hong Kong education; third, to describe the general scene of educational policy-making, with particular attention to third-party consultation and manpower forecasting which are characteristic of the two Episodes under study.

I. Development of Education Policy in Hong Kong

We shall concentrate on policies after 1971, firstly because these are more relevant to the present study and secondly because they were formulated under the leadership of the Governor, Murray MacLehose, who was also the Governor when the two Episodes took place.

I.1. The System and its Evolution

The Hong Kong education system underwent very rapid changes in the decade 1971-1980. The quantitative expansion is particularly spectacular. The following is a very brief account of the development.

The chart on the next page is a schematic presentation of Hong Kong's education system in the 1970s. Broadly speaking, the system remained the same throughout the decade.

Children started school at age six, although the majority did a two years kindergarten and a considerable percentage did nursery classes at three years old.

From 1971, 6 years primary schooling became free and compulsory, but primary education was largely universal even before this legislation. Free and compulsory education was extended in 1978 to 9 years (up to age 15 or Form 3 whichever came first). From 1978, primary school leavers were allocated to different secondary schools (which were usually separate from the primary schools) by a centralised system which took as its criteria student aptitudes, school internal assessment and parental choice. This replaced the Secondary Schools Entrance Examination which existed before 1978. After completion of compulsory schooling, the majority of students went on to study in traditional "grammar" schools. In summer 1980, the gross promotion ratio from Form 3 to Form 4 was around 87% (Education Department, 1986:Table 5), of which some 40% studied in government or

Figure 1.1 Education System of Hong Kong as at 1980

IMAGE REDACTED DUE TO THIRD PARTY RIGHTS OR OTHER LEGAL ISSUES



[Idea by Leung Kam Fong, adapted by Cheng Kai Ming, produced by William C.W. Pang.]

government-aided schools, others in self-financing private schools (Education Department, 1981:33). Another 3% of the Form 3 leavers continued their study in technical institutes in craft courses (Ibid.:40). The number of technical institutes increased from 1 in 1971 to 5 in 1980.

The students sat for a public Certificate of Education Examination after Form 5. About one third of the students went on to 2-year Sixth Forms. Others went to technician training in technical institutes, other post secondary institutions, or became employed.

In 1980, there were three government-subsidized tertiary institutions: the University of Hong Kong (HKU), the Chinese University of Hong Kong (CUHK) and the Hong Kong Polytechnic (HKP). There were others which were registered as post-secondary institutions (e.g. Baptist College).

Sixth-form students were admitted into tertiary institutions, the CUHK in particular, after one year's study. Others sought admission in HKU, HKP and a variety of tertiary institutions after a further year's study. Still others went abroad to study in overseas universities.

I.2. The Education Policies and Their Evolution

The year 1971 saw the legislation of compulsory primary education, following the dramatic expansion planned in the 1965 White Paper (Education Policy, 1965).

Then came the so called 'MacLehose Years' (South China Morning Post, Supplement, April, 1982). In 1972, the new

Governor, Sir Murray MacLehose (now Lord MacLehose of Boech) hastened to announce, in his first policy speech, a ten-year development plan in which Education was one of the three major areas (Hong Kong Hansard, 1972:7-9). The major policy target was to increase the percentage of government-aided junior secondary school places. The target escalated from 50% when MacLehose made the speech in 1972 to 100% in 1977 when MacLehose made a "surprise" introduction of 9-year compulsory education. In between, there were the 1973 Green Paper (Report, 1973) and the 1974 White Paper (Secondary, 1974) which laid out Government policies in secondary education. Then there was the 1977 Green Paper (Senior, 1977) and 1978 White Paper (Development, 1978) which stated policies for post-compulsory education.

The successive promulgation of policies raised a number of controversies and aroused unprecedented public debate. Public attention focused on the desirable size of government aided senior secondary education. The debates were further heated by the emergence of very strong teachers' unions and other education pressure groups.

Meanwhile, in 1979, a government internal working group (Government Secretariat, 1981:96-101) decided to expand technical education by building 2 additional technical institutes, to increase the universities expansion rate from 3% to 4% per annum in terms of student numbers, and to introduce an emergency loan scheme for Hong Kong students going to the U.K. for tertiary studies.

Anyway, in 1980 when the CRE was appointed, the first

batch of "compulsory" students were about to leave Form 3 in 1981, but policies on post-compulsory education were still vague. Whether the proposed expansions could cope with the desire of the much increased number of candidates was questionable. It was supposedly the job of the CRE to tackle these controversies.

In 1981, the Director of Education wrote:

Publication of the [CRE] Committee's report would therefore mark the completion of the current reviews of the Hong Kong education system which began in 1974 with the White Paper on "Secondary Education in Hong Kong over the Next Decade", followed by the 1978 White Paper on "The Development of Senior Secondary and Tertiary Education" ... (Education Department, 1981:1)

This is perhaps the best summary of the background for the CRE exercise. If the CRE exercise were complete, then the OECD review would be a well planned deliberation to review the overall system when policies at all levels were available. The chronology in Table 1.1 may help to summarise the position of the two Episodes in this study.

Table 1.1 Chronology for Development of Education Policies in Hong Kong

1971	Legislation of compulsory primary education
1974	White Paper: planning universal junior secondary education
1977	Announcement of compulsory 9-year education
1978	White Paper: planning expansion in senior secondary education and beyond
1981	Expected policy paper planning development in higher and technical education (CRE)
1982	Expected overall review at all levels (OECD)

II. The Policy-Making Bodies in Education

The following refers to the situation in 1980. Significant changes have materialised since.

II.1 The Decision-makers

The Governor, or the Governor-in-Council, was *de jure* solely responsible for making policy decisions. The Governor was the representative of the British Queen.

The Governor presided over and was advised by the Executive Council (EXCO) which comprised 5 other ex-officio members and 10 others appointed by the Queen or the Governor. Most of the appointed members were unofficial members (i.e. they are not civil servants). EXCO was *de facto* the decision-making body. Its meetings were confidential.

The Governor also presided over the Legislative Council (LEGCO) which made laws and controlled public expenditure. In practice, it was *de facto* a top-level advisory body. The LEGCO comprised 4 other ex-officio and a maximum of 49 appointed members. About half of the members were unofficials. LEGCO meetings were open and minutes of the LEGCO were published in the Hansard.

II.2. The Administration of Education

In 1980, apart from the ordinances for higher education institutions and a separate one for the Examinations Authority, the major legal document in education was the Education Ordinance (Laws of Hong Kong, Chap.279).

The Director of Education was responsible for seeing the Education Ordinance observed. The Director of Education headed the Education Department - one of 49 government departments - and worked under the Secretary for Social Services. The power given to the Director of Education by the Ordinance was quite broad:

The Director [of Education] shall be charged with the superintendence of matters relating to education in Hong Kong.... the Director shall promote the education of the people of Hong Kong and control and direct education policy (Education Ordinance, Section 4).

However, with the development of the education system, the power of the Director of Education was increasingly limited in practice. In at least four areas the Director of Education had no full control: higher education, technical education, special education and public examinations.

Universities and the Polytechnic were governed by their respective ordinances. They were autonomous and were not administered by any government department. The Director of Education controlled the colleges of education and, because of legislative problems, had tentative control over the institutions registered under the Post Secondary Colleges Ordinance.

The Director had control over the technical institutes,

but the planning of these institutions was largely the charge of the Hong Kong Training Council (to be discussed below). In fact the latter was about to take over technical education. There was a Division of Industrial Training in the Labour Department which acted as an administrative arm of the Hong Kong Training Council.

The Director of Education was in charge of special education, but the plans were laid down by the Education Subcommittee of the Rehabilitation and Development Central Committee which was directly answerable to the Governor-in-Council.

Public examinations used to be administered by the Examinations Division of the Education Department. However, this division became independent in 1977 and then functioned as the Hong Kong Examinations Authority (HKEA).

II.3. The Advisory Bodies

There were in 1980 more than 360 policy advisory bodies appointed by the Hong Kong Government. These were not policy-making bodies in legal terms, but were mostly quite influential in their respective policy areas.

We shall concentrate on three such bodies: the Board of Education, the Hong Kong Training Council and the University and Polytechnic Grants Committee.

There were two major categories of advisory bodies: *statutory* and *non-statutory*.

Statutory advisory bodies are established by ordinance

and are therefore answerable to the Governor-in-Council, i.e., the Governor in his official capacity as Chairman of the EXCO. The strength of statutory bodies is that they are established by law and therefore their recommendations will always be tabled in the EXCO. Meanwhile, they can only be dissolved by legal procedures. The disadvantages are that all recommendations of such bodies are subject to formal procedures of consideration and are approved only when the EXCO has discussed and endorsed them.

Non-statutory advisory bodies are appointed by the Governor as his administrative aid. Their advantages and disadvantages are just opposite to the statutory bodies. Their recommendations can easily be dismissed and they can be dissolved for administrative convenience. However, they have direct dialogue with the Governor in person and have more opportunity to apply direct influence over the Governor who in fact has the final say.

The Board of Education is a statutory body. The Hong Kong Training Council and the University and Polytechnic Grants Committee are not.

11.3.1. The Board of Education

The Education Ordinance states that the Governor be advised, via the Director of Education, by the Board of Education (BoE) on all policy matters within the scope of the Ordinance (Education Ordinance, Section 7). The BoE was therefore a *statutory body*, of which the Director of Education was a member and, until 1972, was the Chairman.

Members of the Board of Education were all local, appointed by the Governor in their personal capacities and tacitly understood as representing (a) "community leaders" which usually meant unofficial LEGCO or EXCO members, (b) major school councils (organization of schools by type), (c) major school sponsoring bodies which usually meant the major religious bodies: the Anglican Church, the Church of Christ in China, the Methodist Church and the Roman Catholic Church, (d) the Hong Kong Training Council and (e) tertiary institutions. Membership lists of the BoE in the years 1980-1983 are in Appendix A. In 1972, as another innovation from MacLehose, an unofficial member was for the first time appointed Chairman of BoE.

There were no definite terms of reference for the BoE.

In recent years, the BoE was reminded from time to time that its role was to advise and not to decide (Government Secretariat, 1981:para 4.18-4.21). Its role in policy-making could be illustrated by the drafting of the 1973 Green Paper (Report, 1973). MacLehose was not satisfied with the speed proposed by the Green Paper to substantiate his ten year plan. While the Green Paper was published for public comments, the Governor ordered the UMELCO (Unofficial Members of the Legislative and Executive Council) to set up an ad hoc committee to "improve" the Green Paper. The eventual White Paper (Secondary, 1974) was largely based on the ad hoc committee's confidential report (DSX11). The BoE was even reminded that in certain instances "it might not be

possible or appropriate to consult the Board before the event" (Government Secretariat, 1981:64). The announcement of 9-year compulsory education was obviously one such event when the Governor consulted only the Chairman of BoE and the Director of Education (ISX01).

The BoE's dissatisfaction with its falling status and the Government's reaction to this dissatisfaction surfaced publicly in the background report which was prepared for the OECD review (Government Secretariat, 1981:63-65).

II.3.2. The Hong Kong Training Council

The Hong Kong Training Council (HKTC) was a non-statutory advisory body appointed by the Governor in 1973 (First Report, 1975). Among its terms of reference (See Appendix B), two points were essential: first, to advise the Governor

on the measures necessary to ensure that there is a comprehensive system of manpower training geared to the developing needs of Hong Kong's economy (Seventh Report, 1981:1).

and to look after the sharing of responsibility between the Government and the industry in such training (Ibid.:38).

It also included in its terms of reference the target of converting the Council into a statutory organization. This it achieved in 1982 when a statutory Vocational Training Council (VTC) was established to replace the HKTC.

The HKTC was a comparatively small Council governing a huge complex of training boards and committees. Members of the HKTC included leading industrialists and representatives of the relevant government departments, labour unions and

training institutions. A membership list of the HKTC in 1980-1981 and that of VTC in 1982-83 is in Appendix C.

The HKTC's responsibility was not limited to technical education. It operated vocational training centres, carried out biennial manpower surveys at all manpower levels (from operatives to post-graduates) for the major industries and administered the legislated apprentice scheme in the designated industries. The operations of the Hong Kong Training Council were supervised by the industrial training boards and committees and other ad hoc establishments each comprising the leading employers and trainers in the respective areas. The HKTC was serviced by the Industrial Training Division within the government Labour Department.

In practice, the HKTC was in practice the policy-maker and planner in technical education and vocational training. The entire philosophy was based on the manpower requirements of the economy.

In 1982, a new Technical Education and Industrial Training Department (TEITD) was established by merging the relevant divisions in both the Education Department and Labour Department. This serves as an administrative arm to the new VTC. These are however largely beyond the scope of this study.

It may be necessary to mention in passing that there were also the Construction Training Centres and Clothing Training Centres which were independent of the HKTC and were supported by levy on firms in the respective industries.

II.3.3 The University and Polytechnic Grants Committee

The University Grants Committee was appointed in 1965 as a result of the establishment of the CUHK in 1963, but the idea of an advisory body analogous to the British UGC emerged as early as 1953 (University, 1976:1). In 1972, the Committee was renamed the University and Polytechnic Grants Committee (UPGC) to include the HKP (University, 1980a:9).

Similar to UGC arrangements elsewhere, the Hong Kong UPGC plays the dual role of allocating public funds on the one hand and safeguarding institutional autonomy on the other. However, the Hong Kong UPGC is unusual in a number of ways. The UPGC has developed its methodologies to assess polytechnic costs for which few overseas models exist. In 1980, all the academic members of the UPGC - eight out of fourteen - were serving members of overseas institutions. All members, including the Chairman, work on a part-time voluntary basis (Griffiths, 1984:545-46). A list of the UPGC members in 1980-1983 can be found in Appendix E. The UPGC met twice a year, once in Hong Kong and once in London.

The UPGC was non-statutory. Many crucial decisions were made over a luncheon meeting with the Governor. It was served by a small Secretariat which was a government establishment under the Social Services Branch, and from 1981, under the Education and Manpower Branch.

The Hong Kong UPGC maintained a "triennium" planning system even after the 1973-1974 recession, thus it escaped the constraints of the government annual budgets. Until

1984, there were no "cash limits" imposed on UPGC deliberations, and as a matter of fact, UPGC proposals were not even once rejected by the Government (Griffiths, 1984:546; ISX10).


The UPGC had legally been charged only with duties of financial allocations. In 1980, the terms of reference for the UPGC were revised to re-confirm its policy-making functions (University, 1980b:1). The UPGC was *de facto* the policy-maker of higher education in Hong Kong. The new terms of reference asked the UPGC "to keep under review in the light of the community's needs" the facilities, plans for development, the financial needs and the application of funds in university and polytechnic education in Hong Kong (See Appendix D).

II.4. A Summary

Figure 1.2 on the next page helps to summarise the situation.

**Figure 1.2 Policy-advisory Bodies
in Hong Kong Education
as at 1980**

G



[Designed by Cheng Kai Ming, produced by William C.W. Pang.]

III. Educational Policy-Making in Hong Kong

This section provides a general introduction to educational policy-making in Hong Kong. After a discussion of the overall pattern, manpower forecasting and third-party consultation are then considered in some detail, because these are critical features of the two Episodes under study.

III.1. The General Pattern

Apart from stage of "needs identification" which is often subtle, policy deliberations at a macro level in Hong Kong usually involve the following steps:

- (a) It starts with a specially appointed committee which usually invites public submissions before or during its course of deliberation.
- (b) After submission to the EXCO, recommendations of the commissioned committee are often published, in whole or in a summary form, sometimes as a Green Paper, for public comments.
- (c) The recommendations are then modified, supposedly with due consideration to the public comments, and tabled at the LEGCO, often in the form of a White Paper, for official adoption.

The procedures of such a process are conventional.

There are no standard procedures for the formulation of education policies. Two points are outstanding: consultation and secrecy.

Consultation. Consultation is a special feature in educational policy-making in Hong Kong. It occurs at almost all possible junctures of the policy-making process. There are different modes of consultation. Public consultation can be carried out by issuing a Green Paper, by inviting submissions from recognised organizations, or by discussions in regular or special consultative meetings. Public pressures developed in the mass media may also carry weight. The modes of consultation are discussed in an earlier study (Cheng, 1983).

The 1965 White Paper was preceded by a 1963 Green Paper worked out by an overseas Education Commission. Both the Commission and the Green Paper sought public submissions. The 1974 White Paper was preceded by a 1973 Green Paper which was actually a report from the BoE. Opinions were sought from the public both before and after the Green Paper. The 1978 White Paper followed the 1977 Green Paper. The latter sought public input both before and after its publication.

Consultations are extensive and are not only unique to education. The Government is quite proud of this and regards it as the "distinctive feature of the system of government in Hong Kong" (Government Secretariat, 1981:173).

Secrecy. In contrast to the extensive consultations, there is also no lack of secrecy. The 1963 Green Paper was pre-empted by a Government "Statement" to restructure the education system. The "Statement" was issued just before

the arrival of the Education Commission and the source of the idea was unidentified. The ad hoc UMELCO committee which "improves" the 1973 Green Paper was confidential and its "Memorandum" upon which the 1974 White Paper was based was never made public. The 1977 Green Paper was the endeavour of a Working Party, the existence of which was known to the public only in 1981 (Government Secretariat, 1981:96) but even then its elaborate report was never published. There was another confidential working party which converted the Green Paper to the 1978 White Paper. The 1979 Working Group to deliberate higher education policies was again a government internal set-up.

Resource allocation. Besides the process itself, an additional outstanding point was resource allocation. The Hong Kong government adopted a sort of "demand-led" criteria in funding education (ISB01).

There was not so much a competition of resources, because we did not operate like that. Whenever we feel it is necessary to do something, we always secure support from the Financial Secretary. Whenever we started anything new, we got separate funding and would not compete with the old programmes (ISX08).

We do not have resource competition, not only in education. The doctrine is not cake cutting at all. Items will be financed for justifiable reasons (ISX09).

In practice the EXCO decides which programme is justified and to be resourced. The EXCO of course has to face resource allocation problems, "there is a 'cake' within the EXCO" (ISX10), but there is no sense of "distribution" or "competition" among sectors when policies in individual sectors are being made. This is possible largely because of

two points quite unique to Hong Kong. First, it is not a polyarchy where each social group has a say; second, the Government is in general affluent and can afford to be generous.

III.2. Third Party Consultations

The OECD review can be regarded as a form of third-party consultation. Third-party consultation is another approach which is adopted quite often in policy-making in Hong Kong education. Where possible, elements of third-party consultant were built into education policy-making. consultants including experts from overseas or prominent figures in the local community.

The 1963 Green Paper (Report, 1963), known as the Marsh-Sampson Report, was written by a two-member Education Commission appointed by the Government in 1963. Marsh and Sampson were from Hampshire, England. They paid an eight-week visit to Hong Kong in February-April, 1963 and were asked to advise on the overall demand and supply of education and its finance. The White Paper (Education Policy, 1965) took the Green Paper into consideration, but did not agree with many of the proposals.

In both the final stage of the drafting of the 1977 Green Paper and its conversion into the 1978 White Paper, Peter Williams from the University of London Institute of Education was invited as external consultant. In fact, Peter Williams was also invited to be the adviser in the CRE

exercise.

The most famous internal third-party consultations were the T.K. Ann Commission and the Rayson Huang Committee.

In 1973, there was a dispute over salary between the non-graduate teachers in government and government-aided schools. The dispute led to territory-wide industrial action. After the dispute was settled, a Special Commission on the Certificated Masters was appointed by the Governor (1) to examine the underlying causes of the dispute and (2) to advise on the measures to be taken to obviate a recurrence of such a dispute (Report, 1976:4). This is referred to as the "T.K. Ann Commission" after its chairman. The Committee solicited public opinions and produced the "T.K. Ann Report" (Ibid.).

A "Rayson Huang Committee" was set up in 1978 to investigate the controversial closure of a school run by the Catholic Precious Blood Congregation. The incident started by the public revelation of financial misappropriation by the Congregation and soon developed into a confrontation between the school management and the Education Department on the one side and the students and teachers and pressure groups on the other. At the climax, there was a public students sit-in demonstration outside the Bishop's House. The Education Department reacted by closing the school. The so called "Rayson Huang Committee" invited public submissions and conducted interviews and produced two reports.

III.3. Manpower Forecasting in Hong Kong

This section attempts to trace the historical development of manpower requirement deliberations in Hong Kong. This is done by identifying the major efforts to apply manpower techniques to Hong Kong.

III.3.1. *Special Committee on Higher Education*

The Special Committee on Higher Education (SCHE) was established in 1964. It was obviously prompted by the international tide of manpower forecasting. Its Interim Report started with the following remark:

Throughout the world, countries are becoming increasingly development-minded and it seems that often the key to economic expansion is the planned development of manpower resources. The most important means by which manpower resources can be developed is formal education and in particular, formal education at the higher levels (Special Committee, 1966:1).

The SCHE based its methodology mainly on the British Robbins Report and the now classical work by Harbison and Myers (Ibid.:6). The SCHE even thought of inviting Harbison to undertake a commissioned survey for Hong Kong (Ibid.:4). The SCHE members included representatives of the two universities, senior LEGCO members and other relevant senior officials. The basic terms of reference of the SCHE was to assess the demand and to design the supply of high-level manpower.

The SCHE attempted to calculate the Harbison-Myers composite index (Harbison and Myers, 1964), but this yielded

no fruit because of lack of GNP figures. It then turned to what it called the "forecasting-manpower-needs" approach to assess the demand of "highly educated personnel" (Special Committee, 1966:6-9). By that time the results of the first general census (1961) for Hong Kong were available. Using 1961 as the base-year, the SCHE tried to project the demand and distribution of high-level manpower in 1971. This projection was tested by using the government sector as a "microcosm" of the economy (Special Committee, 1966:22). This projected demand was then balanced by a projected output of education. This constituted an Interim Report in 1966. In 1968, a second interim report was produced which included mainly a survey of one sector of the economy, namely, manufacturing industry. This was carried out by Robert Mitchell of CUHK and was the first of its kind in Hong Kong (Special Committee, 1968). The Mitchell survey looked at (a) the manpower structure of all firms employing 200 or more workers and a small sample of firms employing 100 to 199 workers and (b) the educational qualification of individuals working in these firms. The SCHE did not produce further reports.

III.3.2. Manpower surveys: ITAC and HKTC

An Industrial Training Advisory Committee (ITAC) was appointed in 1965 as a non-statutory body to advise the Governor on industrial training. ITAC was later replaced by the HKTC which was of a more permanent nature (Final Report, 1971:1). One of the major efforts of both the ITAC and the

HKTC was conducting manpower surveys in the major industries.

The ITAC and HKTC adopted the "employer's opinion survey" technique which was first introduced by experts from the International Labour Organization (ILO) in 1967 (Waters, 1985:112). The surveys carried out full-population investigations as far as possible and used the survey results as a basis for forecasting. An "adaptive filtering" technique was used for forecasting where mathematical models which favoured more recent data yielded a family of curves. The training boards then discussed and decided the most acceptable projection (Report, 1977). This has become a biennial exercise for each of the selected industries. Results of the survey and projection for individual industries are published. Two comprehensive reports were published in 1977 and 1984 respectively (Ibid.; Vocational, 1984). The planning of a large range of training facilities, from the training of operatives in training centres to the training of technologists in the Polytechnic, are very much influenced by the survey results.

We shall see that the HKTC's manpower survey had some role to play in the CRE Episode.

III.3.3. The 1977 Green Paper

The preparation of the 1977 Green Paper started with a government internal Working Party on Higher Education which was later renamed Working Party on Senior Secondary and Tertiary Education because it was found necessary to widen

its terms of reference. This was a government internal inter-departmental working party with senior educational officials as its core members. Appointed in 1975, the Working Party produced among others an Interim Report in 1976 (DSX08) and a Final Report (DSX09) in 1977. The latter was condensed and "dressed" to become the Green Paper (Senior, 1977).

The Working Party was the first attempt in Hong Kong to use the manpower requirements approach to plan the overall system of education. Its crucial Chapter II, "Demand and Supply" was repeatedly re-written. In this chapter, much effort was devoted to looking at the demand in terms of *student demand* ("demonstrated demand" and "student ability") and *job opportunities* ("existing occupational structure", "measured (forecast) demand", and "employment patterns and salary levels" (DSX09).

The Working Party, however, did not attempt to conduct its own survey for manpower requirements. The Working Party drew data from the Education Department, the Examinations Authority, HKTC, the 1976 by-census and graduate surveys of the universities and the Polytechnic. The Working Party once thought of asking the Census and Statistics Department to develop a mathematical model to predict the number of vacancies, but was persuaded by the HKTC experience not to do this. While rate of return analysis was too difficult to carry out, the Working Party attempted to draw education-earnings profiles.

Later, the 1979 Working Group took a second look at the

key issues and began to sense the necessity to develop a methodology different from the HKTC approach. The 1979 Working Group exercise developed an expert team and paved the way for the CRE review (ISX11).

III.3.4 Summary of manpower forecasting

We may conclude that manpower calculations were a rather strong tradition in Hong Kong. Their use was reinforced by the availability of a rich data base and a team of experts.

IV. Summary

The two Episodes under study were very comprehensive policy exercises with very broad involvement. It is not easy to describe all the factors that would be necessary for someone foreign to Hong Kong to understand the situations fully. Nevertheless, the above descriptions have perhaps delineated the context in which the two Episodes took place. More detailed information is introduced in the text of later chapters where necessary.

CHAPTER TWO

RESEARCH DESIGN

0. Introduction

This chapter describes the methodology and methods adopted in the research. The basic philosophy follows Homan's remark:

People who write about methodologies often forget that it is a matter of strategy, not of morals. There are neither good or bad methods but only methods that are more effective under particular circumstances in reaching objectives on the way to a distant goal (Homan 1949:330)

There is a description of the conditions under which the research was carried out. In this context, the methodology adopted in the study, which is a retrospective case-study borrowing much from ethnographic research, will be discussed in detail. Because of the nature of the research design, the process of the research will be delineated prior to the methodological presentation.

1. Conditions and Design of the Research

It is essential to describe the conditions under which the research was carried out, because these justify the methodology adopted.

First, the research started with a very vague question: *How are education policies made?* The question does not constitute the necessary components of a "hypothesis". However, what little was known about the policy-making process - and the little that was known might well be a misinterpretation - determined that it would be unrealistic to formulate any sensible hypothesis at that stage.

Second, the researcher has never been an "insider" in the policy-making machinery. All that was available was the published materials and a number of rumours. He would remain as an outsider during the research.

Third, it is clear that given the nature of the research as a PhD programme, it is only possible to do retrospective research. Any on-going process would have presented difficulties of unpredictable durations. Furthermore, the sensitivity of on-going policy issues would have prohibited the "outsider" researcher from acquiring reliable data.

Fourth, the researcher was reluctant to start with a theory which was borrowed from elsewhere. Whether theories generated elsewhere would apply to the Hong Kong scene was to be found during the research, and not before. Given the small amount of knowledge about the policy-making process in Hong Kong, selection of theory could only be arbitrary. In these circumstances, early adherence to any arbitrarily selected theory could pre-empt data-collection and hence pre-empt explanation.

Fifth, policy-making in Hong Kong is highly

confidential. Only the final outputs are published in a very brief form. All the policy-advisory bodies keep confidential minutes. Only the Hansard, the minutes of the LEGCO, are published, but that contains public speeches rather than substantial debates. This was particularly so in the years under research when the LEGCO comprised only members appointed by the Governor. There were so far only two articles published on the process of policy-making in Hong Kong education. One was written by a former UPGC member (Griffiths, 1984) and provided much "insider" view of the process. The other was written by a former Deputy Director of Education (Lowe, 1980). The latter does not seem to reflect much of the actual process of policy-making.

Sixth, since the research started afresh in a virgin ground, there was a dilemma of whether it should aim primarily at breadth or at depth. If the research had aimed at a general trend over a long period of time and a vast number of events, it would have to ask very general questions about each event. Much of what was collected would then be abstract value judgements or general beliefs rather than facts. If this were the case, the research might become a survey of "views" on policy-making which deny the researcher the supporting "facts". The research hence had chosen to start from depth, by doing intensive case studies, so that there was more opportunity to look into the "facts" as well as the "views".

It follows from the above conditions that the research

had to be an exploratory, retrospective, and ethnographic case studies and had to rely heavily on the "key-informants" who participated in the policy-making process.

2. Choice of Cases

The choice of cases is based on a number of considerations.

One, the availability of data. Availability of data was expected to be a problem in this kind of research, the two cases were chosen because they seem to present fewer difficulties than most. There was a host of past or current policy-participants whom the researcher could interview during his stay in Europe and who have either retired or could answer questions in an unofficial capacity.

Two, the "freshness" of the cases. As mentioned above, the cases had to be remote enough from the current issues so that they would not be so sensitive as to prohibit data collection. However, if the cases were too old, it might rely too much on vague recollections or secondary sources. The two cases were quite fresh when the research was started in 1983, but each case had terminated as a policy episode. That the cases were just past gave the advantage that most of the participants were still active in the scene and still kept fresh memory.

Three, the "comprehensiveness" of the cases. The two cases both presented comprehensive policy exercises in education. Each of them considered not just one part or one

policy of the education system. In both cases, almost all actors in the educational policy-making arena were mobilized. The implication of these two case studies thus may extend well beyond an understanding of the two particular episodes.

Because of the nature of the research design, it will be appropriate to describe the procedures adopted and to discuss the methodological aspects thereafter.

3. The Procedures

The research started with a detailed documentary analysis of published policy papers on Hong Kong education, in the period 1963-1983. A list of these documents is included in Appendix G.

3.1. Phase I (October, 1983 - July, 1984)

In Phase I, 22 interviews were made in Europe (U.K., France and West Germany) among people who had once participated or were then participating in educational policy-making in Hong Kong. These are called *key-informants*. During the interviews, information pertaining to both *episodes* were collected, because in practice they were intertwined and involved to a large extent the same informants. The informants include retired senior government officials of Hong Kong, retired Legislative and Executive Councillors and members of the Board of Education and other advisory bodies. There were also members of the OECD Panel

who visited Hong Kong to review education and other relevant OECD officials, overseas members of the UPGC and people who had once acted as external consultants to Hong Kong education. Although most of the interviewees were participants in the two major Episodes, a few persons who had not been directly involved were also consulted. Some of the informants were visited twice. A few interviews were made with participating policy-makers who happened to pass by Europe.

Simultaneously with the interviews there were analyses of the unpublished documents available at that time, including the CRE report and most of its working papers, some UPGC documents, the OECD draft report and other Government confidential documents. Most of these documents occurred as "by-products" of interviews. There were around 7 sources of such unpublished papers.

3.1. Phase II (August, 1984 - May, 1986)

Phase II was carried out mainly in Hong Kong. 17 key-informant interviews carried out in this period, included policy-making participants relevant to the two Episodes, who were either resident in Hong Kong or outside Europe. Two interviews were carried out in the USA and Australia respectively. Meanwhile, the entire body of documents relevant to the two episodes were revisited. These included published and unpublished documents, press articles either from newspaper clippings or from Government Press Release, the Hong Kong Hansard, the UPGC Reports, and so on. The

goal in this Phase was to organize and enrich the data acquired in Phase I, to form a tentative framework for further investigation.

Some part of the investigations at first does not seem directly relevant to the final thesis, but then proved helpful in understanding the context in which the two Episodes took place. In particular, *manpower forecasting* and *consultation* were the two crucial issues in the two Episodes respectively. Therefore, special attention was paid to these two aspects. An in-depth investigation was made to understand the function of manpower forecasting in real planning of training facilities in the Vocational Training Council. The Construction and Building Industry was examined under the microscope and the entire planning process was traced. Two papers were produced (Cheng, 1985a; 1985b). Results of this investigation is not directly related to the analyses of the two Episodes, but prove extremely enlightening in illustrating the notion of legitimacy. Part of the results are included in Chapter 6 (see I.3). An indepth study of the consultation facilities in Hong Kong education was done earlier (Cheng, 1983) and was not repeated in this research.

During the course of this phase, two interim reports were drafted. These became the basic analyses of the Episodes and were revised at the final stage.

3.3. Phase III (June, 1986 - November, 1986)

In this phase, a further 8 key-informant interviews were carried out among selected persons who held key positions during the two Episodes. That these selected key-informants were interviewed at this phase was deliberate. They possess rather comprehensive knowledge of the policy-making machinery in general and of the two Episodes in particular. They were supposed to provide crucial information or opinions which would not have come forth if the interviewer did not possess sufficient knowledge to present questions which probe in depth their understanding of what had occurred.

These were done at the same time when the analyses based on the previous reports were being revised. These produced Draft I of Chapters 4 and 5 of this Thesis.

The third component of this phase was to invite 10 persons identified as expert consultants who were politically sensitive and who were adequately familiar with the Hong Kong scene. They were invited to read the tentative reports (either Draft I and the earlier reports) and give comments either by scribbling on the draft or in discussions with the researcher. Some of these invited were policy-makers interviewed earlier, others were people who never participated in policy-making but had been keen watchers of the two Episodes.

Hence, the key-informant interviews, the revision of

the analyses and the expert consultations ran parallel to each other and interact with each other. In fact the analyses were revised after each interview and each discussion with the expert consultants. Although the modifications on the "facts" were only marginal, changes in the analyses were tremendous. The result of Phase III is presented as Chapters 4 and 5 of this thesis.

4. The Methodology

The present study is basically a retrospective, ethnographic case study. This section presents the basic methodological approach in this research. Lack of consistency in much of the terminology in the literature on methodology has made it necessary to pay special attention to the substance of any term used.

4.1. *The ethnographic approach*

It must be made clear at the very beginning that it is not the objective of the present study to produce an ethnography. The entire objective was to borrow from the rigour in ethnographic research, as an alternative to the traditional "hypothesis-testing" type of research.

The terms *ethnographic*, *qualitative*, *phenomenological*, *naturalistic*, *anthropological* and *participatory* research are used almost as synonyms in the literature (Wilson, 1977:245; Kirk and Miller, 1986:9; Maseman, 1982:1; Burgess, 1985a:1). Halfpenny (1979) gives a rather amusing long list of such

synonyms. In this thesis, the term *ethnographic research* will be used as a "shorthand rubric" (Goetz and Lecompte, 1984:3) for investigations with similar methodological orientation.

The dichotomy between ethnographic research and traditional psychometric approach (another shorthand rubric) is really one of difference in the data-theory relationship. Discussion of such a methodological dichotomy occurs in various branches of social science. Glaser and Strauss (1967), as sociologists, advocate the notion of *grounded theory* which aims at *theory generation* rather than *theory verification*. Parlett and Hamilton (1972; 1977), in an evaluation context, contrast *social-anthropological* with the traditional *agricultural-botany* approach. Aldrich and Ostrom, in a review of research in political science over twenty-five years, distinguished *discovery* from *justification* orientations (1980:864). Owens (1982), from the perspective of educational administration, identifies the dichotomy of *naturalistic* and *rationalistic* inquiry.

As a summary of the discussions, a quotation from Aldrich and Ostrom may be useful. According to Aldrich and Ostrom (1980), the *discovery* orientation is "data-first" and the general sequence of analyses is:

- (1) data collection,
- (2) development of classification schemes,
- (3) inductive derivation of hypothesis, and
- (4) integration of hypothesis into a coherent theory.

On the other hand, the *justification* orientation is "theory-

first". The sequence of analyses consists of the following steps:

- (1) theory construction,
- (2) derivation of hypotheses from the theory,
- (3) data collection and operationalization, and
- (4) testing inductive inference.

There are two key aspects in the distinction between the two approaches: the objective and the sequence.

The present study follows the "data-first" model. The objective is not to verify or test theories generated elsewhere, but to discover and generate theories from the data (Goetz and LeCompte, 1984:5; Glaser and Strauss, 1967). As Hammersley and Atkinson assert, the absence of knowledge of the process itself represents a useful starting point for research (1983:30). The study did not hope to find data to match a theory. Rather, it hoped to find a theory that explains the data (Goetz and LeCompte, 1984:4).

The present study is methodologically naturalistic (Goetz and LeCompte, 1984:10; Owen, 1982:3): it allows the process to unfold itself. The research is empirical, but does not pretend to deny the researcher's influence on the researched. Therefore it does not claim to be absolutely non-manipulative, but the manipulations were to minimize interventions rather than to strengthen them.

It was difficult to divide the research process into the conventional stages of problem-formulation, hypothesis-building, data-collection, data-analysis, hypothesis-testing

and so forth. The stages were often intertwined, overlapped with each other and occurred recurrently throughout the process of research (Burgess, 1985b:9).

4.2. "Theory" in the research

It may be necessary to add a few words at this stage to clarify the role of "theories" in the research.

To start with, the research did not start with a definite theoretical framework in the conventional sense. As Kirk and Miller described, the researcher often "arrives on the scene with considerable theoretical baggage but very little idea of what will happen next" (1986:30). The theoretical baggage did not constitute a theoretical framework because there was nothing definite to be confirmed by the research. A typical ethnographic case-study is Peter Blau's account of his research process in his pioneering book *The Dynamics of Bureaucracy* (Blau, 1967). He started with a large number of random "hypotheses", which he confirmed and refuted in the field. An ethnographic researcher is never theory-free. The difference between an ethnographer and a researcher of other traditions is not whether he/she has theory or not, but rather, whether he/she forces any preconceived theory on to the observed data.

What was done in this research was correctly delineated by Kirk and Miller when they refer to the ethnographic researcher as fieldworker and qualitative researcher:

The fieldworker [...] is continuously engaged in something very like hypothesis testing, but that effectively checks perception and understanding against the whole range of possible sources of error. He or she

draws tentative conclusions from his or her current understanding of the situation as a whole, and acts upon them. Where, for unanticipated reasons, this understanding is invalid, the qualitative researcher will sooner or later (often to the researcher's intense dismay) find out about it (1986:25).

That is, the research started with some vague, indefinite theory. This was meant to be tentative, to be modified during the entire process of research - research design, data-collection, data-analysis, and so on.

The orientation was discovery rather than testing of theory, but analysis was sequential - it was both guided by and guided data collection. "Concepts emerge from the field, are checked and re-checked against further data, compared with other material, strengthened or perhaps re-formulated" (Woods, 1984:51). Woods correctly challenges the notion that concepts "emerge" from the field. The researcher actually searched among existing theories for what might be relevant to his observed data (Wilson, 1977:250-251).

4.3. Ethnographic research and objectivity

Writers are split on the epistemology underlying ethnographic research. Silverman provides a very good summary of three approaches to ethnography: *cognitive anthropology*, *interactionalist sociology* and *ethnomethodology* (1985:96).

Cognitive anthropology regards ethnographic research as just a variation of empirical "science" (Pelto and Pelto, 1978:19-23) which has always "celebrated objectivity" (Kirk and Miller, 1986:10-12).

The *interactionalists* admit objectivity, but recognize the objectivity as a network of social relations of which

the researcher is an integral part (Barnes, 1963:121). Hence, what one can best acquire as objectivity is modified by the researcher (Silverman, 1985:101-9; Hammersley and Atkinson, 1983:11-12).

The pure *ethnomethodologists* regard ethnographic research as the anti-thesis of positivistic research, as "interpretive" and "subjective", as opposite to the *scientific paradigm* (Cohen and Manion, 1985:120). Others discuss ethnographic research in the context of contrasting *naturalism* with *positivism* (Hammersley and Atkinson, 1983:1-9; Lincoln and Guba, 1985).

Therefore, an adoption of the ethnographic methodology does not, as some believe, commit the researcher to a particular school of epistemology. The stand of the present study is near to the category of cognitive anthropology which can be represented by the following quotation:

There is a world of empirical reality out there. The way we perceive and understand that world is largely up to us, but the world does not tolerate all understandings of it equally (Kirk and Miller, 1986:11).

Such a stand will have significance not only in the design, but will also be discussed in the conclusion.

4.4. *Ethnographic approach and qualitative methods*

Some writers equate ethnographic research with qualitative techniques. An increasing number of authors are using *qualitative research* as a synonym for *ethnographic research*, although most of them qualify by declaring that they do not exclude quantitative techniques (e.g. Kirk and Miller,

1986:10; Burgess ed., 1985b; Goetz and LeCompte, 1984; Silverman, 1985:17). In fact, Maanen et al. write in the introduction to their recently published *Qualitative Research Methods Series*:

We wish to highlight the distinction between methods thought to be qualitative and quantitative, but also to demonstrate that such dimensions typically break down when subject to scrutiny (In Agar, 1986:5).

As far as this present study is concerned, it is basically qualitative. It is a matter of practicability rather than a matter of style. Quantitative methods are not applied to the two cases, because (a) the study is exploratory and knowledge about the subject does not allow sensible quantification; (b) the study works on small numbers and statistical methods can hardly play a role.

4.5. Ethnographic research and research techniques

Many authors illustrate ethnographic research by identifying it with certain research techniques. This is not always justified.

Some writers try to substitute case-study (Cohen and Manion, 1985) for ethnographic research, but case-studies could well start with a strong theoretical framework (e.g. Stake, 1980:B-4). Case studies are not always ethnographic. When Philip Coombs used his *comparative case study* methodology to look into non-formal education, he started with 36 pre-set research items (Coombs and Ahmed, 1974:259-264). When Hans Weiler compared educational policy-making in the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany, he started with a strong framework borrowed from Habermas'

theory of legitimacy (Weiler, 1983a). These are case-studies, but are not research in the ethnographic paradigm.

Others commit ethnographic research to fieldwork (see Burgess, 1985a:1). This is to a large extent true, but ethnographic research often also relies on archival materials (e.g. Pelto and Pelto, 1978:116).

Still others equate ethnographic research with participant observation, but there are obvious cases of ethnographic research where participant observation is impossible, or non-participant observation is more appropriate (Cohen and Manion, 1985:122-124).

The understanding in this study is that ethnographic research is a term in methodology, not in techniques. As a matter of fact, many writers regard the use of multiple methods as one of the main features of ethnographic research (Goetz and LeCompte, 1984:3; Wolcott, 1980:F-4).

The methods adopted in this research are multimodal (Wilson, 1977:255): documentary analysis and interviews in the main, but archival materials, newspaper clippings, radio records and conversations also play important roles. On the whole, the methods adopted were not pre-determined by the theoretical framework, but were pragmatically decided by requirements of efficiency and validity in data-collection (Goetz and LeCompte, 1984:3)

The research operated under a flexible design. The process of the research was shaped during the progress of the research. The research tactics were continuously revised

characteristic of ethnographic research (Burgess, 1985b:8).

5. Some Methodological Issues

Given the amorphous nature of ethnographic type of research, problems during the research could not receive neat solutions according to standard formulae. It is therefore necessary to look into some of the methodological issues that were encountered during the research and to see how they were solved.

5.1. *The "outsider-insider" issue*

The aim of the research is to understand a social process (Burgess, 1985b:8-9), which is policy-making. What the researcher faced were therefore participants of a social process who carried with them not only facts, but also values. In a way, it is a study of the "culture" which, as is usually the case in ethnographic research, is unfamiliar to the researcher (Wolcott, 1980:F-3).

One basic strength of ethnographic research is exactly the possibility of gaining access to the culture of a social group or process. This is best achieved in participant observation when the researcher becomes an "insider" of the group or process. Then, the research requires the researcher to identify with, and at the same time to remain distant from, the group or process being studied (Sandy, 1983).

However, there could be a converse argument which favours an "outsider". It could be an advantage for the

favours an "outsider". It could be an advantage for the outsider that he/she has no preconception of the process and therefore would not be insensitive to the "culture". Some even quote the saying, "It would hardly be the fish who discovered the existence of water" (Sandy, 1983:21). Hence, it is up to the "outsider" researcher to exploit his strength to overcome his shortcomings.

In the case of policy processes, insider observation is impossible only in the case of ex-participants. The other possibilities are either the researcher plays a covert role as an insider, which is not likely, or he observes as an outsider. One of the best-known "ethnographic" case on educational policy research, for example, would be the case of Maurice Kogan who researched the policy-making process as an ex-member of the process (See for example Kogan 1975; Kogan and Packwood, 1974; Kogan and Atkin, 1982). Another example could be Harvey Goldstein who used his experience as ex-member when he was researching into the Assessment of Performance Unit (Gipps and Goldstein, 1983). In most other cases, however, the researcher remains foreign (For example, Jennings, 1977; Allison, 1971; Helco and Wildavsky, 1981).

In this research, the "outsider" position of the researcher makes him suffer from the "opaqueness" of the scene, but at the same time it gives him the privileged position of an impartial "third-party". In a way, that the researcher was foreign to the "culture" did bring some advantages. Several interviewees remarked: "I like talking to you. I have never thought that way" or "It has helped me

to summarise."

5.2. A retrospective research

The present research is retrospective in nature. The historical nature of the research presented a number of methodological difficulties. First, the informants responded by recollecting past events. This made the informants in a sense "impartial" because they were then more remote from the politically sensitive events and were less worried about the responsibilities and consequences of providing information. This "impartial" sense was an advantage because it helped to reduce the sensitivity and confidentiality of the information. However, the reliance on recollections gave rise to disadvantages that the informants might provide reproduced versions of the information which might not reflect their actual perspective when they participated in the process (Hindley, 1979).

The recalling feature also added to the difficulties in reliability. This is discussed in section 2.5.5.

5.3. Key Informant Interviews

The main body of the research was done through key informant interviews.

Key informants are not subjects who respond to questions or stimuli, rather, they teach the researcher to interpret the information and understand the process through the former's eyes (Spradley, 1979:25-34). Therefore, instead of trying to eliminate subjective data (subjective due to

the informant), the researcher tried to incorporate them (Goetz and LeCompte, 1984:9-10).

The exploratory nature of the research determined the naturalistic features of the interviews. The interviews were unstructured, covering only open ended broad topics, usually sent to the interviewee before the interview. The informants were allowed, if not encouraged, to elaborate in whatever direction they choose. The idea was to minimize the degree of manipulation so as to let the episodes unfold themselves. There were pieces of information that did not seem to be relevant at the time of interview, but later became precious clues.

To start discussion, most of the time the informants were asked to present their "insights". It was found that very few people were unwilling to speak about their "insights", but once they speak, they usually tend to collate facts to support their "insights". "Insights" were therefore the "thin end of the wedge" opening up the way to obtain data, values and facts alike. This use of "insights" incidentally coincides with Yin's suggestion (Yin, 1984:83).

5.4. Locating key informants

Unlike interviews in controlled experiments or surveys, key informants are atypical individuals who, instead of being chosen by sampling, are chosen by deliberation so as to ensure representativeness (Goetz and LeCompte, 1984: 119-20). The informants are not expected to reflect across-the-board pattern. On the contrary, key informants are chosen

each because of his/her special knowledge. They frequently are chosen because they have access - in time, space or perspective - to observations which are otherwise denied the researcher (Ibid). Key informant interviewing is therefore the process of seeking a large body of special information from each of the informants (Wolcott, 1980:F-4).

Given the nature of key-informant interviewing, locating the key informants becomes an essential step (Spradley, 1979:45-54). The locating of informants in the present research started with the pool of policy-makers in the high level advisory bodies. They are, fortunately, finite in number. Nevertheless, because of time and access problems, full population interviewing was still impossible.

The informants were name-picked according to their participation in the two policy-making episodes. The intention was to interview those who would provide the best information, both in terms of quantity and quality. As the interviews went on, earlier interviews informed the researcher of further potential interviews. When time constraints were significant, the reduction of number of informants was based on the expected returns of information rather than by statistical sampling.

The search for key informants was a continuous process. The research started with little knowledge about "who is who" in the policy-making arena, but as interviews accumulated, it became clearer who were the "key" informants who deserved to be interviewed. An interview with a retired senior official at the very early stage, for example, was

very informative. The interview itself was a complete failure. The interviewee knew very little of what had happened at the policy-making level, and what he claimed to know was obviously largely imaginery and contradicted the facts collected elsewhere. One of three points might be true: (a) the interviewee was not in the policy-making rank, (b) the interviewee was insensitive to policy matters, or (c) the interviewee was lying. Further interviews tend to support (a) and (b). The Education Department, for example, was not a place to study policy-making. Apart from the planners in the Education Department, people there had very little knowledge about the policy-making arena. Further, there were people who were involved but were insensitive. One retired Councillor, for example, kept on telling inside stories which mixed scandals and gossip with politics. Such cases gave strong hints of who the "key" informants were.

Another example was the interviews with the OECD Overall Review panel members. Each member had a view about the other members. These views more or less converge and enabled prioritising the importance of the four members, although all of them were "key" enough to be informants. In the end the Rapporteur was identified as the most key person. This converging view, however, was not shared by policy-makers outside the panel. If the word culture could be used in this context, there was a kind of culture within the OECD panel which was foreign to people outside the team. The process of prioritising the panel members was somehow a

process of learning the culture within the team - *enculturation* in Spradley's terms (1979:47). Very similar situations occurred in interviewing the UPGC members.

Spradley's notion of "current involvement" was an important factor in choosing key informants (Spradley, 1979:48-49). In one sense, as what were researched were historical events, interviews concentrate on people who participated in those events. In the other sense, there was a marked difference between those who were still making policy and those who had retired from the arena. Ex-policy-makers had the advantage of relaxation from responsibility and confidentiality. Several informants strongly invited the researcher to take away the documents in their possession. Two of them were retired and one actually said: "I am a dying man of seventy. These materials will be of no use to me." The other said: "I am now a free citizen and I can do whatever I want to." The best key-informants were therefore persons who participated in the episodes under research but had retired when they were interviewed.

5.5. Reliability

It is often said that research using ethnographic methodology enjoys high validity but suffers from low reliability. Therefore, special attention was paid to reliability. The low reliability is often attributable to the naturalistic setting which is hardly replicable (Goetz and LeCompte, 1984: 211). It is also attributable to the "personalistic" nature of such research, that no researcher

does research just like another (Ibid:213).

In the present study, the *episodes* under investigation are bygone historical events. Replication is out of question. This, however, increases the *internal reliability* because the facts are unique and different researchers coming to the same episode would come to the same pool of informants and obtain more or less the same information. This meanwhile poses difficulties on the *external reliability* because the same episode would not repeat to allow for comparison.

An additional internal reliability problem arose from the fact that the interviews were not tape-recorded. In the present research, all interviews were recorded by hand. It may be argued that what is quoted in the report has been polluted by the researcher's mistakes, errors, misunderstandings and misinterpretations. This reduction of reliability, due to lack of machine-recording, is rewarded by the increase in validity that informants are more willing to express their viewpoints freely and feel less threatened when they come to matters of confidentiality. Machine recorders are suspected of reducing this validity to an intolerable level (See also Pelto and Pelto, 1978:118). The design was actually to trade reliability for validity. To compensate, in cases where immediate transcription is not possible, the manual records were transferred into details immediately after the interviews by the researcher's self-tape-recording. This was an attempt to preserve the attitudes, the tones, the

language and so on of the informant. Full texts were then transcribed at some later time, because the transcription usually took eight to ten times longer than the verbal recording. This final transcription was sometimes done by a research assistant.

Reliability was also improved by *triangulation*. In the actual interviews, very often more than one informant referred to the same event, although with different undertones and varying minor details. When more and more informants referred to the same event, what actually happened became increasingly clear. Informants may lie; they rarely tell the same lie. That the informants were far apart added to this advantage. If this could be called the multiple-informant approach, it actually played a dual role. First, it provided triangulation for a given fact. The degree of success of this triangulation was often reflected by the reducing marginal return to additional interviews. Secondly, given that the facts were confirmed, the multiple-informant approach provided a very good means to probe the reactions of the different actors to the same fact - a way to separate "values" from "facts".

It has to be mentioned that the research is to a certain extent handicapped by the lack of access to more confidential papers. Official archives are open to research (to research only) only if they are older than thirty years. If the official minutes could be traced, more about the dynamics of policy-making could be understood.

5.6. Theorizing

Theorizing is the cognitive process of discovering or manipulating abstract categories and the relationship among those categories. It is the fundamental tool of any researcher and is used to develop or confirm explanations for how and why things happen as they do (Goetz and LeCompte, 1984:167).

Theorizing is perhaps the most difficult part of the whole research process. Although it may be argued that theorizing always presents a real test of the intellectual ability of the researcher, it is particularly so in ethnographic research because at the point of theorizing, the researcher has to switch his thinking from an "insider" to an "outsider", from understanding to analysing, from passively receiving information to creatively interpreting the information (Goetz and LeCompte, 1984:198). Theorizing is to a considerable degree an art, because the switching does not occur at a definite stage, but occurs continuously throughout the entire research process.

Agar attempts to reduce the complex process of *theorizing* to a notion of *breakdowns*.

A breakdown is a lack of fit between one's encounter with a tradition and the schema-guided expectation by which one organizes experience. One then modifies the schemas or constructs new ones and tries again. Based on this new try, further modifications are made, the process continuing iteratively until the breakdown is solved (1986:21).

A theory is thus born.

Goetz and LeCompte attempt to resolve *theorizing* into

standard techniques as "perceiving; comparing, contrasting, aggregating and ordering; establishing linkages and relationships; and speculating" (1984:167). Among all these techniques, the greatest challenge for researchers would be to distinguish between what is *perceived* and what is *speculated*.

In the actual research, data perceived prompted the researcher immediately to analyse and generate some hypotheses. Unfortunately, speculation is the basis of hypothesizing (Goetz and LeCompte, 1984:173). These hypotheses therefore represented a mix of what was perceived and what was speculated. In fact, successive hypotheses were formulated and subsequently tested throughout the research. Speculation hence became an integral part of the research design and occurred recurringly throughout the research.

In an ideal case, the researcher is very conscious of the distinction between the perceived and the speculated and in further research steps modifies the speculated while preserving the perceived. However, if not careful, the researcher might easily pollute his perceptions with his speculations. He might unintentionally increase the weight of speculation in his further hypotheses generation and take for granted that the speculated are *facts*. This will make the researcher more and more insensitive to the perceived data. He would then unconsciously move away from the ethnographic approach which requires a maximal influence of the perceived data on the speculation.

This might be the source of what Spradley called "lip

service" (1979:23) to ethnographic research. The research then easily degenerates into a cheap piece of journalism.

It is almost an art to avoid the degeneration. Different authors have listed various techniques in the process of theorizing (Goetz and LeCompte, 1984; Wilson, 1977; Owens, 1982). However, the lists provide more a summary of what people have done rather than a guideline for those who are doing. In other words, the lists of techniques do present a spectrum of cognitive activities during theorizing, but they do not, and cannot, tell the researcher when to use which. It is the choice of techniques which demands intellectual effort. Once the choice is made, techniques such as *negative-case selection*, *constant comparison*, *typological analysis* and so on (Goetz and LeCompte, 1984:175-183) themselves normally does not present much technical sophistication.

The strategy used in the present research to maintain sensitivity to perceived data comprised three components.

First, the researcher forced himself to remain in stupid naivete for the greater part of each and every interview, as if the research had just been started afresh. Each new interview was carried out with the same open-ended topics. This sensitizes the researcher to new information in the data, or signals for new hypothesis in the data. This alone, however, would prohibit the use of gathered data and probing for depth in understanding. Hence the second component.

Second, the researcher did not absolutely withhold the knowledge gathered from previous data-collection. Two tactics were used to make use of previous data.

In the first case, at some stage of the interview particularly when the informant was giving very official and superficial information, the researcher tries to give the informant some signal that the researcher had some knowledge of the subject matter. This often caused the informant to feel relaxed that "I am not the first one to speak up"; feel more interested because "I am facing a sensible interviewer", or feel obliged to provide more information so that "I don't look as if I know less than the other informants."

In the second case, particularly at the end of interviews, when the informant had more or less provided all he/she would, some "hypothesis-testing" was done by asking "higher-level" questions such as "Some say that the entire purpose of the CRE was to co-ordinate the fragmented policy-making machinery. What is your comment?" Such questions were asked only at the end of the interview, or at second interviews, to guarantee that the questions did not steer the direction in which the informants elaborate.

Third, the expert consultation played an essential part in guarding against over-use of speculation. The expert consultants did point out a large number of inconsistencies in the drafts of Chapters 4 and 5 and also raised new questions to be answered. This put the researcher's speculation under the microscope of other perspectives.

The task in theorizing is actually to formulate the *optimal* theoretical explanation. In other words, after all those *comparing, contrasting, aggregating and ordering* (Goetz and LeCompte, 1984:169-72), the researcher has to use his/her creative mind to discover or generate a theory that can best explain *most* of the data collected. The researcher should not expect a theory that can fully explain all the data, but he/she can look for a theory that explains the largest number of cases, that encounters the least number of negative cases (Goetz and LeCompte, 1984:175-76). In short, ethnographic research can hardly expect *perfect* or *ultimate* theory (although in the absolute sense, perfect or ultimate theory exists nowhere)(Kirk and Miller, 1986:11; Glaser and Strauss, 1967:32). In some sense, the theorizing process is ever incomplete. The termination of the research process is mainly a matter of managerial necessity (Kirk and Miller, 1986:67).

5.7. Reporting

As is with most ethnographic research, the research was rounded up in "thick descriptions" (Owens, 1982:7-9) which were supposed to carry not only the facts or the events in the cases, but also the texture, the quality and the context (Ibid.).

The reports of the two episodes will be seen in Chapters 4 and 5 of this thesis. The discussion that follows is to highlight some of the methodological and ethical issues that arise when reporting.

The report of each episode is largely divided into two parts: the "facts" and the analyses. This is a deliberate device to separate the "perceived" from the "speculated". Although it may be argued that the "facts" were constantly affected by the changing perspective of the researcher, it would still be important to leave the analyses open. Care is therefore taken in the reporting of the "facts" to avoid imposing cause-effect relations to the data, and to leave ample room for "speculation" from various perspectives.

This is very much so in the CRE episode (Chapter 4). In the OECD episode, much was known to the public before the research, but what was perceived by the public did not totally match the findings of the research. There are hence two versions of the "perceived" scene: by the public and by the research. These two have been deliberately separated in reporting.

The second methodological issue in reporting is *confidentiality*. Most of the documents are confidential and all the interviews are confidential. At the early stage of the research, it was envisaged that there could be three levels of confidentiality:

- Level 1. Release of source and content are both forbidden.
- Level 2. Release of source is forbidden, the content can be quoted but not in its exact wording.
- Level 3. Release of source is forbidden, but the content can be quoted in exact wording.

Very early on in the research, one retired top official (ISX01) accepted an interview

on the strict understanding that if he (the researcher) repeats anything either verbally or in writing he does not reveal the source.

This is confidentiality of Level 3 and is in fact the best one can have in this kind of interview. This formula was repeated with all the other interviews and all informants seemed to accept its happily.

The formula proved essential to the research. It would be extremely difficult to carry the tones and gestures, i.e. the "culture" in the reporting if exact wordings could not be quoted. In hindsight, it seems that confidentiality of Level 3 is almost the base line to allow a research of ethnographic nature in policy-making.

In the actual reporting, the exact wordings were used whenever possible, but the sources were coded. "Exact wording" here needs qualification. Apart from documentary sources, the records of the interviews were immediate reproduction or tape-reproduction of manual records. It was not the most desirable, but it was the best one could have under the existing constraints.

A third problem in reporting is a matter of ethics. A large amount of interview data involved personal names. Sometimes the names are essential because they indicate a special relation among people or the views of people on the policy-makers. Most of the names, unless they were essential for understanding, did not appear in the reports. Absence of the names has inevitably reduced the vividness of the

reports, but has provided more comfort as far as confidentiality is concerned.

There was in fact a possibility of pursuing a "third explanation" for the two cases, which focussed on people's personal likes and dislikes of a particular key person. This is briefly discussed in the conclusion. After some ethical considerations, this was not done.

6. Summary of Chapter Two

The research probes a policy-making process which was foreign to the researcher. This determined that the research had to be ethnographic in nature, i.e. to be based on data and to search for and develop theories to explain the data.

This has brought out a host of issues in methodology: in data-collection, in theorizing and in reporting. There were no standard prescriptions to attack these issues, but that only prompted the researcher to justify each and every step from first principles.

The methodology adopted in this research may have general application in studies of the policy-making process which usually presents itself as a "black-box". It proposes a multimodal way of acquiring knowledge of the inside of the "black-box". This relies on the "insiders" and the research methodology is to allow the "insiders" to teach the "outsider" researcher to perceive what goes on in the "black-box". As the research develops, the researcher learns

increasingly more from the "insiders" and is in a stronger position to interpret what is perceived. With due speculation, the researcher arrives at some theory, which can be further modified by further data-collection.

Such research does not necessarily entail a single theory to explain the policy-making process. The data may tolerate different explanations. Modification of the theory is continuous, and endless. This is, anyway, the way mankind develops its body of knowledge.

CHAPTER THREE

THEORY

0. Introduction

As has been made clear in Chapter 2, the aim of this research is to *search for* theory or to *discover* theory to explain the acquired data, and to generate hypotheses therefrom.

The purpose of this chapter on theory is therefore not to delineate the theoretical framework in which the research operated, but to re-present the theories encountered during the study. In fact, data and theory interacted dynamically in the course of the study. Various theories came to attention at different stages of the study in a rather random manner. Such theories have been rearranged so that they form a more logical sequence.

The basic question is: *How are policies made?*

There is never a shortage of theories or models in the study of policy-making. The task of this chapter is to survey such theories and models, to attempt to classify them, to see how these can be useful in explaining the two episodes and to identify possible alternatives.

Dye (1978; 1981; 1984) displays an array of eight

models: *institutional model, process model, group model, elite model, rational model, incremental model, game theory models and systems models*. He calls these "models of politics". Harman (1978) displays twelve "theories of policy-making and policy process": *rational or classical model, incremental approach, political interest group theories, bargaining theories, Lowi's typology, Rose's models, political systems model, Iannaccone's typology, theories of voting behaviour, organization models, garbage can model and process model*. These two lists are typical and many others are similar (e.g. Schoettle, 1968; Woll, 1974:21-52; Lynn, 1980:9-22; etc.).

Dye conceives these models as "separate ways of thinking about policy" and "each one provides a separate focus on political life" (1984:20). Although Dye emphasises the combination of models in reality, it is questionable whether the models really represent "separate" ways of thinking. For example, in the Dye models, one may regard the *systems model* as a kind of *process model* (Jenkins, 1978:16-19) and one can hardly separate *game theory model* from *rational model*, both of which work for optimal solutions. It is even more so with Harman's list. One needs only to look at the example of Herbert Simon (to whom we shall return later). Harman regards Simon's "satisficing" notion as a modification and adaptation of the *rational model* (1978:11). Other authors quote "satisficing" as a modified development of rationality (Smith & May, 1980); still others regard it as a theory of the "self-interest of the policy maker"

(Schoettler, 1968:154). More often, Simon is identified as champion in the *organizational model*.

There is no suggestion that the classification into models is arbitrary or meaningless. However, it is strongly suggested that the relations between the different theories and models are by no means straightforward. The rest of this chapter will start with a survey of the typical theories in policy-making, using *rationality* as a frame of reference. The notion of *legitimacy* will then be discussed as an alternative to notions of rationality. The last part of the chapter will focus on Allison's models to see how different writers view this multiplicity of models.

I. The Notion of Rationality

In his seminal work to explain the Cuban Missile Crisis, Allison (1971) puts forward three parallel perspectives: the *rational models*, the *organizational models* and the *political models*. These have since also been borrowed by writers in the field of educational policy-making (e.g. Peterson and Williams, 1972; Crowson, 1975; Benjamin and Kerchner, 1982; Lane, 1983; Kirst, 1977). By using Simon's notions of rationality, a classification of the various theories of policy-making yields a continuum which roughly matches Allison's three models.

I.1 Simon's Notions of Rationality

Herbert Simon discusses decision-making in the context of both management science and political science. Central to his discussions are his insights on rationality. Simon follows the classical definition of rationality:

In a broad sense, rationality denotes a style of behavior (A) that is appropriate to the achievement of given goals, (B) within the limits imposed by such conditions and constraints (1964).

He distinguishes *substantive rationality* and *procedural rationality* as the two basic forms of rationality (1985: 294). In essence, the concern of *substantive rationality* is the "substance" or output of decision-making; that of *procedural rationality* the "procedure" or the process of decision-making. In Simon's own analysis, the focus is on the behaviour of the decision-makers:

Behaviour is substantively rational when it is appropriate to the achievement of given goals within the limits imposed by given conditions and constraints.... Behavior is procedurally rational when it is the outcome of appropriate deliberation. Its procedural rationality depends on the process that generated it (1976:130-31).

Substantive rationality is also referred to as "objective" rationality because here the decision is based purely on constraints that arise from the external situation (Simon, 1985:294). On the other hand, *procedural rationality* can also be referred to as "subjective" rationality because it takes into account "the limitations of knowledge and computing power" (or *bounded rationality*) of the decision-maker (Ibid.)

According to Simon, *substantive rationality* is assumed

in the realm of economics and *procedural rationality* in cognitive psychology (Simon, 1964; 1976; 1983; 1985). His consistent effort throughout the years is to bridge the two, so as to introduce behavioural explanations into management science and political science.

The relevance of Simon's notions of rationality to this study is less the emphasis on "behavioural" explanations than the separation of "substance" from "procedures" of decision-making. This pertains to the relationship between *means* and *end* in decision-making. In the following paragraphs, there is an attempt to discuss the typical models and theories of policy-making using the "means-end" relationship as a frame of reference.

I.2. Substantive Rationality

Simon's *substantively rational model* is usually realized as the *rational model*. By *rational model* is commonly implied the classical or comprehensive rational model which is typically represented by the following five steps (adapted from Carley, 1980:11):

1. identification of problems and criteria for solution,
2. survey of alternative solutions,
3. estimation of consequences,
4. comparison of consequences,
5. selection of an optimal solution.

At one point, Simon reduces the model to John Dewey's three questions: *What is the problem? What are the*

alternatives? Which alternative is best? (Simon, 1960:3).

There are a number of assumptions in this classical rational model.

Firstly, it assumes that there are definite distinctive goals in policy-making.

Secondly, it assumes that the decision-maker is a rational man or an entity that acts as a single rational man.

Thirdly, it implicitly assumes that the decision maker has the intelligence to acquire full information and full capacity to analyse it, or at least is able to assess the probabilities.

Fourthly, it follows that given a particular situation, there is a unique optimal solution to each problem:

The foundation of... [the rational model] ...is the assumption that every actor possesses a utility function that induces a consistent ordering among all alternative choices that the actor faces, and, indeed, that he or she always chooses the alternative with the highest utility (Simon, 1985:296).

Such a policy-making process can be conveniently referred to as one of "maximization" or "optimization".

Fifthly, and most relevant to this study, such a process assumes that decisions are made in a process where the "end" determines the "means". In group policy-making, there is an identifiable consensual goal which determines the consensual procedures.

I.3. Procedural Rationality I: rationality redefined

Simon's notion of *procedural rationality* can be realized in a number of theoretical frameworks of decision-making, viz. as an extension of the rational models, as an organizational model and as a type of political model.

I.3.1 Lindblom: incrementalism

Lindblom argues that in order to be rational in the classical sense, one has also to be *comprehensive*. That is, one has to have full access to comprehensive information and full competence to analyse the alternatives, i.e. one has to submit to "comprehensive rationality". Lindblom argues that this is impossible in reality:

It assumes intellectual capacities and sources of information that men simply do not possess, and it is even more absurd as an approach to policy when the time and money that can be allocated to a policy problem is limited, as is always the case (Lindblom, 1959).

Because of this, it is not possible to list all the alternative solutions, and the solutions cannot be estimated and compared with full confidence.

Besides, a policy-maker has to face conflicting values and subtle priorities that cannot be settled by rational means (Ibid.). Under these circumstances:

The test [of "good" policy] is agreement on policy itself, which remains possible even when agreement on values is not (Ibid.).

Therefore, the actors "fall back on agreement whenever it can be found" (Ibid.). This deviates significantly from the classical rational model because the actors arrive at consensus even if they disagree on the goals.

What happens in reality is what Lindblom calls *successive limited comparison* or *limited rationality*, where only a limited number of solutions which are not far apart from the *status quo* can be safely selected. As a matter of consequence, means are often selected without reference to a well-defined end, and decision-makers tend to evade definite value goals. Therefore, policies tend to change only in small steps, hence the term *incrementalism*.

An attempt to adopt the incrementalism notion to explain educational policy-making can be found in Hochschild's comprehensive analysis of school segregation in the United States (1984).

1.3.2 Simon: satisficing

Lindblom's "incrementalism" echoes, at least in part, Simon's earlier notion of "satisficing" which originated from organizational decision-making in business firms. As Simon himself admitted:

My point is that first-hand contact with business operations leads to observation of the procedures that are used in reaching decisions, and not simply the final outcomes (1976:137).

In Simon's view, the decision-maker's rationality is bounded not only by the lack of full information and capability, but also by his/her particular values. In the case of policies made by an organization, the decision-makers who disagree in values tend to accept the solution which receives early consensus. The decision-making process is therefore a "satisficing" process (Simon, 1957b) in which

the decision-makers discover and select satisfactory alternatives rather than an "optimal" solution.

1.3.3 Extended notion of rationality

Lindblom's "limited rationality" and Simon's "bounded rationality" can be regarded as extensions of the traditional definition of rationality in decision-making.

Etzioni and Dror, independently, regard Lindblom's and Simon's notions as just variations of the classical rational model.

Etzioni puts forward a model of "mixed scanning" (1967) which proposes that comprehensive rationality and incrementalism could be applied respectively to broad political orientations and detailed policy decisions, so as to safeguard from conservatism in the former and to be realistic in the latter.

Dror (1968; 1983) argues that Lindblom's "incrementalism" is a variation of economic rationality where the "costliness" of getting comprehensive information is weighed against the benefits of doing so. He also argues that Simon's "satisficing" is but a change of goal in rationality, from "optimal quality" to "satisfying quality". Lindblom's and Simon's models are therefore presented as "realistic second-bests to the unachievable ideal, pure rationality".

While Etzioni and Dror may be right in stating that both Lindblom's and Simon's notions are still in the realm of rationality, they fail to recognise the basic difference

between *substantive* and *procedural* rationality.

The conclusion here is that both notions pertain to rationality, because both arrive at some consensus in the process of making policies. The difference is related to the goal. In *substantive rationality*, there is a consensus in the goal; in *procedural rationality* there is a conflict in goals.

I.4. Procedural Rationality II: Organizational Models

From the above discussion, it seems legitimate to equate *procedurally rational models* with *organizational models* and to retain the name *rational models* for models adopting *substantive rationality*.

Procedural rationality can be interpreted as rules of decision-making that takes place in an *organization* of human beings with different individual values, goals and interests (Simons, 1976:138). "Incrementalism" and "satisficing" are consensual rules of the game to arrive at a policy among actors with conflicting values, goals and interests.

In fact, Simon opines that "the principle of bounded rationality lies at the very core of organization theory" (Simon, 1957a:200). In the organizational setting, decision-making aims at consensus in procedures rather than at an optimal solution. In a way, Simon observes that in an organizational environment procedural consensus is the only possible solution to problems. This is expressed in a number of ways in different contexts.

1.4.1 Firms as organizations

Cyert and March (1963) studied behaviour in business firms and found that that organizational structures and conventional practices heavily influence the development of goals, the formulation of expectations and the processes of choice in business firms (Jenkins, 1978:34). Here the procedures of decision-making have developed into "conventions" in a stable organization.

1.4.2 Government as organization

Allison further developed this into the *organizational process model* where (a) most of the behaviour is determined by previously established procedures; (b) decision procedures have become routines that decision-makers in the government are given only limited choices and (c) decisions have to be made within narrow constraints (Allison, 1971: 79). This is Allison's second model in his analyses.

Allison's model has also developed into various versions of *bureaucratic models* where organizational decisions are bound by bureaucratic routines (examples in education are Kirst, 1977:318; Peterson and Williams, 1972:158).

Allison's model has apparently reduced all government decisions to Simon's *programmed decisions* which are purely subjects of routines (Simon, 1960).

On the other hand, the "garbage-can" model (Cohen et al., 1972), which we shall discuss below, seems to treat all decisions as "non-programmed decisions".

1.4.3 Organization as garbage-can

The model refers to "organized anarchies" where participants, with definite goals in mind, search for opportunities to realize these goals by attaching themselves "strategically" to some central policy issue which is most likely to be solved. If this issue then becomes too difficult to solve, the problems will flow to other more attractive issues until they get solved.

Although Simon endorses the model (1983:81-82), it is debatable whether in the "garbage-can" there is any consensus in the process of producing policies. Hence, it is not all clearcut whether the "garbage-can" model is an example of *procedural rationality* or one of *political model* which we discuss below.

1.5 Procedural Rationality III: Political Consensus

In the garbage-can model the consensus in procedures is less apparent than the case in a commercial firm or in a government bureaucracy. The "garbage-can model" therefore comes near to a *political model* where each individual is very rational, but the decisions are made by political, and not rational, procedures. There are two types of such political procedures: by consensus and by conflicts. We shall discuss the "consensus" case here and leave the "conflicts" case to the next section.

In general, a decision-making process can be regarded

to be "political" if there are conflicting goals among the decision-makers. The goal-conflicting actors may make policies by consensus, i.e. by procedures that are agreed by all the decision-makers.

The argument here is that the consensus political models lends themselves to *procedural rationality*. In these models, the actors each has his/her own axe to grind, but they come to consensus according to certain rules of game in policy-making. The consensus here is one in the *process* and not in the goals.

In a broad sense, such political consensus is the basic notion in all sorts of *democracy*.

In theory, *democracy* means "rule by the people" (Held, 1987:2). In practice, democracy means involvement of all parties in decision-making. There are different conceptions of democracy, embedded in the *political culture* or *civic culture* (Almond and Verba, 1963) and various models as a matter of ideology (Held gives eight models, 1987). However, in principle democracy is a means so that people of different interests and values can live together. Hence, democracy in a stable state is also a consensus among the citizens. In this sense, democracy provides the means (e.g. voting, parliaments) of *procedural rationality*, that is, providing consensual procedures of policy-making for conflicting goals.

The purpose of the above is to show that Simon's notion

of *procedural rationality* has broad interpretations in the frameworks of decision rationality, organizational models and political consensus. These frameworks share the same features that there are goal conflicts which are to be solved by consensus in procedures. Simon's two notions of rationality, however, do not seem to include the case when the goal-conflicting actors do not come to consensus in procedures. This is our *partisan models*.

1.6 Partisan Rationality: policy-making by interactions

However, there are other cases where the goal-conflicting actors in policy-making do not work according to consensual procedures. The conflicts are solved by interactions among the actors. Such interactions involve either peaceful negotiations, persuasions, or rather antagonistic dominations or coercions. Policies are produced as a result of such interactions and not as the result of any consensual procedures. A few examples are briefly introduced to demonstrate this case.

1.6.1 Allison: decisions as resultants

The results of political interactions are referred to as political "resultants" in Allison's third model of decision-making: the "governmental politics paradigm",

resultants in the sense that what happens is not chosen as a solution to a problem but rather results from compromise, conflict, and confusion of officials with diverse interests and unequal influence (1971:162).

The word "resultant", borrowed from mechanics, connotes (a)

that the forces pull in different directions (i.e. conflicting goals), (b) that there is no external influence over the interaction among forces (i.e. pluralism), (c) equilibrium is achieved by force and not by agreement (i.e. political interactions), and (d) none of the actors achieves his/her goals to full satisfaction.

Peterson and Williams (1972:161-167) apply the model to analyse U.S. school boards as an arena for political bargaining and identify three categories of bargaining: democratic, pluralistic and ideological.

1.6.2 Truman: interest group interactions

The pluralistic bargaining model in Peterson and Williams' theory is similar to Truman's theory of political interest groups. Here the interest groups play a significant role in policy-decisions. Truman even asserts that given adequate information about the "variables" of the interest groups, some prediction can be made about the policy decisions (1956). Levin in fact applied the theory to educational policy-making (1974).

There are numerous other examples which study the influence of political interest groups on educational policy-making (e.g. Kogan on U.K., 1975; Urwick on Nigeria, 1983; Peterson and Rabe on U.S., 1983).

1.6.3 Archer: political exchange

The decision-making process can be viewed as a process of political bargaining or exchange of benefits. Margaret Archer presents the best example in education policies.

Archer looks at decision-making processes which she interprets as "negotiations" among the educational professionals, the external agencies and those in power. She identifies (1979; 1981) three types of negotiations in educational policy making: *internal initiation*, where the educational professionals trade expert services for financial and political resources (money and autonomy); *external transaction*, where the external agencies buy expert service with financial resources; and *political manipulation*, where those in political power exchange power resources for expert services (1981:34-36).

1.6.4 Lindblom: Persuasion

Persuasion is a broad term that Lindblom uses to indicate all the means by which one interest party exerts control over others in a polyarchy. The means include propaganda, indoctrination, advertising, campaigning, "scientific" analysis or, in general, talking (Lindblom, 1977:52-54; 1980:30). Lindblom regards persuasion as a way of exchange between the leader and the citizen, between leaders at all levels and between politicians and their opponents (1977: 137-9). It is a game by which political conflicts get solved and is a fundamental feature of policy-making in a polyarchy (1980:30).

1.6.5 Lowi: manipulation of process

Lowi (1970; 1972) assumes a power structure, by way of resource distribution, in the society. In this power

framework, he classifies *policies* into categories. Each of these categories is found to be associated with some particular type of policy-making process with some particular degrees of citizen participation. He further asserts that the different types of process are deliberately designed by the government to control the making of public policies ("legitimate coercion").

1.6.6 Bachrach & Baratz: Control of Agenda

Bachrach and Baratz (1962; 1963) look into the stage of agenda-setting in policy-making. They discover that the struggle and coercion of powers do not exist only during the stage of making choices (selection of policy options), but also in the stage of agenda-setting, i.e. as early as when the policy problem, or the issue is being identified.

In so doing, the dominant power exercises its bias influence not only during the process of decision, but also by preventing the issue from entering the process. This is a way to confine decision-making to safe issues (Ham & Hill, 1984:63) and thereby suppress the conflicts. Bachrach and Baratz call these *non-decisions*, to distinguish them from negative decisions (decisions that suppress) and decisions of non-action.

1.6.7 Lukes: Latent Influence

Lukes assumes that there is a dominant power, but he does not look only at the overt conflicts over the decision-making table, or the covert conflicts over agenda-setting. Instead, he looks at the latent conflicts that exist in the

environment in which decisions are made. Lukes states that the dominant power may exercise influence to shape people's preferences. There the dominant power can manage to maintain a certain prevailing value system which is to the advantage of some rather than the other (Ham & Hill, 1984: 68). Lukes' idea comes near to the notion of legitimacy which will be discussed in the next section.

1.6.8 Marxist Theories

Marxist theories in general view policy-making as a matter of class struggle, i.e. coercion of social groups which are classes. Again, most Marxists recognise that there is a dominant power in society, which is the bourgeoisie in a capitalist society. Marxist theories differ from other power models in that they regard public policies as somehow pre-determined by the class relations of the society.

Along this line, education policies are made either as an instrument to reproduce social relations (e.g. Bowles and Gintis, 1976), to pursue class struggle in the arena of education (e.g. Apple, 1982), or that education policies *per se* have become arenas of class struggle (e.g. Carnoy and Levine, 1985).

1.7 An Interim Summary

We have now three alternatives to explain the policy-making process: (1) the classical rational model or Simon's

substantive rationality where there is consensus in the goal as well as the procedures; (2) the *organizational model*, the *bureaucratic model* and the model of *political consensus*, all as variations of Simon's "procedural rationality" where there is conflict in the goals but there is consensus in the procedures; and (3) the *partisan political model* where there is conflict in the goals as well as in the procedures.

In a way, the actors in the *partisan political model* are rational, rational in the sense that they are conscious of their goals, each has his/her axe to grind, but they do not come to consensus in the procedures of making policies. They are therefore not "rational" in Simon's sense. Some coherence in terms can be achieved if we label this last category of partisan political models as cases of *partisan rationality*. There is then the following summary table.

Table 3.1 Classification of Rational Models

	Goals	Procedures
Substantive Rationality	consensus	consensus
Procedural Rationality	conflict	consensus
Partisan Rationality	conflict	conflict

The coherence in the terms is also intrinsic in the fact that in all the three models, there is the concern of producing some policy.

In *substantive rationality* and *partisan rationality*, there is the concern of producing a policy that serves the goal. In *procedural rationality*, there is the concern of an

agreeable procedure that will yield satisfactory policies. In more abstract terms, there is a concern for the "end", or the "means" towards an "end". That is, they all lie in the "means-end" paradigm in a broad sense. This justifies the use of the term "rationality".

In the analysis of the Episodes in Chapters 4 and 5, a rational explanation is adopted where "rational" takes its broadest sense, i.e., a concern for producing some policy.

The table above immediately hints at a fourth category of rationality: consensus in goals and conflict in process. The discussion of *legitimacy* to a certain degree answers this question.

In a vague sense, *legitimacy* considerations may lead to a concern of the process of policy-making, but not necessarily the output of that process. In Chapters 4 and 5, this notion of *legitimacy* will be used as an alternative to the rational explanations.

II. Legitimacy in Policy-Making

This section starts by defining the meaning of legitimacy and by introducing the spectrum of notions of legitimacy in the context of this study. Having done that, the discussion focusses on the use of technical expertise and consultation as means of attaining legitimacy.

II.1 The Meaning of Legitimacy

The term legitimacy has been used fairly broadly in the literature of policy studies. As different authors use the term in different contexts, it is necessary to survey the various meanings of the term and to delimit its meaning to what is appropriate to this study.

II.1.1 General Definition

The Oxford Dictionary definitions of *legitimacy* are:

(a) of a government or the title of a sovereign: the condition of being in accordance with law or principle... (b) conformity to a rule or principle; lawfulness. In logic, conformity to sound reasoning.

This dictionary definition presents more the legal and rational senses of the term. Schaar (1969, in Connolly ed. 1984:108) calls this the "old" definition and distinguishes it from the "current professional definitions" which are put forward by Lipset and other writers:

Legitimacy involves the capacity of the system to engender and maintain the belief that the existing political institutions are the most appropriate ones for the society (Lipset, 1960:77).

In fact, the Webster International Dictionary's has already extended the meaning of the word to customs and beliefs:

(a) the possession of title or status as a result of acquisition by means that are or are held to be according to law and custom. (b) a conformity to *recognized* principles or *accepted* rules or standards (emphases added).

In the tradition of Weber, legitimacy has been defined as "the degree to which institutions are valued for themselves and considered right and proper" (Bierstedt, 1964:386, paraphrasing Lipset).

Other writers define political legitimacy "as the quality of 'oughtness' that is perceived by the public to inhere in a political regime. That government is legitimate which is viewed as morally proper for a society" (Merelman, 1966:548). Legitimacy is therefore a matter of "credibility and acceptability on the part of the modern State in its relationship to its society and its citizens" (Weiler, 1985:185).

Dahl, a recognised pluralist (Manley, 1983:368), adopts an "axiomatic" approach by assuming "uneven political influences" and "conflicting aims" in the modern political system. It is in this context that the "acquisition of legitimacy" becomes a basic task of the political leader. In the most recent edition of his famous book *Modern Political Analysis* he writes:

Leaders in a political system try to ensure that whenever governmental means are used to deal with conflict, the decisions arrived at are widely accepted not solely from fear of violence, punishment, or

coercion but also from a belief that it is morally right and proper to do so (Dahl, 1984:53).

Schaar identifies that "the old definitions all revolve around the element of law or right" and is "external to and independent of the mere assertion or opinion of the claimant", whereas "the new definitions all dissolve legitimacy into beliefs and opinions" (1969, in Connolly, 1984:108).

In sum, *legitimacy* in politics is a sort of second-order objectivity people accept to justify the authority of the government. In this sense, a government is regarded as legitimate not necessarily because it *produces* anything "good", but more because the people *believe* that it is *doing* things in the "right" way.

It is relevant to look briefly at a few notions of legitimacy put forward by masters in the field.

II.1.2 Weber's notion of legitimacy

Max Weber uses the term *legitimacy* in the context of the State:

A state is a human community that (successfully) claims the *monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force* within a given territory (1918, tr. 1948:78, original emphasis).

In this sense,

The state is a relation of men dominating men, a relation supported by means of legitimate (i.e. considered to be legitimate) violence (Ibid.).

It is in this context that Weber put forward his three well quoted *basic legitimations* of domination (Ibid.:78-79): *tradition, charisma and legality*. Some authors call this

the three basic types of authority (e.g. Ham and Hill, 1984: 47); others call these the three grounds on which the political leader might claim legitimacy (e.g. Dahl, 1984:64-65).

In Weber's views, the weakness of traditional authority lies in its static nature and the weakness of the charismatic authority lies in its instability. It is the rational-legal authority which is superior to either of the other two (Ham & Hill, 1984:47). Weber's rational-legal legitimacy rests upon

a belief in the legality of the patterns of normative rules, and the right of those elevated to authority under such rules to issue commands (tr. 1947:328).

Therefore, Weber implies that rational-legality, or bureaucracy, provides the State with the legitimacy to shake itself free of class control (Ham and Hill, 1984:48-49). This is perhaps the basic distinction between Weber and the Marxist theories on legitimacy.

II.1.3 Habermas' legitimation crisis

Habermas' *Legitimation Crisis* (1973, tr. 1975) is widely recognized as the Marxist classic on the topic. Habermas' notion of legitimation is formulated in the context of "late-capitalism" where the basic "contradiction" remains the "private appropriation of public wealth". "The problem, in short, is how to distribute socially produced wealth inequitably and yet legitimately" (McCarthy, 1978 in Connolly ed. 1984:156).

Habermas identifies four crisis tendencies: economic

crisis, rationality crisis, legitimation crisis and motivation crisis. He classified the first two as *systems crises* and the other two *identity crises*, belonging to the infrastructure and superstructure respectively. The four crises form a hierarchy with a tendency of moving towards *legitimation crisis*. Thus, there is a transformation of crisis from the economic system through the political system into the social-cultural system. This is schematically presented in the following diagram (Habermas, tr. 1975:45):

Table 3.2 Habermas' Crises

Point of Origin	System Crisis	Identity Crisis
Economic System	Economic Crisis	-
Political System	Rationality Crisis	Legitimation Crisis
Socio-cultural System	-	Motivation Crisis

Habermas' *legitimation crisis* is based on the assumption that in late-capitalism, the State intervention has transferred from market mechanisms to administrative manipulations. He defines the *legitimation crisis* in terms of "mass loyalty":

The legitimizing system does not succeed in maintaining the requisite level of mass loyalty while the steering imperatives taken over from the economic system are carried through (tr. 1975:46).

Although Habermas is undoubtedly working within the

Marxist framework, he deviates from the traditional Marxists (which he calls the *orthodox position* (Ibid.:51)) in what he calls a "reconstruction of historical materialism" (cited in McCarthy, 1978 in Connolly ed. 1984:156) where he moves from an emphasis of the economic system to an emphasis on superstructural considerations.

The basic point where Habermas differs from Weber is that "the political decisions that reflect the existing organizational principle of society *ipso facto* do not admit of rational consensus" (McCarthy, 1978 in Connolly ed., 1984:156). Therefore, while Weber looks at rational-legal legitimacy as a progressive, neutral element in the modern state, Habermas talks about a *rationality crisis*. In Habermas' views, Weber's rational-legality fails to support the political system which consists of discrepancies between public poverty and private wealth. There is therefore a *legitimation deficit* (Habermas, tr. 1975:47) and hence a legitimation crisis.

II.1.4 Legitimacy: Offe

Although Offe takes a stand which is very similar to Habermas, he talks about *contradiction* instead of *crisis*. In Offe's argument, contradictions are "where the necessary becomes impossible and the impossible becomes necessary" (Ibid.:132). The basic contradiction of *advanced capitalist society* is one between *efficiency* and *legitimacy* (Ibid.: 130).

Offe distinguishes two kinds of legitimacy problems:

sociological or socio-psychological and philosophical. In the former, "legitimacy means the prevalence of attitudes of trust in the given political system". In the latter, "the legitimacy of a regime or government depends upon the justifiability of its institutional arrangements and political outcomes" (Ibid.:268). According to Offe, society progresses in three stages.

If the State is *efficient*, that is, the society "works" - successfully "providing, restoring and maintaining commodity relationships for all citizens and for the totality of their needs" (Offe, 1984:268;138) - then there should be no problem of *legitimacy*.

Unfortunately, "this happy condition of normality can hardly be assumed to be the normal case" (Ibid.:145). Then comes the second stage. If the system fails to function, then the attitudes of trust and satisfaction are disturbed. "This leads to the development of a sense that society does not work according to its own established standards" (Ibid.: 268). Here arises the sociological problem of *legitimacy*.

The problem may further develop and even more basic questions may be raised. Here comes the third level legitimacy problem which concerns "the validity of the normative foundations" of the political arrangements (Ibid.:268-69). It is Offe's view that late-capitalism has entered into this third stage of *philosophical legitimacy* problems.

Although Offe implicitly goes alongside Habermas, his definition of a legitimacy problem allows a broader inter-

pretation. One can apply Offe's notion to any situation where the State is not functioning efficiently, without necessarily confining it to the framework of late-capitalism.

II.1.5. An Interim Summary

It sounds sensible to pause here to see the position of this study in this sea of theories of legitimacy.

From Weber to Offe to Habermas, the term *legitimacy* is used in the context of a State theory. Weber talks about a normative model of rational-legal legitimacy as salvation to the modern state; Offe refers to *legitimation problems* arising from the State's inefficiency due to its basic contradictions; while Habermas' *legitimation crisis* is based on deep-rooted economic and political crises of the late-capitalist State.

The theories, different as they are, concurrently identify legitimacy as an indispensable element for the State to maintain its authority. There seems to be a consensus that *legitimacy* is in the realm of value and belief which are not always visible on the surface of the formal political and economic systems. This is the notion of *legitimacy* adopted in this study.

However, in this study, the notion of legitimacy is used in a more general sense, that not only the State needs to secure legitimacy to maintain its authority, but also the various political actors need to secure legitimacy to maintain their own participation and influence in policy-

making. The notion of legitimacy used in this study is not restricted to the maintenance of the State. However, the use of the term in this study is confined to the realm of policy-making, to see the role of legitimacy in the process. There is no intention of further explaining the source of legitimacy in a framework of political economy.

II.2 Senses of Legitimacy in Policy-making

There can be four alternative uses of the term *legitimacy* in relation to public policy-making. First, the substance of policies *per se* may aim at acquiring legitimacy for the State. For example, there could be a policy to indoctrinate citizens to be loyal to the State. Secondly, a policy which is believed to be "good" can help to gain legitimacy for the State. For example, improvement of social welfare helps the State to gain popular support. Thirdly, a "good" policy-making process, regardless of the policy decisions, may help to legitimate the State. If policies are decided with broad citizen participation, the citizens tend to think the government is a good government and tend to neglect the substance of the policies *per se*. Fourthly, a "good" policy-making process may help to legitimate the policy decision. People may feel satisfied with a policy so far as it is decided by rational arguments, even if they do not like the policy. The last two are closely related but are different. In the first three senses the State is to be legitimated; in the last sense, the policy is to be

legitimated. These will be elaborated, using cases in education policies as examples.

II.2.1. Education "for" legitimacy

Much has been said about using education as a means for the State to acquire legitimacy. Habermas takes educational planning, especially curriculum planning, as a typical example where cultural affairs which were taken for granted now fall into the administrative planning area (Habermas, tr. 1975:71). This is an attempt to compensate for legitimation deficits through conscious manipulation.

Offe devotes much attention to the study of education. He regards education as, on the one hand, a means to increase efficiency of the society - by putting individuals in a more marketable position (Offe, 1984:137) - and, on the other hand, as affecting the moral consciousness of people which may otherwise undermine the legitimacy of the existing political order (Ibid.:144).

Some theories of political education regard education, *inter alia*, as an instrument for political socialization. Education transmits or develops political culture. If the former - the so called "conservation" (Portor, ed. 1983) or "transmission" approach as contrasting the "development" or "emancipation" approach - is the case, then education (in the form of political education) reinforces the legitimacy for the State to maintain the *status quo*.

Weiler (e.g. 1983a; 1984a; 1985) takes the notion further to discuss the legitimation function of education

and knowledge.

II.2.2 Education "as" Legitimacy

In many developing countries, the expansion of education serves as a major means of legitimacy acquisition. When alleviation of poverty is a difficult promise and other political promises are equally precarious, expansion of education becomes the cheapest and most comfortable way of making people feel satisfied. This led to Carnoy's remark (Speech, 1985) that in many less developed countries, almost every *coup d'état* is followed by an expansion or a reform of education (Carnoy, speech 1985).

A similar notion of education as legitimacy lies in the *reproduction* function of education (e.g. Apple ed. 1982 and Carnoy 1984; Carnoy and Levin, 1985). Education as a social policy reproduces and hence legitimates the stratification in society. The well discussed *screening hypothesis* serves as an example of this *legitimacy* function. If education provides less an increase of productivity than a "credential" (Collins, 1979) to justify the student's position in the social strata, then education becomes an instrument to maintain the *status quo*. In other words, education *legitimizes* the existing social structure. Bowles' and Gintis' *Schooling in Capitalist America* (1976), which has now become a classic in the field, falls also in this category. As Blaug summarizes:

Screening by educational qualifications is economically efficient not because 'good' students are always 'good' workers but because educational credentialism avoids

the inherent conflict of interests between workers and employers (Blaug, 1983:21).

II.2.3 Process to Legitimate the State

Hans Weiler applies the Marxist notion of legitimacy to explain the educational policy-making process. In his comparison of education policies in U.S. and FRG, Weiler writes:

Education has a key role in allocating statuses and in socializing different groups in society into accepting and sustaining existing structures of wealth, status, and power (1983b:261).

He identifies three strategies used by the State as a means of compensatory legitimation, i.e. to compensate for legitimacy deficit (See II.1.3). These are *legalization*, *expertise* and *participation*. In particular, *expertise* refers to the utilization of scientific expertise in the policy-making process, especially through such devices as experimentation and planning (Weiler, 1983b:261). Participation refers to "the development and stipulation of client participation in the policy process" (Ibid.).

The use of *expertise* and *participation* are particularly fashionable in controversial "issues" which "are embedded in a context of values, choices and conflicts" (1984b:470). On these occasions, planning in technical terms "presents a temptation to remain within a carefully constructed shell that is made up of data, targets and projections" and "participatory planning" has become popular to solve the problem of meeting different societal needs (Ibid.:471). In the end,

The notion of 'legitimation by procedure' thus opens up the possibility of authorizing the continued exercise of political authority without examining its normative 'worthiness' - so long as it proves to adhere to procedures that can claim to be 'rational', intelligible and transparent (Ibid.:476).

Weiler has discerned the forms in which the state acquires its legitimacy. The theme in Weiler's notion is that the "procedures" legitimate the status quo, "for avoiding substantive changes in the objective of those who exercise power over a society". That is, the process legitimates the state.

One criticism of Weiler's arguments could be that most of the time his explanations are "political" and does not particularly refer to "political economy" as Weiler has claimed. Particularly when he is discussing the policy-making process, Weiler is *de facto* presenting a legitimation argument which may be totally detached from Habermas' notion. In more precise terms, the fact that the state is employing *expertise* and *participation* to legitimate its policy-making processes does not logically require the premise that the state is in a "legitimation crisis" in the Habermas category. It may be argued that *legitimation* has become a necessary routine for a modern State, independent of whether it is in late-capitalism or whether it is in Harbemas' "legitimation crisis".

Nevertheless, Sections II.2.3-4 below discuss two of Weiler's forms of legitimation in educational policy-making, viz. *expertise* and *participation*.

II.2.4 Process to Legitimate Policy

This can be understood in three levels: (a) legitimation as a legal or an institutional procedure, (b) legitimation as governmental manipulation and (c) legitimacy as a matter of political culture.

Legitimation as an institutional procedure. Dye (1984: 318) uses the term "policy legitimation" to indicate a special stage in policy-making. He refers to the stage when policies finally get endorsed in the formal policy-making machinery. This is still along the "old" definition of legitimacy in the realm of legality and relates little to the values and beliefs discussed above.

In a comparative study of the educational policy-making processes in U.K. and U.S., Kogan and Atkin use the term "legitimation" as one step in the process by which "educational policies become identified, expressed, legitimated, promulgated, and tested" (Kogan and Atkin, 1982:3).

Jennings (1977:39-40) in an education context, identifies "legitimization" as the fifth of six stages in policy-making. In this "legitimization" stage,

[Decisions] may be taken by a few influential people in the government or by group of policy-makers that has power to direct others formally or informally. The choice of policy is then ratified or legislated by a majority of those policy-makers empowered to do so by law.

Jennings' notion of "legitimization" is still largely a matter of legality. Policy-makers are influential because they are "empowered by law".

Legitimation as government manipulation. In another study, Kogan recognises that the many policy committees and advisory bodies, which are supposed to be public, are "far more 'in-house', far more a part of official review, than the outward forms seem to suggest" (Kogan and Packwood, 1974:23). In this sense, policy committees and advisory bodies are means for the government to legitimate its policies.

Similar notions are adopted by Gaziel who studies advisory councils in the centralised system of France and finds that one of the functions of the advisory councils is to provide the government bureaucracy with legitimacy for its policies and to shield it from criticism (1980:399-40).

Salter and Tapper use the term "legitimation" as the central theme in their thesis (1981). Their notion of legitimation covers both the *process* and the *product* of policy-making. They have noticed the change of the DES (Department of Education and Science) in U.K. from using external committees to using internal experts in policy-making, and attribute this change of *process* to a change in *legitimacy*. They argue that

if educational change is to be acceptable to the populace at large it has to go through an ideological stage. There are, analytically speaking, two aspects to this stage: (a) the way in which policy is produced and (b) the *policies* produced. Both require ideological legitimation and, in practice, the nature of this legitimation may overlap the two aspects (1981:111-112, emphases added).

Salter and Tapper have the merits of paying special attention to the *process* of policy-making as a way of

legitimation.

Salter and Tapper provide useful tools to approach the problem of legitimacy and there analysis of the DES can easily find applications elsewhere. One major point of criticism could be that Salter and Tapper have taken the DES as seemingly a wilful policy-maker. They come near to a kind of "conspiracy theory" which precludes the possible explanation that such legitimation processes are matters of a *political culture* inevitable in a given polity.

Legitimacy as a matter of political culture. Salter and Tapper, nevertheless, do hint that legitimacy hinges on public opinion. "The externally-based inquiry", Salter and Tapper state, has "rendered these policies credible and acceptable to the general public" (Ibid.:198). There is also the observation that "the DES would acquire increased public confidence from greater openness" (Ibid.:199). Here, credibility, acceptability and public confidence are all ingredients of legitimacy.

In an earlier study, Kogan also identifies that education policies move "with the climate of opinion" (1971:46-47).

In his more recent work, Kogan has extended this notion of legitimacy to values. He contrasts the liberal democratic model with the participative model in education accountability. He asserts that there remains strongly rooted in practice a tradition of liberal theory which emphasizes process and equity, and hence has a firm belief in knowledge, expertise and efficiency. Because of this,

public and elected authorities (politicians, education committees, professional officers and professionally led institutions) work with strong assurance of their legitimacy (1986:92). On the other hand, there is the participative model which stems from a set of values which start from a very different principle that

no legitimation is permanent but must be constantly reinforced by participation and consultation with those receiving services or providing them (Ibid.).

The above discussion points to the very root of the difference in sources of legitimacy underlying *expertise* and *consultation*.

11.2.5. Interim summary: senses of legitimacy

The above four senses of legitimacy may help to visualize the concept of legitimacy as it occurs in educational policy-making. It may be vaguely stated that *legitimacy* is a kind of "second-level objective" which is not directly visible from the primary or "first-level" policy objectives. In this sense, *legitimacy* is often an unstated yet significant goal in policy-making.

This reminds us of a more abstract definition of legitimacy, as captured by Berger and Luckmann in a sociological framework:

Legitimation as a process is best described as a 'second-order' objectivation of meaning. Legitimation produces new meanings that serve to integrate the meanings already attached to disparate institutional processes (1966:110).

II.3 Expertise and Legitimacy

Expertise is taken to mean the "technical", "objective" and "scientific" methods and techniques used in policy-making. Finer definitions may not be necessary for the discussions below. In the following paragraphs, *expertise* will first be identified as an indispensable element in the policy-making process. The role of *expertise* in the policy-making arena will then be discussed in three "layers": *expertise* as impartial analysis; the interaction between *expertise* and politics and *expertise* as a means for *legitimacy* building.

II.3.1 *Expertise: an indispensable element*

That *expertise* is indispensable is readily evidenced by the fact that

Public officials, journalists, interest-group leaders and interested citizens often join in informed discussion... [S]pecialized professional fact-finding, research, and policy analyses flourish as routine inputs into policy making. A policy maker will ordinarily feel naked without help from both informed discussion and specialized professional studies (Lindblom, 1980:13).

Expertise involves means and techniques which bring "information, thought, and analysis into the policy-making process". Lindblom labels these as the "intellectual components of policy making" (Lindblom, 1980:11).

Authors who believe in the "comprehensive rational model", as is to be expected, emphasize the importance of rational analysis in decision-making and policy-making.

However, even if one refutes the rational model of decision-making, expertise remains indispensable. (In this sense, expertise, information, analysis and rational approach will sometimes be used as synonyms.)

That expertise becomes indispensable can be seen in a number of aspects.

First, it can be convincingly argued that expertise plays an increasingly important role in modern policy-making (e.g. Benveniste, 1977:4). Modern technological change has created more new options for action and has caused rapid changes and complicated social relations. Hence, "technological change creates uncertainty and uncertainty brings about a need for experts" (Ibid.:30-31).

Second, there is a strong traditional belief in knowledge and efficiency. There is an "epistemological assumption" that "knowledge is capable of achieving reasonable states of certainty" (Kogan, 1986:92). That is, the classical rational model is still the popular mode. In lay language: since they (experts) know more about the subject, they should be given control over it, and they are likely to make better policies (Peters, 1984:188). Hence the experts possess the legitimacy to make policies, even if they do not necessarily make good policies.

Third, knowledge and information pertain to facts, and facts are "objective" and therefore "impartial". This impartiality provides expertise with the legitimacy to be relied on in policy-making, because expertise is then regarded as apolitical and will not bear partisan bias.

This isolation from partisan politics allows them [experts] to argue that not only are they experts in what they do, but also that their decision will not be affected by the need to placate voters (Peters, 1984: 189).

Fourth, expertise provides rules for decisions. Political disputes during policy-making has to be settled by some rules of the game (Anderson, 1979:77). These rules of the game, however, are often "competition of analysis" (Lindblom, 1980:30-31):

In effect everyone agrees not to go further than that, that is, not to fight harder than with fact and analysis, because escalation [of the dispute] beyond that point would demand too much time and energy and would incur too many risks. The result is that by rule all accept certain solutions, not because actually persuaded of their merits but simply because they have agreed that the decision goes to those who have, by conventional standard, made the best case (Ibid.).

The convention works, not because it can produce the best policy, but because it secures the credibility among the policy actors that this is the best way of settlement. In other words, analysis in this case provides legitimacy for making policy among uncompromisable actors.

11.3.2. Experts as actors

The indispensability of expertise has made experts the "rising elite" in the policy making arena (Lindblom, 1980: 30). The impartiality thus gives expertise the ground for exerting its influence, or power, in policy making.

Information and knowledge become unusually important resources for gaining and maintaining influence, and various "information and knowledge elites" come to play crucial roles in decisions (Dahl, 1984:70).

However, it can also be argued that experts have become

new "elites" not because of their knowledge or information, but because of their capacity to interpret information. Interpretation, however, is value-oriented. As Carron rightly points out:

The truth is that the expert is not an asocial being. He belongs to and identifies himself with a specific social group, whose interests he serves either implicitly or explicitly. Whether he likes it or not, in his work he is constantly obliged to make assumptions and choices which are necessarily based on value judgements. The rationality of expertise is never socially neutral (1980:54).

Either consciously or subconsciously, experts have themselves become political actors in policy-making.

However, experts as political actors are different from politicians. Experts have to maintain their *legitimacy* of impartiality if they are to maintain their contribution to policy-making. If the expert drops his "mask" of impartiality and behaves like a politician (Benveniste, 1977:75-76), he would virtually undermine this *legitimacy* and become just another politician. He then has to compete with other politicians. He has to regain his *legitimacy* through election votes or other means that are not readily generated from his expertise.

Some writers advocate that the expert should realize his own political role and actively participate in the political interactions. Referring to educational planning, Williams (1979:128) states that in a "political model", "the role of the planner becomes the tactical one of finding a way between the different interests involved" (Also Williams, 1972:383; 1983a:498-99; 1983b:342). Healey et al.

raises a similar point in the context of urban planning, that for the planner "to maintain a strategic role at all, they are forced to develop capacities in the politics of influence" (1982:13). Such a view is widespread in the literature and is the central theme of many international conferences (e.g. Weiler ed., 1980).

To achieve this, Carron opines that "the planner will therefore have to assume fully the political aspect of his role instead of retreating behind his technocratic neutrality" (1982:9). The argument may even go further to suggest that

[The planner] would have a political role in his own right in which he would try either to utilize the "political space" which the other actors leave him, or to affect, with his own power of expertise, knowledge of the system, and political alliance within the system, the overall direction of the "political project" (Weiler ed., 1980:161).

II.3.3. Expertise and government bureaucracy

Expertise can well be utilized by various actors to establish their own authority. The expert may upgrade the scientific sophistication of his deliberation or create a monopoly of his information base. A politician may imperceptibly shift the decision rule to favour his own proposal. These are just two examples of how a clever actor who knows the power of expertise can manipulate the situation to favour his own legitimacy in policy-making. In this respect, the position of government bureaucracy has attracted much discussion in the literature. The following paragraph from Peters (1984) may represent most of the

viewpoints:

The first, and perhaps most important, resource of the bureaucracy is *information* and *expertise*. To the extent that government has at its disposal information, this information is concentrated in bureaucratic agencies. Going along with the information is the technical expertise to understand and interpret it. This relative monopoly of information can easily be translated into power in several ways (Ibid.:188).

In any case, policy-makers require information for formulating policies, but the major source of such information is still the government bureaucracy, who is then most of the time more knowledgeable in the specific policy area than the non-government policy participants. Therefore, the bureaucracy "can at least implicitly trade information for influence over policy" (Ibid.). For example, "information may be produced selectively to make one type of decision a virtual inevitability" (Ibid.).

Smith, using his British experience, identifies *expertise* as one of the sources of power for the government bureaucracy (1976:16-23). In one sense, Smith equates expertise with experience which the government administrators may use against the ministers:

The knowledge of public policy derived from direct experience of its operation gives the senior administrator a near monopoly of knowledge relevant to policy-formation (Ibid.:102).

This knowledge "is certainly not matched by that of his minister". Although the ministers can sanction or veto, they "find it difficult to do anything other than accept or reject the advice given in toto" (Ibid.:104).

Control of information, or control of the expertise to interpret the information, gives the government virtual

control in policy-making, yet saves it from applying overt authoritarian measures over the decision process. Under these circumstances, the public and the other actors have to accept the policy, not because of its merits, but because they lack the information and expertise to compete; that is, they lack the legitimacy to challenge the bureaucracy.

II.3.4. *Expertise and the State*

We have introduced Weiler's discussion of expertise as a means to compensate for legitimacy deficit for the State and we shall not repeat the discussion here (See II.2.3 in this Chapter).

Not only that actors or government bureaucracies make use of *expertise* to legitimate themselves, but also the State makes use of *expertise* or *experts* to maintain its legitimacy as the authority. Legitimacy is here itself an "end", not only a "means", in State activities. The power of *expertise* to legitimate the State is derived from the same source where experts acquire their legitimacy, i.e. information and impartiality.

Benveniste quotes a number of basic patterns whereby the *Prince*, the policy-maker, makes use of experts to legitimate policies.

Legitimation can have several dimensions. Sometimes it consists of providing the rationale for decisions that have already been made. Sometimes it may be a rationale for not taking any action. At times it may be used to test resistance to a contemplated action (Benveniste, 1977:61).

In sum, Benveniste's notion of legitimation is "to reassure

everyone that decisions taken for other motives appear to have been taken for rational, technical reasons" (Ibid.:55).

Benveniste's notion of legitimation is echoed by Knorr:

[The experts'] data and arguments are used selectively and often distortingly to publicly support a decision that has been taken on different grounds or that simply represents an opinion the decision-maker already holds... [Decisions] are made intelligible and are legitimized only after the resolution (1977:171-72).

However, Benveniste's and Knorr's notion pertains to only one aspect of legitimation, viz. legitimation of policies. They do not address the fact that legitimation by expertise could well be less a matter of dishonesty than a matter of belief and convention. *Expertise* provides the most readily acceptable convention whereby citizens may maintain their confidence in the State. Therefore it has become a convention that policies have to be presented in a form justified by *expertise*. The policy-maker may or may not be dishonest; the policies may or may not be good; but that has no direct casual connection with the process of legitimation. The State has to rely on expertise if it wants to be or at least to look impartial.

II.4. Consultation as Legitimacy

Participation and *expertise* lie on different sides of a dichotomy. While *expertise* pertains to facts and impartiality, *participation* is related to values and interests (Carley, 1980:12; McGrew & Wilson, 1982:3).

Lindblom bases his conception of policy-making on the dichotomy of *efficacy* versus *popular control* which he sees

as "the two overriding questions asked about governmental policy making":

In short, a deep conflict runs through common attitudes toward policy making. On the one hand, people want policy to be informed and well analysed. On the other hand, they want policy making to be democratic, hence necessarily political. In slightly different words, on the one hand they want policy making to be more scientific. On the other, they want it to remain in the world of politics (1980:12).

This hints that *participation* is as indispensable an element as *expertise* in policy-making.

In the following paragraphs, we discuss the legitimization function of *participation* and pay particular attention to *consultation*. The latter is another major concern of this study.

II.4.1. Participation in Policy-Making

Fagence, who has done perhaps the most comprehensive survey in the literature on *participation* (1977), starts with a not very enlightening definition of the term.

The term and concept of 'participation' has attracted to itself in recent years a diversity of meanings and a seemingly inexhaustable variety of practical expressions. In addition, 'participation' has become at various times the focus of sympathy, antipathy, comprehension, incomprehension, delay, frustration, challenge and other similar emotional responses; it seldom seems capable of attracting rational consideration and expression (Ibid.:20).

Therefore, any attempt to define *participation* may add to, rather than eliminate, confusion. *Participation* will better be discussed in substance than in abstraction.


To this end, some hierarchy of participation proves useful. Evans, for example, proposes three levels of

participation: *nominal, consultative and responsible* (1977: 29). Spiegel and Mittenenthal, in the context of urban planning, proposes a hierarchy of seven elements: *information, consultation, negotiation, shared decision, joint planning, delegation and neighbourhood control* (cited in Fagence, 1977:128). Kwok identifies four processes of citizen participation: *public hearing, institutional review, citizen participation and community participation* (1980). There are numerous other hierarchies or typologies of participation.

Among others, Arnstein's "Ladder of Participation" (1969) may prove particularly helpful (Fig 3.2 on the next page). Arnstein presented a continuum of eight "rungs" of participation with different degrees of citizen influence. The eight rungs are further classified into three categories: *non-participation, tokenism and citizen power*. Although Arnstein's notions originate from urban planning in a community context, it is generally applicable to public policy-making at large.

Informing, consultation and placation are regarded as "tokens" of *participation*, because citizens are expected to feel respected when they are being informed, consulted or placated, but may not be respected in real decisions. This "tokenism" lends itself to the notion of *legitimation*. In other words, participation may play two roles: (a) a real contribution in policy-making; (b) a "token" that the policy-making process is legitimate. Sometimes only the latter role is assumed.

Figure 3.2 Arnstein's Ladder of Participation
(Source: Arnstein, 1969:217)



The relevance of Arnstein's "ladder" to this study is to find the place of "tokenism" in a continuum. However, Arnstein's "ladder concept" does not make clear whether the "rungs" refer to activities or effects. There are, for example, various consultative committees which are meant to conduct "consultation", but whose effects may range from "informing" to "delegation". On the other hand, there could be arrangements of "delegation" whose effect is no more than "placation". In reality, it is risky to assume that each degree of participation is represented by one and only one form of activity, or one may be blinded by mere rituals.

Furthermore, by equating activities with effects, Arnstein's "ladder" assumes that there is only one ultimate democracy - "citizen control" - thereby neglecting the significance of difference in political cultures (Almond and Verba, 1965).

In fact, the subject matter of *legitimacy* studies is precisely that political activities may carry secondary effects which are not directly implied by their primary functions. The latter are usually taken for granted in their forms. In terms of *legitimacy*, a form of participation is accepted by the citizens as long as they believe that it is the right form. It does not really matter to what extent citizens actually contribute to policy-making.

The discussions that follow will concentrate on *consultation*. The definition is again vague. Arnstein in fact does not define "consultation".

Jaques defines *consultation* as a contrasting concept to *participation*:

Consultation is a process in which a manager hears views and himself decides how much to take those views into account; participation is a process in which elected representatives take part in establishing policies and objectives within which managers must work (Jaques, 1974:297).

The distinction is never so clearcut in reality. We shall look at two particular cases of *consultation*: advisory committees and third party consultations.

II.4.2. Advisory committees for exchange of legitimacy

Advisory or consultative committees refer to those set up by the policy-maker to solicit policy inputs from the

community at large or its representatives.

Such committees may or may not be established by legislation. If not, they are established administratively to aid policy-making. They may be either "standing" or *ad hoc* in nature. Members of such committees may either be elected by some parent constituency, or appointed from above. The members may either represent interest of particular interest groups, various areas of professional expertise or ideology (Griffiths, 1960). The most powerful committees may approve or veto a government proposal; they are near policy-makers. More often, they enjoy the legal obligation to be consulted and provide an input to policy-making. In this case, their advice may receive different degrees of respect: from total acceptance to total rejection. Those committees which do not enjoy a legal status may still be consulted because they are tacitly "legitimized" for consultation (Kogan, 1975). Still other committees may not enjoy this "legitimization", they may have informal and unbinding dialogue with the policy-maker.

There are basically two interpretations of these committees. On the one hand, such committees are channels of representation. On the other hand, they provide legitimacy for policy-making.

Many authors regard advisory committees as an "important medium of communication between the government and organised interests" (Smith, 1976:69). Theoretically, the advisory committee provides a forum for the various interests and value systems to interact; the job of the

government then is to provide administrative support and to implement the policies made by the policy-maker.

However, in reality, the government has grown into a bureaucracy and has its own interests to defend. There are then not only interactions among the interest groups, but also between the government sectors and the interest groups. Interaction of the latter type is even more "political". Under these circumstance, the advisory committees provide a channel for political exchange. On the one hand, the government bureaucracy needs information and support from the interest groups in the making, defending and implementing of its policies. On the other hand, the interest groups need access to and influence over policy-making (Peters, 1977; Richardson and Jordon, 1979 abridged in McGrew and Wilson, 1982:275-276). Advisory committees satisfy both.

In this context, Peters discerns four "modes" of interactions between the government bureaucracy and the various interest groups: (a) where legitimate groups are legally and officially involved in making policies; (b) where legitimacy is only granted to one particular group; (c) where there is "kinship" between the "hegemonic" policy-maker and an interest group; and (d) where illegitimate groups not compatible with the system of legitimacy then act "outside the pale of normal political actions" (Peters, 1977:262-270).

The political exchange between the government

bureaucracy and the interest groups can be expressed in the currency of *legitimacy*: the government bureaucracy gains *legitimacy* through accumulation of information and acquisition of support; the interest groups gain *legitimacy* for being involved in the policy-making process. The transaction of *legitimacy* takes place in the advisory committees.

It is therefore essential to understand how the government bureaucracy selects the membership of advisory committees, i.e., to separate the "insiders" from the "outsiders" (Grant, 1977:16). In this respect, Kogan classifies groups which are consulted into *legitimised* and *non-legitimised* groups. Three points are central to Kogan's classification: First, interest groups are legitimised if they have a statutory or conventional right to be consulted. Second, the right to be consulted is never specific and the decision to consult is in the gift of the government. Third, although the authority rests with the government,

it takes a major dislodgement of the power system for an identifiable interest group to be disregarded on any decision affecting its members (Kogan, 1975:75).

Hence, effectively, the legitimacy system of consultation is closely geared to the power system and to the conventions in the society. Jennings further argues that because of conditions based on assessments of power and influence by parties, there are restrictions on who may be consulted and when. He states:

These restrictions... tend to distort the meaning of consultation by a *priori* selection of those to be consulted and by delaying consultation until the

political metes and bounds of decisions have been well established (Jennings, 1977:184).

II.4.3. Advisory committees for legitimation

Peters' classification, however, does not address the case where the government has control over policy-making, as is the case in this study. Here, the government, formally or informally, is held responsible for making policies.

Under these circumstances, the advisory committees may play two roles: legitimating the *policies* and legitimating the *government*.

In the first role, the committees provide the government with the necessary information to formulate and implement policies with confidence. Or, in a "conspiracy" context, the government may use advisory committees to "camouflage", i.e. to *legitimate* a policy by "impartial" recommendation (Smith, 1976:70). The government may also use advisory committees to delay taking a decision, to capture the support of organised interests by involving them in the policy-making process, or to "nobble" the opposition.

Critics can be pacified by the appointment of a committee which creates the impression that something is being done when it is not, or that consultation is being taken when it is not (Ibid.).

Gaziel has similar observation in his study of the French case (1980). There, the advisory councils play the dual role of constituting an objective appraisal of government performance and confirming the policies of the government, shielding it from criticism (See also II.3.4. of this Chapter). One of Jennings' points is also that the

committee "fulfils a political purpose in that it makes consultation amenable to control and the results more predictable" (Jennings, 1977:184).

In this way, the government bureaucracy passes its policies by the endorsement of some legitimate machinery - the advisory committee - but it manages to control this machinery. Legitimation again has nothing to do with the appropriateness of the policy.

The second role of advisory committees pertains to what may be called "second level legitimation": the government manages to develop or is obliged to entertain a convention, or belief, that working through advisory committees is the most acceptable means of making policies. If this can be established, then the advisory committees not only legitimate the policies, but more importantly legitimate the government itself.

This ideology can be developed to the extent that the government puts tremendous efforts into building this *legitimacy* (convention and belief that advisory committees are amenable), even at the cost of accepting some policies that may be detrimental to the bureaucracy. In this last case, the government trades benefits in specific areas for the *legitimacy* of its general authority.

II.4.4. Third-party consultations

Third-party consultation differs from the consultations discussed above in that the consultant is not an interested party in the policy involved. There are two common instances

of third-party consultations. The third party could be composed of high-prestige and supposedly neutral community leaders. It could also be a special mission from overseas.

Third-party consultation can be regarded as a kind of conflict management, or constructive crisis management, which is typical of *organization development* (OD) once prevalent in the United States. Third-party consultation, also known as third-party intervention, is a particular form of *process consultation* whereby people in the same organization better understand one another and hence eliminate unnecessary conflicts (Schein, 1969:9; French and Bell, 1969:137; Huse, 1980:330).

Little is mentioned in educational policy-making of third-party consultation, or OD at all (an exception could be Carron, 1982:16), but it could be argued that the concept is readily adopted by many governments.

During the crisis of an uncompromisable conflict, the third-party has the merit of being *impartial*. It does not represent the interests of the conflicting parties and therefore has no vested interest in the solutions. Hence, the *impartiality* gains *legitimacy* for both the third party and whoever invites the third party. In this sense, third-party consultation is an alternative to *expertise* whose legitimacy again dwells in its *impartiality*.

Whether the third-party does a good job or not, whether the conflict is solved or not, is a secondary concern. If the government initiates a third-party consultation, the initiation *per se* allows the government to withdraw itself

from the conflict and evade accusations of biased value judgements.

II.4.5. *Public opinion*

The above discussions already involve the notion of *public opinion*. If public opinion favours rational expertise, experts get the legitimacy to participate in policy-making; if public opinion endorses top-down consultations, committees acquire the legitimacy to make policies; if, after all, the government make policies in ways favoured by public opinion, then the government gains the legitimacy of being a policy-making authority.

However, "public opinion" is a subtle concept. In reality, what the public opinion is is open to interpretations. Nevertheless, *public opinion* constitutes another currency in the policy-making arena.

Actors who represent a significant body of public opinion have a stronger say in policy-making. Such a representation may be acquired through the leadership of a large organization (union, pressure group, ...) or coalition of organizations, or through majority support by election votes. The policy-maker may feel obliged to involve such a representative in the policy-making machinery, or at least to enter into dialogue with this representative. Otherwise, the policy-maker may be accused of neglecting the public.

Actors may also carry weight if they can demonstrate that they have access to public opinion. Those who conduct opinion polls and public hearings are examples of such

justifications. A government may well claim legitimacy for a "White Paper" if the preceding "Green Paper" has undergone a process of public consultations.

In a way, *public opinion* provides an actor with the "ticket" to the game of policy-making. In more academic terminology, representation of or access to *public opinion* provides the actor with the legitimacy to participate in policy-making.

The legitimacy provided by *public opinion* can be a very strong one. Actors who appear to represent or have access to *public opinion* may claim to play judge in the legitimacy game. They are supposed to know what is legitimate and what is not, because they may claim they represent the norm or belief that constitutes legitimacy.

The legitimacy due to *public opinion* is also different from that due to expertise. They belong to different sets of value principles. The legitimacy of expertise comes from the belief that policies are good if they are produced by experts who possess the knowledge, who can handle uncertainties and who are independent of biased interests. The legitimacy of *public opinion* comes from the belief that policies are good if the all interests are represented.

II.5. Summary on Legitimacy

In this section, the concept of *legitimacy* and its application to interpreting various aspects of the policy-making process have been discussed at length. This

explanation of the policy-making process is an attempt to find an alternative to the various rationality explanations elaborated in the previous section.

While the three types of rationality (See I.7 of this Chapter) are concerned with producing some "good" policy or a "good" process to produce some acceptable policy, *legitimacy* is concerned with the process *per se*. As far as the process is "legitimate", *legitimacy* is achieved.

The notion of *legitimacy* in this thesis is adopted in its broadest sense. It does not delimit itself to the legalization of public policies in a formal way, nor does it follow the framework of a legitimation crisis in a State. In this thesis, *legitimacy* is taken to mean the framework of values, beliefs and conventions people hold to judge policy-making. Hence, *legitimacy* is a type of "second-level objective" which is not directly visible from the form of the policy-making activities, let alone their products. It is seen only through the system of values, beliefs and convention people hold towards policy-making.

Some effort is devoted to explain, in *legitimacy* terms, the role of *expertise* and *consultation* in public policy-making. It becomes apparent in the explanations that there could be two kinds of objectives or two levels of objectives in the process of *legitimation*. At one level, *expertise* or *consultation* is employed to legitimate policies. That is, as an alternative to saying that a policy is "right", employment of *expertise* and *consultation* allows the

government to say that the policy has been produced in the "right" manner. At a higher level, when employment of *expertise* and *consultation* in policy-making is commonly believed to be "good" then the government which employs them acquires the *legitimacy* of being a "good" government.

By the same token, there could be a fifth sense of legitimacy in addition to the four senses of legitimacy in educational policy-making (See II.2 of this Chapter). In this fifth sense, each actor in policy-making has to be conscious of his own legitimacy.

Further elaboration in this direction will be left to the conclusions in Chapter Six.

III. The Multiplicity of Models

Before ending this chapter of theories, it is necessary to discuss the issue of multiple models. It is quite possible for authors to explain the same policy-making process using parallel but distinctively different explanations. As will be seen in the following chapters, this is of particular concern to this study. If different models can explain the same event, what is then the status of each of these models? What are their inter-relations? What is then the "reality"? In this respect, the seminal work by Graham Allison: *The essence of decisions: explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis* is frequently quoted and his models borrowed. The discussions below starts with the Allison models and proceeds to see how different authors view this multiple model approach.

III.1. The Allison Models and their Interpretations

III.1.1. Allison: parallel explanations

The best known case of parallel explanation is that presented by Allison who explains the Cuban Missile Crisis by three models. In the three models, decision-making is viewed as rational, organizational and political process respectively. In each model, he tries to ask the same questions, but the three models provide completely different types of answers. There are therefore three different

explanations of the Cuban Missile Crisis.

With hindsight, the models themselves do not seem to be excessively impressive. For example, Lindblom is quoted by Allison as example of governmental political model (Allison, 1971:154), and not of organizational process model. This may not meet unanimous endorsement from contemporary writers. In his concluding chapters, Allison in fact finds difficulties in strictly separating discussions of his Model II (Organizational Process Model) from those of Model III (Governmental Politics Model).

The merits of Allison are mainly in the approach. His pluralistic approach presented a challenge to the tradition of accepting any one model as *the* model. By presenting three parallel explanations, Allison illustrated the possibility of adopting a multiplicity of perspectives. Based on the same facts, each model proceeds within its own framework and adds its own value judgement:

Each conceptual framework consists of a cluster of assumptions and categories that influence what the analyst find puzzling, how he formulates his question, where he looks for evidence, and what he produces as an answer (Allison, 1971:245).

Therefore, what are presented as facts are not merely facts,

Rather, they are points that emerge when one mixes traces of evidence with judgement; one is inclined to accept or reject the judgements depending on the logic of the model within which he is working (Ibid.:248).

The implication of Allison's approach is not only the multiplicity, but also that any single model is never value-free. Hence it is difficult to talk about *the* model.

However, by the end of his book, Allison was tempted to

move away from pluralism and to incorporate the three models in a "grand model" (Ibid.:255). He attempts to see the models as consecutively complementing the previous one:

Model I fixes the broader context, the larger national patterns and the shared images. Within this context, Model II illuminates the organizational routines that produce the information, alternatives and action. Within the Model II context, Model III focuses in greater detail on the individual leaders of a government and the politics among them that determine major governmental choices (Ibid.:258).

This view does not seem to be shared by those who borrow from Allison's models to explain other policy-making events.

III.1.2. Kirst: alternative perspectives

Kirst (1977) renamed the Allison models as the *economic, political and organizational* models and applied them to analysing the decision-making process in school districts (in the U.S.) to see how this affected the resulting expenditures after a school finance reform. He agrees with Allison in that the models represent different perspectives:

The model used in an analysis critically influences what information is considered relevant, how the decision-making process is viewed, and how the outcomes of that process are interpreted (Ibid.:308).

However, his conclusion remains pluralistic, that "alternative models used in concert increase the likelihood of a clearer grasp of the whole" (Ibid.:308-9).

Such an approach is also used by Tyack (1976) who uses five models to explain the cause of compulsory education. He observes that

Alternative ways of seeing not only draw on different kinds of evidence, but also depict different levels of

social reality and so aid us in gaining a wider and more accurate perception of the past (Ibid.).

III.1.3. Peterson and Williams: multiple dimensions

Peterson and Williams studied the Chicago School Board and used exactly the Allison models to analyse the decision-making process. They view each of the models as observation in a particular dimension:

Each of the three models ... offers a distinctive way of understanding the decision-making of the school board. It should be clear from the beginning, however, that we believe that each model presents only one facet of the totality of the situation. Although the analogy may not be exact, it can be said that the model is like one snapshot of a three-dimensional event. Only by interrelating the three models does the full picture emerge (Peterson and Williams, 1977:153, original emphasis).

This notion is near to the conception of "the blind men and the elephant". This is somehow shared by Harman, who opines that the multiplicity of approaches

should ... be thought of partly as different ways of thinking about different kinds of policy processes and partly as tools that can be used in combination (Harman, 1978:25).

III.1.4. Lane: the "right" model

Lane (1983) applies four decision-making models to Swedish higher education: incrementalism, the demographic model, the rational model and the garbage-can model. His view on the multiple models is that

Different models satisfy different situations. The different models ... must be confronted with a common body of data in order to make possible the evaluation of their different claims to truth in terms of the extent to which the models satisfy the situations derivable from the data (Ibid.:521-22, original emphasis).

His effort was therefore to seek whether any of the four models fits the data concerning higher education in Sweden. In the end, Lane discovers that none of the four models is satisfactory and proposes a particular "public administration model" that will successfully explain policy-making in Swedish higher education.

The assumption in Lane's study is that for any particular situation, there should be one model that can match the truth. The difference in models is therefore not a matter of perspectives, or a matter of dimensions, but a matter of appropriateness to particular situations. Implicitly, there should be a "correct" model for each situation.

Lane's approach seems to have confused the objective reality and the subjective interpretations of the reality. The danger of such an approach is that once a model is adopted, one tends to become blind to other alternatives and hence excludes the possibility of alternative theories.

III.1.5. Crowson: models as prescriptions

Crowson (1975) also used exactly the Allison models. However, he treats the rational model as obsolete because "assumptions of rationality are no longer adequate for the development of educational planning theory" (Ibid.:57). Crowson therefore urges that attention should be paid to the organizational and political constraints which are best delineated by Allison's other two models.

This prescriptive use of the Allison models is less

appropriate than other models in educational planning. For example, Williams contrasts the *technocratic* model which was suited to the expansionists' 1960s with the *political* model which gradually replaced the former (1979:125). Kogan distinguishes a *second generation* planning model, which takes the multi-value political mode, from the *first generation* planning model which emphasises "the quantifiable and the predictable" (1980:8).

III.1.6. Benjamin and Kerchner: actors' perspectives

Benjamin and Kerchner (1982) attempted to operationalise and quantify the Allison models to which they added the garbage-can model. The four models were then operationalised as 15 key concepts. Q-methodology (60 Q-sort items) was then applied to higher education decision-makers (each with four scores) to test their perceptions of the decision-making processes.

Apart from questions in the methodology, Benjamin and Kerchner substituted "insider" views for "outsider" analysis, and individual feelings for holistic perceptions. There is also the doubt why the four models should be the "only" models and what should be done when the subject does not conform to any one of the models. Such a study can easily be criticised as purely a juggling of research techniques and a misuse of the models.

III.1.7. Bush: a comprehensive model

Although Bush works in educational administration rather than policy-making, his theories are near to those

used in the latter. In his recent publication (1986), he describes five different types of models: *formal models*, *democratic models*, *political models*, *subjective models* and *ambiguity models*. The different models represent different perspectives with different assumptions about the basic aspects of an organization. He views that these models "differ along crucial dimensions but taken together they provide a comprehensive appraisal" of the situation. He calls this notion a comprehensive model (Bush, 1986:126). He quotes Baldbridge et al.:

[...] the search for an all-encompassing model is simplistic, for no one model can delineate the intricacies of decision processes in complex organizations (1978:28).

In fact, earlier, Bush (with Goulding, 1984) used four of these models to explain the decision processes in one institution (Bush and Goulding, 1984:260-262).

Bush's notion of a comprehensive model comes near to a multiple perspective approach which is adopted in this study.

III.2. A Multiple Perspective Approach

The co-existence of parallel explanations lead to the notion of *multiple perspectives*.

III.2.1. Parallel explanations and reality

Do the parallel explanations all tell the "truth? Or does anyone of them offer superior explanation? Or are they

simply arbitrary propositions? Or, The answers to these questions depend on the researcher's attitude towards reality. There could be three such attitudes, as have been put forward by Lincoln and Guba (1985:82-87)(They put forward four, which are now collapsed into three in this thesis).

First, there is no reality at all. The parallel explanations are simply arbitrary constructions of individual minds.

Second, there is an objective reality. Each of the parallel explanations are is a different interpretation of the same reality. These parallel explanations are partial and incomplete and full knowledge is never possible.

Third, there is an objective reality. This reality can be fully understood in the long run. The parallel explanations therefore represent approximations or partial "truth" and may eventually converge to some "ultimate theory".

Every researcher has to take a stand and make a choice among these attitudes.

III.2.2. The multiple perspective approach

The author of the present thesis believes in an objective reality external to the human mind, but he does not follow the notions in either the second or the third cases above. The following are some elaborations:

(a) Take policy-making as an example. Compared with the complexity of policy-making processes, one can safely say

that the existing theories are still relatively simplistic. While human knowledge about the policy-making process is ever growing, the process itself is getting ever more complex. To hope for an ultimate theory of policy-making is simply a static point of view and is unrealistic.

(b) The parallel explanations are not merely partial and incomplete perceptions. The parallel explanations as they stand each contributes to the understanding of the reality. Each of them provides a perspective of the whole reality. If we take each explanation positively, then the totality of all the parallel explanations form the body of knowledge of the reality. We shall call these the *multiple perspective approach*.

(c) The *multiple perspective approach* is not the case of the "blind men and the elephant". Each of the blind men perceives only a part of the elephant, whereas each of the parallel explanations pertains to the whole body of reality. The knowledge of the blind men can be integrated to one coherent piece. Multiple perspectives do not always lend themselves to coherent integration.

(d) The multiple perspective nature of the explanations is determined by the fact that analyses of policy-making process rely on subjective data. The data collected about a political process (and in fact all social processes) reflect "facts" as well as the perception of supplier of data. This is however, the only way complex political processes can be understood.

(e) The *multiple perspective approach* is not the same

as the notion of *multiple reality*. The latter as it is used in the literature usually connotes a denial of a reality external to the researcher, or that "reality" is simply a synonym for "interpretations". The *multiple perspective approach* provides a multiple perspective picture of the social reality.

(g) It may be true that the different explanatins do not apply evenly to all parts of the political process. A certain model may better explain certain type of processes. Each political process has its own characteristics and does not entertain all explanations equally.

As can be seen in Chapters Four and Five, the two Episodes are analysed using two different frameworks. each of the explanations contribute to the understanding of the reality in policy-making. The message here is that trying to explain a political process by one single theory or model is inadequate.

IV. Summary of Chapter Three

This chapter has surveyed theories on policy-making encountered during the course of the study. In particular, the typical models and theories are analysed starting with Simon's notions of rationality as a frame of reference. The notion of legitimacy is then discussed in detail in the context of policy-making.

A distinction begins to emerge. On the one hand, there is the *rationality* line of thinking. Whether it is substantive, procedural or "partisan", the rationality models look at the policy-making process as an important means to arrive at some *policy*, be it "optimal" or "satisfactory". That is, the success of the process is assessed by the extent it achieves its *primary function*. On the other hand, there is the *legitimacy* notion, where the design of the policy-making process aims not so much at the goals as at the procedures of policy-making. Thereby, the policy-making process *legitimizes* the policy and the policy-maker. Hence, there is a *secondary function* in the policy-making process which is not directly related to its primary function. Both notions of rationality and legitimacy will be adopted in Chapters Four and Five to explain the two Episodes.

There is also an attempt to survey different authors' views on the approach of using multiple models, and to clarify the stand of this study towards the multiple perspective approach.

There will be a further discussion of the theories in the conclusions in Chapter Six when the analyses have been made.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE CRE REVIEW (1980-1981)

0. Introduction

The Committee to Review Higher and Technical Education, the CRE, which operated in 1980-81, is the first *Episode* to be examined in this research. As mentioned in the Introduction to this thesis, little was known to the public except the announcement of its establishment and some scattered pieces of news. Information included in this chapter therefore comes mainly from research interviews and survey of unpublished documents. The chapter will be divided into four sections: (a) basic facts about the CRE, its operation and its outcome; (b) the development of the manpower model which was seen to be central to the episode; (c) a preliminary analysis of the episode by way of identifying and describing the actors who significantly influenced the decision-making (This analysis of the actors will also be significant in the other episode, the OECD review, analysed in Chapter 5); and (d) analysis of the episode, using two different perspectives: the *rational explanation* and the *legitimacy explanation*.

I. Operation and Outcomes of the CRE

This section is devoted to describing the basic facts about the operation of the CRE. The description is largely based on documentary data extracted from published as well as unpublished sources.

I.1. The Appointment

On November 18, 1980, the Hong Kong Government announced:

With the approval of the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Mr Ken Topley is to relinquish on Thursday (November 20) his appointment as Director of Education to undertake an in-depth study of Hong Kong's higher education requirements as full time chairman of a Committee to Review Post-secondary and Technical Education (Government Press Release, November 18, 1980).

The Committee, usually abbreviated as the CRE is also nick-named the "Topley Committee". It was announced that the CRE, which had broad terms of reference, would report to the Governor-in-Council within 6 months. On completion of the Review, Topley would become the newly created Secretary for Education in the Government Secretariat (Ibid.).

A few days later, the CRE invited recommendations from the public (Government Press Release, November 24, 1980). Meanwhile, major educational bodies received formal invitation for written representations.

I.2. Terms of Reference of the CRE

The terms of reference of the CRE were presented in the form of six considerations, and recommendations were expected in five aspects.

I.2.1. Six considerations

The CRE was required to pay regard to six considerations (DSCRE/1). These, in concrete terms, specified the background for the setting up of the CRE. The six considerations were:

Firstly, the advice of the UPGC about the "uncomfortable implications" of the slow growth rate for universities and the Polytechnic.

The UPGC worries referred to the annual growth rate of 3% for the universities and a ceiling of 12,000 full-time-equivalent students at the Polytechnic. These were policy targets laid down in the 1978 White Paper (Development, 1978). It felt that a significant proportion of the 3% annual expansion had been pre-empted by the requirements of the new medical and dental schools (the former in The Chinese University of Hong Kong and the latter in the University of Hong Kong), leaving little scope for the introduction of new courses or the expansion of departments outside the medical and dental fields (DSCRE/0:15). In September, 1980, the Governor-in-Council decided that the growth rate at the universities should be raised from 3% to 4% per annum (Ibid.:8). Given that, UPGC members still felt that this 1% increase only covered the extra expansion due

to the new projects, but did not in real terms improve the 3% growth rate (ISU03).

Secondly, the concern of the Advisory Committee on Diversification that (i) the current higher education policy might not meet both the social and economic demands; (ii) technical institutes should be more flexible and responsive and (iii) part-time adult education should be a means for upgrading Hong Kong's manpower.

The Advisory Committee on Diversification was an independent committee set up by the Governor in 1977, "to advise whether the process of diversification of the economy, with particular reference to manufacturing industries, can be facilitated by modifying existing Government policies or introducing new policies" (Report, 1979b:2). The Committee produced its report in 1979 (Ibid.). A full chapter was devoted to education and training (Ibid.: Chap IX). The Advisory Committee noted in its report that the small increases in university and Polytechnic enrolments proposed in the 1978 White Paper contrasted sharply with the growth rates of earlier periods. It was also worried that "the necessary provision of craftsmen might be jeopardised by the potential students being drawn away to the expanded senior secondary sector" (DSCRE/0:16). The Advisory Committee also proposed to remove the technical institutes from the Education Department and to place them under the Hong Kong Training Council.

Thirdly, the likely decrease of students going overseas in view of the fee rise.

The increase of fees for overseas studies can best be exemplified by the British situation:

Table 4.1 Fees payable by overseas students on first degree courses in Britain (in sterling pounds):

<u>1979-80</u>		<u>1980-81</u>	<u>1981-82</u>
940	existing students	1165	1389
(all courses)	new students:-		
(")	Arts	2000	2500
(")	Science	3000	3600
(")	Medicine	5000	6000

Similar developments occurred in Australia and Canada, both of which traditionally attracted a large number of students from Hong Kong (DSCRE/O: 17-18).

It was always difficult to reckon the exact number of Hong Kong students in overseas universities, but the general estimate was that this number exceeded that of students in local institutions of higher education.

Fourthly, the likely increase of post-sixth form candidates as a result of the expansion of secondary education.

The concern with the significant increase in post-sixth form candidates was reflected in a report of the Committee on Sixth Form Education which was set up within the Board of Education in 1978. A report was published in June, 1979 (Report, 1979a). This provided a framework to streamline

the matriculation system in Hong Kong where the two universities had different durations of undergraduate courses and different matriculation requirements. There were, therefore, two matriculation examinations held one and two years respectively after completion of Form 5. The so-called Sixth Form Report also put forward the theme of broadening the sixth form curriculum so that it does not only prepare university entrants (Board, 1978).

Fifthly, the right mix of trained manpower for employment demands.

This pertains to the priority of manpower training as indicated by the estimated technologist-technician-craftsman ratio. The Hong Kong Training Council continued to predict that there would be a shortfall of craftsman. However, whether this would be the real case and what should be the methodology to do the prediction were open to question.

Sixthly, the high proportion of the educational vote already devoted to higher education.

This pertains to the priorities in resource allocation. In practice, the development of higher education in Hong Kong was "demand-led" (ISB01) and not "resource-led", i.e. programmes were financed once they were justified (ISU01a; ISOR2), and therefore real competition for resources did not exist (ISX08). However, the CRE was reminded of the high proportion - some 29% - of the educational vote for higher education as a matter of resource priority when the population in general education was 40 times greater than that in higher education.

I.2.2. Areas of Study of the CRE

The CRE was then required to advise on five aspects:

- (1) the adequacy of the present pattern and range of institutional provision for post-secondary education;
- (2) current and projected educational and training needs at different levels, including university education, teacher education, vocational and professional education and technical and community education;
- (3) student enrolment targets for the decade commencing with the next triennium (See Chapter 1) in 1984 in the range of available and prospective courses;
- (4) policy options with recommendations relating to
 - (a) the expansion of existing institutions;
 - (b) the creation of new institutions;
 - (c) relationships between institutions;
 - (d) the use of distance learning;
 - (e) alternative courses of action and development
- (5) the feasibility or desirability of instituting public scholarship (or other schemes) for degrees overseas either generally or in particular fields of study.

I.3. Membership of the CRE

I.3.1. The list

There were fourteen members plus one secretary for the CRE. They were (DSCRE/O):

K.W.J. Topley
Chairman of the CRE,
Director of Education, 1974 to 1980,
Secretary for Education Designate

E.L. Alleyne (Mrs)
Registrar of the University of Hong Kong

W.M. Bradley
Secretary of the UPGC since 1979

Chen Fong-ching
Registrar of The Chinese University of Hong Kong

Chen Shou-lum
Industrialist
Vice-Chairman of the Hong Kong Training Council
Member of the Legislative Council

Henry Ching
Deputy Financial Secretary

Ching Yuen-kai
Deputy Director of the Hong Kong Polytechnic

C.H. Haye
The newly promoted Director of Education

E.P. Ho
The Secretary for Social Services

D.G. Jeaffreson
The Secretary for Economic Affairs

Daniel Lam See-hin
Member of the Board of Education
Manager of the Hong Kong Baptist College

Lee Quo-wei
Banker
Unofficial Member of the Executive Council
Chairman of the Board of Education

Andrew Li Kwok-nang
Barrister-in-Law
Member of the UPGC

C.J. Symons (Rev)

Principal of Diocesan Girls' School
Senior member of the Anglican Church
Unofficial Member of the Legislative Council
Member of the UPGC
Member of the BoE

N.C.L. Shipman

Secretary of the CRE (Senior Civil Servant)

1.3.2. Representations of the CRE

In general, the CRE was represented by all the relevant government departments, the major educational advisory bodies and the institutions of higher education.

Quite a number of members possess dual representations.

The Government representation included the Social Services Branch (which used to take care of Education), the prospective Education Branch, the Economic Branch, the Financial Branch and the Government Secretariat.

The presence of the Secretary-level officials in the CRE guaranteed that the CRE was a high-power committee. The direct involvement of the Financial Branch and the Economic Branch gave the CRE the status that its decisions, pending rubber-stamping, represented Government decisions.

The major advisory bodies were represented. BoE was represented by its Chairman, Q.W. Lee and its members Joyce Symons and Daniel Lam. Topley himself was Vice-Chairman of the BoE.

The HKTC was represented by S.L.Chen who was rumoured to be the government designated Chairman for the new statutory body for training, and Dr Y.K. Ching who also

represented the HKP.

The UPGC was represented by Bradley who was the Secretary, Joyce Symons who was also a member and Andrew Li who was a young Barrister-in-Law.

The major institutions of higher education were each represented by E.L. Alleyne, Registrar of HKU, Dr. Chen Fong-ching, Secretary of CUHK, Dr. D.K. Ching, Deputy Director of HKP and Daniel Lam, member of the the Board of Directors of the Hong Kong Baptist College.

1.3.3. A brief introduction of the members

The Chairman, Kenneth Topley, had been involved with the development of higher education since 1964 when the Special Committee on Higher Education attempted Hong Kong's first manpower forecasting (see Chapter 1, III.3.1). He was also one of the architects of the Hong Kong UGC (University Grants Committee, the predecessor of the UPGC) (ISU01) and was seconded from the then Colonial Secretariat (later the Government Secretariat) in 1965 to become the first Secretary of the Hong Kong UGC (University, 1976:2). He had been Director of Education since 1974 and was involved in all the education policy evolutions since. The Government announcement said:

Mr Topley, aged 58, first joined the Civil Service as a Cadet Officer in November, 1955. He was promoted through the ranks to Administrative Officer Staff Grade A in November, 1972. During that period, he held many senior appointments, including those of Commissioner for Co-operatives and Fisheries, Deputy Commissioner of Labour, Secretary of University Grants Committee, Commissioner for Census and Statistics and Director of Social Welfare (Government Press Release, November 18, 1980).

The newly appointed Director of Education, Colvyn Haye, had a very different career path. He was in the teaching profession right from the beginning in 1953 and was promoted within the Education Department up to the post of Deputy Director before his CRE appointment.

The Secretary, Nigel Shipman, was a Government Secretariat officer who was very much involved with education. He had headed the production of the major educational policy papers before the CRE. In particular, he was involved in the drafting of both the Green Paper and the White Paper in the 1977-78 period.

Q.W. Lee was basically a banker with the largest bank with local origin (Hang Seng Bank which is famous for its Hang Seng Index). His involvement in education started when the CUHK was being established and he became its Treasurer. He was then also made Treasurer for the HKP. He was appointed an EXCO member since 1968 and became Chairman of the BoE in 1977. For health reasons, he left the political scene for a while, and rejoined the EXCO in 1984. He was often able to enter into direct dialogue with the Governor (ISX07).

Rev. Joyce Symons was the Principal of a prestigious school and was a senior person in the Anglican Church (Sheng Kung Hui) which had long been one of the most influential school sponsoring bodies in Hong Kong. She was famous for her openness in criticising Government education policies and was the first educator appointed a LEGCO member. She

was for a long time member of the BoE and right before the CRE was made a UPGC member, the first local educationalist to be made so.

Daniel Lam was a businessman, but was a member of the BoE presumably because of his status as one of the Managers of the post-secondary Baptist College.

S.L. Chen was an industrialist and was an experienced member of the LEGCO. He was well known for being articulate in industrialists' views in matters of education and training. He was always apprehensive of the likely shortage of low-skilled manpower because of the expansion in education.

Table 4.2 on the next page may help to summarise the situation.

I.4. The Process

The CRE held its first meeting on December 4, 1980 and the final meeting on June 24, 1981. It held a total of 32 sessions, including regular weekly meetings and special sessions to hear the views of educators, students and interested members of the public (DSCRE/0:1-2).

Table 4.2. Representation of the CRE

Member	Government	Advisory Bodies	Institution
Topley	*	*	
Alleyne			*
Bradley	*	*	
Chen			*
Ching, H.	*		
Ching, Dr		*	*
Haye	*		
Ho	*		
Jeaffrson	*		
Lam		*	*
Lee		*	
Li		*	
Symons		* *	

There were 80 Committee papers. A list of the papers used during the research can be found in Appendix K. 44 pieces of written evidence were studied. These were submitted to the CRE in response to the open invitation issued by the CRE at the outset of its work. Of these 44 pieces, there were 15 representations from educational organizations and the others were made by individuals or institutions. The CRE also invited others to give oral evidence. There were 16 pieces of oral evidence. (DSCRE/0: App C)

The CRE paid particular attention to overseas experience. Peter Williams, who once advised the Government on the 1978 White Paper, was formally invited to be the Adviser. He was then Professor of Education in Developing Countries in the University of London Institute of Education. He visited Hong Kong from March 21 to April 9, 1981. A. Christodoulou, former Secretary of the British Open University and Secretary-General of the Association of Commonwealth Universities was also met by the CRE. The CRE also made use of the opportunity to meet a large number of Commonwealth vice-chancellors when the Association of Commonwealth Universities held its conference in Hong Kong. Bradley, Secretary of the UPGC and member of the CRE, visited Australia in February, 1981 to study the structure of higher education in New South Wales and Victoria. The CRE also received a report from Bray and Leung who visited Singapore to study its arrangements for industrial training and technical education (DSCRE/0:3).

In March, 1981, the Chairman envisaged that a draft of the report would be finished by mid-July and this could be finalised after the draft had been studied by the UPGC in its September meeting. The Chairman even comforted the members that there was no hurry to rush out a final report before September.

[The] drafting of the report will be put in hand immediately, with a view to the first draft of the report being ready for consideration by the Committee in May. June would be devoted to revising the drafts of the report with the aim of reaching agreement by mid-July. ... If it should turn out that it is not possible to adhere to this schedule, it is proposed to adjourn the Committee in mid-July, in view of the holiday period, and to reconvene the Committee in early September for the purpose of completing the report (DSCRE/51).

However, the final Report actually came out in June.

I.5. The Methodology

The CRE took a rather "rational" approach which believed that policies could be formulated by logical deduction based on measurable parameters that can be obtained objectively. The following is a brief description of the approaches adopted by the CRE in arriving at its recommendations.

The CRE looked at the "demand" and compared this with the "supply" of post-compulsory education. The "demand" is taken in a broad sense under the title "criteria for development". The measurement comprised five aspects: students' aspiration, students' abilities, requirements of qualified manpower, overseas provisions, and demographic

changes. The basic framework was similar to the Working Party prior to the 1977 Green Paper (See Chapter 1, III.3.3.), but with much greater depth and the Committee collected its own data.

1.5.1. Students' aspirations

Students' aspirations were examined from four angles:

- (a) the past record of application for places in universities and higher institutions;
- (b) a survey of students' preferences among Forms 5, 6 and 7 classes in a representative sample of 30 secondary schools;
- (c) the students' opinions as conveyed in the evidence put forward by two joint student bodies; and
- (d) an account of Hong Kong students overseas as a measure of demand for higher education.

1.5.2. Students' abilities

Students' abilities were measured in two dimensions:

- (a) trends in the number of senior secondary students, examination candidates and matriculants;
- (b) number of students capable of meeting the present academic standard of higher education institutions.

1.5.3. Manpower Requirements

The measurement of manpower requirements was perhaps the most substantial part in the entire CRE exercise. The measurement was done through seven alternative approaches:

- (a) *The Hong Kong Training Council's survey.* This had been a continuous exercise carried out by the Hong Kong Training Council and its predecessor since 1967 (see Chapter One, III.3.2). The survey adopted the "employers' opinion method" and surveyed manpower requirements in selected industries. In a nutshell, the survey looked at the present labour structure in individual enterprises and asked for the employers' 12-month prediction. This was extrapolated by an "adaptive filtering" mathematical technique to a five year projection. In this technique, data were so manipulated that more recent figures were given more weight (See also Chapter One, III.3.2).
- (b) *International comparison.* The CRE limited itself to the comparison of "density ratio" of skilled manpower: the proportion of graduates per 1,000 workers in the labour force of developed overseas countries. This was based on the data arranged by Prof. W.A. Reynolds of the University of Hong Kong.
- (c) *Graduate employment surveys.* This looked into the employment opportunities, earnings and job satisfaction of the graduates of the existing institutions. Surveys were carried out by the two universities, the Polytechnic, the Baptist College and the government division in charge of the technical institutes. The CRE compiled an integrated picture by listing the proportional distribution in three major employment sectors: (i) commerce/industry/public utilities; (ii) .

Government and (iii) teaching. The compiled picture also provided some information about graduates' starting salaries and their growth.

- (d) *Tracer studies.* Here the CRE referred to tracer studies of the employment history of past graduates. Only a pilot study had been done with one of the technical institutes (Morrison Hill Technical Institute).
- (e) *Earnings-education Profiles.* This was a survey of level of earnings in relation to educational attainment. It made use of the 1981 Census data and tried to plot the earning-education profiles for Hong Kong. This was done by the CRE.
- (f) *Manpower Model.* This was entirely a CRE endeavour. It occupied the two largest paper in the whole CRE exercise. The model was built in two stages. In stage one, a projection was made by assuming the existing occupational structure and arrived at a minimum requirement. In the second stage, projection was made by anticipating changes in the occupational structure which would mean a redistribution of manpower. This was done through mathematical models, trends analysis and consultations.
- (g) *Manpower requirement of particular sectors.* This was estimated through commissioned studies carried out by government departments and professional bodies. The study includes a regression-analysis projection made by

the government Civil Services Branch; and projections submitted by the Director of Social Welfare, the Secretary for Social Services, the Public Works Department, the Hong Kong Society of Accountants, the Hong Kong Management Association Electronic Data Processing Committee and the Committee on Management and Supervisory Training of the HKTC.

1.5.4. Overseas Provision

The fourth measure of demand was provision in overseas countries. This was based on OECD's 1981 publication which provided an international comparison of

- (a) enrolment ratios in higher education,
- (b) public expenditure on higher education.

1.5.5. Demography

The last concern of demand was *demographic factors*. The CRE looked at the trends in the size of the relevant age population using the projections which were carried out by the Census and Statistics Department as a regular exercise.

1.6. The CRE Report

The CRE forwarded its Report (also broadly known as the "Topley Report") on June 24, 1981.

1.6.1. Contents of the CRE Report

Since the CRE Report was never published, it becomes necessary to introduce the contents of the CRE Report. The Report was divided into 6 chapters.

Chapter 1: Introduction. This set the scene. It described the background, the considerations and the working of the CRE.

Chapter 2: Criteria for development. In this chapter, the CRE worked out the targets for expansion in higher and technical education based on various aspects of demand. The target was worked out with reference to the five criteria mentioned above: students' aspirations, students' abilities, manpower requirements, overseas provisions and demographic changes.

Chapter 3: The development of tertiary education institutions. This chapter worked on the "supply" side of the issue. The supply was worked out on an institutional basis, scanning all existing post-secondary institutions.

Chapter 4: Special issues. This chapter identified four special areas and made proposals thereupon. These areas were (1) part-time and adult education, (2) distance learning, (3) colleges of education and (4) assistance to students overseas.

Chapter 5: Summary of principal recommendations

Chapter 6: Postscript was a rather polemic piece of fifteen paragraphs, supplementing the body of the report with views that were in the minds of the CRE but which were not included in the previous chapters.

1.6.2. Conclusions of CRE

The comparison of the calculations at the demand side and the supply side led the CRE to arrive at a number of

conclusions on the demand of higher and technical education.

Firstly, if students' aspirations were to be respected, then the CRE discovered that the students' demand well exceeded the existing provision. It reckoned that if every post-sixth form applicant were to secure a place, it would probably require a three-fold increase in the number of places. It also reckoned that twice as many Hong Kong students went to universities overseas compared with those who went to local ones. Many of these never applied locally and so the demand should be greater than what was demonstrated in the local scene (DSCRE/0:30-31).

Secondly, with respect to student abilities, the CRE discovered that even if the number of places expanded to two to three times of the existing provision, there should be sufficient suitable candidates to meet the academic standards that the courses required (DSCRE/0:41).

Thirdly, most of the manpower measurements mentioned above pointed to

- (a) a shift in distribution of employment to industries which require a greater proportion of highly educated manpower; and
- (b) a change in the occupational structure of industries towards a higher content of professional and technical administrative and managerial workers (DSCRE/0:75-76).

Fourthly, the study of provisions in overseas countries showed that the provision of higher education in Hong Kong

had been remarkably low. The CRE "felt concerned that Hong Kong's relative economic position in the world contrasted so markedly with the opportunities it provided to enter higher education" (DSCRE/0:88).

Fifthly, the demographic trend revealed that there would be a decline in the relevant age group and this would be helpful to facilitate an increase in the opportunities for higher education (Ibid.:91).

1.6.3. The Proposed Targets

The CRE proposed dramatic expansion in higher and technical education.

The CRE proposed that the 2% of age group in degree courses should be increased to 8%. The non-degree courses were to be doubled. Craft-courses were to be increased to more than three times the existing provision. Table 4.3 gives a summary:-

**Table 4.3 Targets for subsidized tertiary education:
first year students**
(Source: DSCRE/0:100)

	1980-81	1989-90 (% of age group)	1994-95	2001-02
Degree courses	2.0	6.0	8.0	8.0
Non-degree courses	16.1	32.5	32.8	32.8
Craft-courses	9.1	23.5	23.8	23.8
Total	27.2	62.0	64.6	64.6

1.6.4. The Recommendations

The CRE made 32 recommendations (See Appendix J) on the "supply" side. These were mainly development targets for institutions. Highlights of the recommendations included:

- (a) expansion of the existing universities, including a new campus for the University of Hong Kong, but *not* a new university;
- (b) inclusion of degree courses in the Polytechnic and Baptist College;
- (c) planning for a second polytechnic;
- (d) establishment of an engineering faculty in The Chinese University of Hong Kong;
- (e) building of the seventh and eighth technical institutes;
- (f) creation of a new government department for technical education and industrial training;
- (g) experimenting with a purpose-built adult education accomodation;
- (h) setting up a working party to oversee teacher education;
- (i) preference of increasing local opportunities over assistance for overseas studies;

The main theme of the recomendations was highlighted in the Postscript:

The prime requirement, it appears, is to cater for the wider range of aptitudes emerging as a result of the expansion of secondary education and to do it as far as possible by providing for diversity of opportunity in institutions equal in prestige though differing in purpose (DSCRE/0:184).

1.7. Fate of the CRE Report

1.7.1. The Executive Council Decision

The CRE Report, a 195 page volume, was forwarded to the Executive Council for discussion and endorsement on July 14, 1981 (DSX01). The meeting decided that

- (a) the CRE Report was acceptable as a basis for discussion and
- (b) the UGPC was to be consulted.

The Executive Council also added its own comments.

These were:

- (a) that economic demand should be given priority over social demands in manpower assessments;
- (b) that the set ratio of technologists/technicians to craftsman did not seem to match international norm;
- (c) that the pros and cons of financing students overseas was to be explored in more detail;
- (d) that there should be provision for certain specialists studies overseas;
- (e) the possibility of a Hong Kong university outside Hong Kong should be explored;
- (f) the increase of university and polytechnic fees to 10% of costs should be considered;
- (g) the issue of the 4-year course duration and a separate matriculation examination for The Chinese University of Hong Kong should be tackled.

The Chief Secretary, Jack Cater, wrote immediately after the Executive Council meeting to the UPGC on July 22,

1981 (DSX02). The letter conveyed the following sentiments:

- (A) the Executive Council in general endorsed the CRE Report;
- (B) the Executive Council wanted to have the opinions of the UPGC on
 - (a) a third university,
 - (b) the size of the existing universities,
 - (c) a second polytechnic,
 - (d) degree courses in Baptist College,
 - (e) UPGC's taking over of the Baptist College,
 - (f) an engineering faculty in the Chinese University of Hong Kong
 - (g) the growth rate of degree courses,
 - (h) the expansion of post-graduate studies;
- (C) the Executive Council's additional comments on the CRE Report, as mentioned on the previous pages.

1.7.2. The UPGC Reply

The UPGC's replied on October 19, 1981 after its September meeting (DSX03). (The UPGC normally met twice a year, in March and in September.)

The UPGC's reply started by reiterating its own programme target for the tertiary institutions. While the Report recommended changing this to 7%, the UPGC maintained the 4% growth rate for the universities up to the year 1989-90. It explained that "rapid development" was "harmful". It would prefer a pace which was "moderately brisk". The same principle applied to the growth of other institutions.

In reply to the specific questions, the UPGC stated:

- (a) A third university should be considered only after 1990.
- (b) Expansion of the sizes of the existing universities was not agreed with.
- (c) The second polytechnic should be an independent institution (there was a proposal that this could be an extension of the Hong Kong Polytechnic).
- (d) The UPGC was glad to take over policy matters in connection with the Baptist College.
- (e) "No" was the answer to the proposal of an engineering faculty in the CUHK.
- (f) There should be substantial expansion in post-graduate studies.

The Final Decisions

The UPGC's reply apparently put the Executive Council in difficulties. The latter further discussed the issue on February 9, 1982. The Government was in a dilemma, because

there were some expectation among the press and educational pressure groups that the Committee's Report would eventually be published and not to publish the Report would incite some pressure groups to campaign for publication. However, in the event of publication it would be necessary to explain in detail why so many of the recommendations have been changed on the basis of advice from the UPGC. This could give rise to controversy, in particular over the role of the UPGC in the formulation of higher education policy (DSX04).

To publish, or not to publish? The decision was that the Report *should not* be published,

though it may be necessary for government spokesmen, if pressed, to reveal certain findings and recommendations

of the Report. As an alternative to publishing the Report, it is proposed that the Government should issue a policy statement of its own. It is not considered appropriate to issue a White Paper at the present time, as education policy will be subject to further review later in the year following the report of the OECD panel. Under these circumstances, it would seem appropriate to issue a briefer policy statement (Ibid.).

However, in the end, the proposal for a replacement statement was indefinitely deferred. Since, nothing about the CRE has been heard of. This may be considered the end of the CRE policy episode.

I.8. After the CRE

While little was known to the public about the CRE and its report, attention to education was soon drawn to the OECD review which was announced in June, 1981 even before the completion of the CRE Report. This was meant to be an Overall Review of the Hong Kong Education System. A study of the OECD provides the substance of Chapter Five. However, a number of significance points should be made.

I.8.1. What the public knew

The public knew very little about the CRE. The press has a short memory. The news focus soon turned to the OECD review. However, one or two papers persisted in probing the CRE.

On January 28, 1982, the *Sing Tao Jih Pao* (a leading Chinese daily newspaper) quoted Shipman, Secretary of CRE: "A report has been competed for quite some time, but there is no fixed date for publication". It also quoted Topley

who said that the OECD panel had read the report but did not comment. It further quoted some senior person who said that publication of the Topley Report might cause embarrassment if its recommendations did not agree with those the OECD panel might make. This was the case before the February 9 EXCO meeting.

On February 20, 1982, the *South China Morning Post* (a leading English daily newspaper) released a number of more substantial points under the title: "Topley review: April release". It was apparently a Government statement in reaction to intensive probing. The paragraphs that follow was the only official news about the CRE since completion of its report:

"The [CRE] report was submitted to the Government on June 24 last year. Since that time extensive consultations have taken place, especially with the UPGC who will consider the matter further during their next visit at the end of next month. Following that visit it is expected that a comprehensive announcement on the Government's policy for the development of tertiary education will be made".

The *Morning Post* further attempted to confirm news from "sources" that the Government has decided against publishing the full report; that the CRE called for the establishment of a second polytechnic in lieu of a third university; and that in 10 years' time there would be an addition of 10,000 university places, i.e. double the capacity.

The SCM Post yesterday asked the Education Branch for confirmation on these three points but in its response, the Branch completely evaded the questions.

On March 31, 1982, the *Sing Tao Jih Pao* revealed that "there is high possibility that the Topley Report may become

a confidential internal paper and will never be published". The paper analysed that besides the "embarrassment" due to possible disagreement from the OECD panel, there was a second possible explanation that the recommendations were too "idealistic" and had encountered strong objections from "pragmatists" in the Government. Members of the CRE and its Secretariat refused to say anything about the report.

1.8.2. An internal document

The *Sing Tao Jih Pao* did say that the report was circulated among officials at the Director grade and that the abridged version was available to administrations of higher education institutions.

The former was confirmed. The CRE Report was issued to senior officials of relevant government departments (ISX08; CSL02). Its status was dubious. On the one hand, it is not a policy document; on the other hand, there has been no policy paper to replace it as a guideline for development in higher and technical education. At one point in 1984, an Executive Councillor said in categorical terms that "The Topley Report is being updated!" (ISX04), but there was no further confirmation of this.

1.8.3. Policy developments after the CRE

Despite the lack of a policy paper, technical and higher education did not stand still in the five years that followed. A number of new developments was closely related to the CRE recommendations:

In 1982, a statutory Vocational Training Council (VTC) was established to replace the Hong Kong Training Council. The VTC was equipped with its executive arm, a newly created Technical Education and Industrial Training Department (TEITD) which was in fact a merger of three divisions: the Technical Education Division in the Education Department and the original Training Council Division and the Apprenticeship Division under the Labour Department. The VTC took over the technical institutes.

The establishment of the VTC and the TEITD was within the recommendations of the CRE report (DSCRE/0:175). However, such arrangements had long been underway with the general course of the HKTC which dissolved itself in March, 1981 before the CRE report was made.

In 1984, the VTC announced that the seventh and eighth technical institute were to be built. This was formally recommended by the CRE (DSCRE/0:131-141).

In 1984, a second polytechnic, the City Polytechnic, started to operate. This was again one of the major recommendations of the CRE (DSCRE/0:117). In fact, in its First Report, the Planning Committee for the Second Polytechnic attributed its appointment to the CRE proposal and the subsequent endorsement by the UPGC (Planning Committee, 1982).

Starting from 1984, the Baptist College was brought within the ambit of the UPGC, this was also recommended by the CRE (DSCRE/0:128).

In 1984, the Financial Secretary, in his annual budget

speech, disclosed the plan for higher education development, which aimed to provide first degree places for 8% of the mean age group 17-20 in 1994-95. This was the target proposed by the CRE (DSCRE/0:171).

In 1985, both the polytechnics and the Baptist College began operating degree courses, another recommendation of the CRE (DSCRE/0:115; 119; 122).

In 1986, The Chinese University of Hong Kong announced its plan to establish an Engineering Faculty, this implemented another CRE recommendation (DSCRE/0:110) which was not endorsed by the UPGC.

However, not all policies agree with the CRE recommendations. As an example, the Government announced in 1986 its commitment to establish a Third University, a point refuted by the CRE (DSCRE/0:115) but favoured by the UPGC. Subsidy to overseas undergraduate studies started in 1983, although it was restricted to U.K. Meanwhile, the re-organization of teacher training facilities and the co-ordination of adult education were seemingly neglected after the CRE episode.

According to a Government official: "In sum, the Topley Report is a document that has not been accepted, but it still conditions our thinking" (ISX09).

In 1986, under pressure from the elected members of the LEGCO, a summary table was released to review the state of affairs of the recommendations put forward by the CRE. This is included in this thesis as Appendix J.

II. Development of the Manpower Model

The position of the manpower model was conspicuous in the CRE episode, as reflected in the CRE Report. It would not be an exaggeration to say that the manpower model was virtually the backbone for the CRE recommendations. It is therefore worthwhile to spend more time to examine how this manpower model took shape and what were the reactions to the model during the CRE exercise.

Before we start looking into the details, a time line may help:

- Dec 1, 1980 CRE Secretary's Paper
- scene setting for manpower forecasting
- Dec 4, 1980 CRE Secretary's letter to Secretary for the Civil Services, for manpower survey
- Dec 6, 1980 HKTC Secretary's paper
- the manpower assessment methodologies adopted by the HKTC
- Dec * 1980 CRE Chairman's paper
- manpower studies for educational planning
- Dec 19, 1980 Second CRE meeting
- decided on manpower modelling
- Jan 8, 1981 CRE Secretary's paper
- commenting HKTC survey results
- Feb *, 1981 Yip's First Report on manpower model
- Mar 13, 1981 HKTC's comment on Yip's First Report
- Mar 26, 1981 Report of manpower requirements in three sectors
- Apr 2, 1981 Williams' comment on Yip's First Report
- Apr 15, 1981 Yip's Second Report on manpower model
- 1981 Williams' reaction to the Second Report

[*] Exact date not available.

II.1. The Stated Objective

Why was manpower forecasting adopted as a basic approach? We may start from what the CRE claimed as the importance of assessing future manpower requirements, that

there is a need to be satisfied that economic growth and the development of the social services would not be impeded by deficiencies in educational standards among new recruits to the labour force;

changes in the output from the education system can have major repercussions on the labour market and it is important that trends within education and within employment should be understood;

they [assessments of manpower] may serve to draw attention to particular areas of shortage where additional graduates, given the right kind of training, may be usefully employed (DSCRE/O:41-42).

To substantiate this claim, it is necessary to look at the Committee's working papers, to see how the manpower approach was actually placed in the process of the CRE Review.

In a scene-setting paper (DSCRE/4) the CRE Secretary outlined the responses of the Government to the recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Diversification (ACD). After all, the ACD recommendations formed one of the major considerations in the terms of reference of the CRE. And two out of the six considerations were on manpower (See I.2.1 of this Chapter).

This paper could be regarded as laying out the basic manpower issues and the related controversies to be considered by the CRE. These issues included:

- (1) regular review of the manpower forecasts,
- (2) the "crisis" for the craft-courses,
- (3) the line between craft and technician courses,
- (4) the governance of technical education,
- (5) the attraction of part-time day-release courses,
- (6) the co-ordination of adult education.

Immediately after, the Secretary sent a letter to the Secretary for the Civil Service, asking the latter to conduct a sort of employer's opinion survey in the public sector.

II.2 The HKTC methodology

Next to this, the CRE Secretary distributed a paper from Horace Knight, Secretary of the Hong Kong Training Council, who explained on December 6, 1980 its method of manpower assessment.

The HKTC assessment was a biennial exercise for ten major industries. Similar exercises were started for six service industries. It used the employers' opinion survey to obtain data about

- (a) current employed workers with income ranges;
- (b) current workers under training;
- (c) existing vacancies;
- (d) forecast of additional vacancies;
- (e) education and training workers should have.

The HKTC used what it called the "adaptive forecasting technique for manpower planning" (See also Chapter 1,

III.3.2)

Briefly, in this method the available data are weighted as the basis for forecasting. The weights used are geometric series with heavier weight given to the more recent data (DSCRE/5: para 5).

That is, the method required moderate history of data and was more dependent on the recent data.

HKTC claimed that besides the assessment made by Williams, it had consulted the Bureau of Labour Statistics of the Department of Labour in the United States, and also the Education and Labour Market Policies Branch of the International Labour Office. The ILO expert, Keichi Inore, commended the HKTC exercise as "an unique method" that "contains many lessons to be learnt by other countries" (DSCRE/5: Annex D), although he also pointed out that substitutability and internal promotion, monitoring and cost-benefit analysis should also be taken into account.

II.3. The Williams' Papers

Then came the two papers Williams wrote during his visit in 1977/78 pertaining to the use of manpower forecasting and rate-of-return analysis in educational planning. These papers were originally prepared for the drafting of the 1978 White Paper.

In the first paper "Manpower forecasting as a basis for educational planning for Hong Kong", Williams briefly surveyed the development of manpower forecasting approaches elsewhere and concluded that "at the present time, overall manpower forecasting is likely to be only very modestly

useful to Hong Kong" (DSCRE/6: Annex A: para 6).

He called for attention to *manpower planning* which is a broader concept than forecasting and involves policies and programmes in such fields as wages and incentives, analysis of the employment situation, employment creation, labour training and retraining, mobility of labour, etc. (Ibid.: para 7)

He went on to evaluate the manpower forecasting method used by the HKTC and made strong criticisms both the technical and conceptual aspects of the method. This had received heavy backfire from the HKTC, but that was in 1978.

The second paper tried to introduce to policy-makers in Hong Kong the rate of return approach to educational planning. Reference was made to the Hong Kong system, the relevant data required, and its implications for policies related to the 1977 Green Paper.

II.4. The Choice of Manpower Modelling

The CRE Secretary, in a following paper, addressed the difficulties in finding a "reliable method" for manpower forecasting (DSCRE/7:1). He listed 4 different methods at hand and tried to justify the adoption of the manpower modelling approach (Ibid.:5). This was regarded as being "the one most likely to produce useful results", because

it makes use of predictions of changes in the size and in the composition of the labour force which are already available and because the results would be constrained within limits on which reasonable confidence can be placed (Ibid.:4).

Meanwhile, it was emphasized over and over again that results of the employers' opinion survey obtained by the Training Council "will be taken into account" (Ibid.: para 11; 13), although the overall comment on the survey method was its weakness in longer term planning, a comment made by Williams in an earlier visit.

The paper also outlined the two stages in which such a manpower model would be developed.

II.5. Comments on HKTC results

Before long, on January 8, 1981, the Secretary distributed another paper on manpower supply and demand (DSCRE/12). In this paper, the results of the most recent Training Council (79-80) manpower assessments were presented. It was disclosed in this paper that in a meeting on December 19, 1980, the Training Council methodology was discussed and a 9-point qualification of the method was suggested. Given all these, the assessments pointed to the broad conclusion that by 1985

- (i) the supply of technologists should be adequate;
- (ii) the shortfall in the supply of technicians should have been reduced and
- (iii) there would continue to be a very serious shortfall in the supply of qualified craftsmen.

The technologists : technicians : craftsmen ratios would be as presented in the following table.

Table 4.4 Manpower Density Ratio (Technologists as 1)

	Technologists	Technicians	Craftsmen
demand	1	3.8	8.4
supply (1981) (Existing)	1	2.6	2.1
supply (1985) (Projection)	1	2.6	2.9

Two points here might be noticeable for future discussions:

- (1) The CRE did not find the HKTC methodology desirable.
- (2) the HKTC assesement pointed to a demand for more craftsmen but not technologists nor technicians.

II.6. The First Report

The manpower modelling materialized in two reports, pertaining to two stages in the development of the Model. Stage I was to assume the *existing* structure of occupation and educational levels and to arrive at a *minimum* requirement picture. In Stage II, requirements were calculated based on a *future* structure of occupation and educational levels. Both results were done by Yip, a Senior Statistician working in the Education Department.

The First Report (DSCRE/36) was the result of Stage I. There were four steps in this stage: (1) projecting the

total employment; (2) projecting by industries; (3) projecting by occupational groups and (4) translating into educational levels. The assumptions in the preceding paragraph came into play in steps (c) and (d).

The nature of the Stage I exercise was best explained by one paragraph in the First Report:

This method is a modification of the OECD Mediterranean Regional Project approach which starts from a projection of output instead of employment... It may be argued that the approach adopted is not linked to the targeted output and is therefore looking at the supply side of the equation rather than the demand. The rationale is that the nature of the Hong Kong economy and the flexibility of its labour market are such that one can safely assume that there is always full employment (Ibid.: 4).

The findings of Stage I concluded that firstly, the whole economy would shift away from primary production sectors and accordingly workers would shift towards higher educational qualifications. Secondly, comparing supply and demand, there would be a shortfall of university graduates in 1986 and 1991, but not in 1996 and 2001; however, there would be over-provision in other types of post-compulsory education.

The second conclusion apparently ran against the conclusions of HKTC findings discussed in DSCRE/12 which pointed to an adequacy of technologists (graduates) and a serious shortfall of craftsmen.

The author of the First Report was quick to point out that what had been obtained in stage one was only a minimum, that is, over-provision might not really mean over-provision, but shortfall meant more serious shortfall, given

the expanding nature of the Hong Kong economy.

This First Report was considered by the CRE at its sixth meeting held on March 14, 1981 (DSCRE/62: 1). It was then commented on by the Hong Kong Training Council, the Education Department and Williams.

II.6.1. The HKTC Response

The HKTC Secretary, Horace Knight, immediately made a brief comment on the First Report. He queried the source of data and put forward a large amount of evidence to prove the existence of potential errors in the data. In a short concluding paragraph, Knight said

The errors in the data source might be very high and would be magnified many times in the process of long-term projection. Nevertheless, the quantitative results may be used as qualitative indicators for policy formation (DSCRE/36a).

Although this was followed by a vague sentence reiterating the importance for a flexible technical and tertiary education system, the comments did not seem to represent fierce opposition about the implications of the First Report.

II.6.2. Williams' comments

Williams came to Hong Kong after the First Report was completed. Williams made his response to the First Report on his way to Hong Kong (DSCRE/47).

In this paper, he spent a few paragraphs trying to distract the CRE from indulgence in pure "economic desiderata". The main body of the paper was devoted to

commenting on the First Report. He pointed out a number of possible errors and a number of unpredictables, and concluded

My conclusion on the manpower forecasting model that has been developed is that whilst it has been constructed with a high level of technical competence and enormous care its main value to the Committee is to illuminate the pitfalls of forecasting rather than to lead it to a definite conclusion (Ibid.: 9).

In more concrete terms, Williams pointed out that

Since we know that the labour force will become on average more educated . . . , the model by its nature is bound to show a future large deficit of low-level skills and a surplus of high level skills (Ibid.: 10, original emphasis).

He further opined that the change Hong Kong was undergoing was not marginal:

I can't think of any country which has moved as rapidly as Hong Kong from more or less universal primary education to more or less universal secondary. This may produce something of a labour shortage in respect of young unskilled workers in the short-term and result in rising wages for uneducated labour: in a few years time, the basic level of education of new entrants to the labour force will be much higher (Ibid.: 11).

Williams went on to reiterate the possible application of rate of return analysis to Hong Kong's education. The remarks revolved round the high rate of return of Hong Kong's tertiary education: high cost and scarce provision in the public sector; and inequity between the public and the private sector.

In short, it could be said that besides giving all kinds of technical advice, Williams diplomatically warned against the danger of relying heavily on manpower planning approaches.

II.7. Three Manpower Calculations

Before Williams made his comment, the CRE Secretary distributed three papers containing manpower forecasts for three sectors: the Civil Service, the Social Welfare Department and the construction industry (DSCRE/44).

The three calculations all pointed to the future inadequacy of high skill manpower. By high skill manpower here was meant university and polytechnic graduates as well as post-graduates. In the case of the construction industry, deficiencies were noted also in the training schemes of technicians, craftsmen and operatives.

II.8. The Second Report

After all these comments, a Second Report was produced by Yip on April 15, 1981 (DSCRE/62).

II.8.1. Results of the Manpower Model

The Second Report admitted that although the First Report was meant to give a minimum, this minimum had been conservative (Ibid.:1). On the supply side, the Second report took into account also returning graduates from overseas, and this had been considered in greater detail by Williams in a separate paper (DSCRE/57).

The two constants: occupational distribution within industries and educational composition of workers within occupations had now changed.

The occupational distribution was projected after (a) a

trend analysis, (b) consultations and (c) international comparison with reference to Japan, Singapore and Taiwan.

The educational composition was replaced by the "desirable" composition based on consultations and the manpower survey conducted by the Hong Kong Training Council. Based on this desirable composition, two sets of projections were derived: a *high* projection assuming the target year as 1991 and a *low* projection assuming the target as 2001.

The Second Report concluded, in a typical planning language:

The shortfall of university places in 1980-86, at only about 340 a year, seems to suggest the creation of new places in existing institutions, while the anticipated shortfall after 1986 justifies the creation of a new institution. The shortfall of technician and craft places in 1980-1986 means the need for at least one additional technical institute; to meet the shortfall in 1997-2001 requires 8 new technical institutes, or 1 new polytechnic and about 3 technical institutes (Ibid.:25).

At two points in the Second Report, reference was made to the HKTC manpower survey and the Advisory Committee on Diversification respectively.

The ratio of workers with degree to workers with technician or equivalent post-secondary education was projected by the Model as between 1 : 1.5 and 1 : 1.9. The HKTC manpower survey arrived at a figure of 1 : 3.3. The Second Report argued that if non-technical workers were to be included (and these had not been covered by the HKTC), the ratio at 1979, 1980 were 1 : 1.3 and 1 : 1.4 respectively. The ratios as calculated by the Civil Services Branch were 1 : 1.8 and 1 : 1.7 and was projected to 1 : 1.4

for 1990/91. The following table may help to visualize the situation.

Table 4.5. Manpower Ratios: Non-degree/Degree Holders

	1979	1980	1990
CRE Manpower Model	1.3	1.4	1.5 - 1.9
HKTC	-	-	3.3
Civil Services Branch	1.8	1.7	1.4

The old debate reappeared in the form of numerical data: More degree holders or more sub-degree graduates? (DSCRE/62: 13)

In connection with the point of additional technical institutes, the construction of a few more technical institutes ran against the Advisory Committee on Diversification's apprehension about difficulties of filling craft places. This might be even more so when 70% of the F3 leavers would obtain a place in an ordinary school. This made apparent the real problem in planning technical education, that provision of places did not guarantee a real supply (DSCRE/62: 26).

II.8.2. Williams' comments on the Second Report

Williams welcomed the Second report for its more realistic approach, particularly for its employment of actual data (DSCRE/62a: para 1-2).

However, Williams criticised the unrealistic forecast

caused by the recognition of only formal qualifications. He also warned against the tendency of "trying to impose rigid hierarchical classifications on jobs and appropriate qualifications for them".

This seems likely to inhibit mobility and versatility of labour which has been one of the great strengths (as I understand it at least) of the Hong Kong labour scene. The direction of policy and planning in Hong Kong should not, in my opinion, be in the direction of greater specification of occupation - qualification - salary links (DSCRE/62: para 9).

Williams addressed the problem of under-subscription for craft courses and called for a re-structuring of the craft courses, given the fact that there were theoretically enough Form 4 places for Form 3 leavers.

In this comment, Williams was more out-spoken on his views about manpower forecasting:

I have a more general set of doubts about the logic of what is being attempted through the long-range forecasting model used in Phase 1 and Phase 2. The basis for the estimates of manpower required is a forecast by the Census and Statistics office of the future distribution of employment by industrial sector. But this distribution must surely depend on the supply, productivity and price of labour and these will depend in part on the quantity and quality of the supply. To attempt to derive the scale of the education system, supply, from a forecast of labour force distribution is in some senses a back to front operation, or at best a circular one (Ibid.: para 15).

He called for emphasis on "manpower planning" at least as much as manpower forecasting, so that the absorptive capacity of the economy for educated labour and the growth of productivity of labour had to be studied in order to see the "economic need" for post-secondary education (Ibid.: 6-7).

III. Actors in the CRE

Before analysing the CRE Episode, it is necessary to examine the principal actors and their roles. The actors identified and described here will also be significant in the OECD review to be discussed in Chapter 5.

However, it is perhaps necessary to clarify the meaning of an actor as adopted in this thesis. There could be at least three levels in which people study actors in policy-making. At the first level, the attention is on the behaviours of the individual participants in the policy-making process, to understand how decisions are made in a group. This often occurs in the realms of psychology or behavioural science and the actors are individuals. At the second level, the subject of study is the interaction between different organized forces which contribute to policy-making. Here, the actors are policy organizations and the study usually takes a framework in political science. At the third level, the participants in policy-making are identified as representing interests of different social groups (or classes) in the larger society. Such studies often assume a sociological framework, or a framework of Marxian political economy.

In this thesis, the second level meaning of actors is adopted. That is, actors are the identifiable organizations which participate in the policy-making process. The purpose of this study is to understand how these organizations interact with each other to yield policy decisions. There

will be little discussion, unless necessary, on the behaviours or personalities of the individual actors in the process; nor will discussion go into the sociological background of the groups the actors are representing.

In this context, the CRE itself is an actor, but since the CRE has been discussed in detail, we shall not repeat its description. In this section, we shall examine the roles played during the CRE exercise by the EXCO, and the three advisory bodies - BoE, HKTC and UPGC.

III.1. The Executive Council (EXCO)

The EXCO was evidently the chief decision-maker of education policies. In this CRE episode, it decided firstly the adoption (or non-adoption) of the CRE Report; secondly that consultations to be carried out (in this case the UPGC as the consultant) and thirdly ways to handle the report (in this case non-publication and no substitution).

As is mentioned in Chapter 1, the EXCO was virtually the top decision-making body from which the Governor generated his decisions. The Governor seldom made decisions without informing or discussing these with the EXCO. The farthest the Governor would go was perhaps like the extreme case in 1977 when he instituted nine-years compulsory education. In this case, only Topley and Q.W. Lee were "consulted" (See further analysis in Chapter 6, I.1).

However, it is also evident that the EXCO did not prescribe policy decisions. There is no evidence that the

EXCO had any pre-determined policy options that they would have liked the CRE to endorse; or the EXCO would like to steer decisions to any certain direction when things were "going off the track". On the contrary, the EXCO was in dilemmas when it had to face conflicting constraints.

For example, when the CRE did not come to terms with the UPGC, the EXCO had to find a way to compromise.

The decision for the non-publication of the CRE Report was another example. On the one hand there was the unsolved conflict of options and publication of the Report was bound to embarrass someone or another; on the other hand, there was the public pressure for some outcome from the CRE.

It was the dilemma, rather than the solution to the dilemma, that was indicative of the role of the EXCO. If we can single out the CRE episode, the EXCO was more concerned with smooth running of policy-making than the substance of the policies.

The EXCO did exercise its "power" to have the final say. It added to the CRE recommendations its supplementary comments (See I.7.1 of this Chapter). However, even then, the "comments" were new questions more than directives and did not play judge in the debate.

However, these supplementary comments do present a challenge to the values behind the CRE recommendations. The supplementary comments emphasized economic needs over social demand. Its query of technologist : technician : craftsmen ratio are inclined to the HKTC viewpoints. Many informants

that these reflect the opinions of Sir S.Y. Chung, the Chief Unofficial Member of LEGCO and EXCO, himself an engineer and identified spokesman for the industrialists. He was the architect for the idea of a polytechnic and then the second polytechnic. It is also believed that he was the strong proponent who gained the Governor's sympathy to start the third university which would concentrate on engineering. During the EXCO discussion of CRE Report, Chung refuted the CRE approach and favoured an education system that would give room to production of more craftsmen (ISX08). However, on the whole the EXCO comments were still interrogative in nature.

A number of other points are worth noticing. First, the subsidy of overseas students went against CRE decision. This eventually became a policy. Second, the increase of tuition fees was not within the terms of reference of the CRE, not even that of the UPGC. Third, the reminder to tackle the CUHK problem was particularly spectacular. This was against an earlier Governor decision to drop the topic and that was supposed to be a result of consultation with the EXCO (see Chapter 6, I.2).

The proposal of a Hong Kong university outside Hong Kong sounds like a casual joke, but that helps to understand the attitude of the EXCO members towards the CRE.

III.1. The UPGC

The importance of the UPGC can be realized in the fact

that it was the only body that the EXCO consulted after the completion of the CRE report. It could be argued that the importance of the UPGC was by virtue of its terms of reference of planning higher education, but then the HKTC should have been given equal status.

The role played by the UPGC in the CRE episode was an ambivalent one. On the one hand, it was at least partially the UPGC's "uncomfortable" feeling about the slow growth rate of higher education that initiated the entire CRE exercise. This was actually written into the terms of reference and became first of the six basic considerations upon which the CRE deliberated (see I.2.1 of this Chapter). On the other hand, it was apparently the UPGC's disagreement with the CRE's ambitious recommendations that caused the CRE report to remain unpublished (see I.7.2-3 of this Chapter).

The relation between the UPGC and the Governor was a very special one. The UPGC was not a statutory body and has no legal relations with the EXCO (See Chapter 1, II.3.3). That the EXCO wrote to the UPGC for consultation itself was a very unusual move.

III.3. The Training Council (HKTC)

The HKTC was not formally consulted during the CRE exercise, as was in the case of the UPGC. However, as technical education was a major component in the entire CRE exercise, the HKTC was actively involved in the CRE. This was evident from (1) the presence of Chen Shou-lum in the

CRE, (2) the HKTC's input during the proceedings of the CRE and (3) the HKTC's input from outside the CRE.

The HKTC's input during the CRE was mainly its manpower calculation. The Secretary of the HKTC, Horace Knight, presented a paper to the CRE to illustrate the manpower assessment methodology adopted by the HKTC. This was included as one of the seven approaches to manpower calculations in the CRE Report (DSCRE/0:43-49). Although the usefulness of the HKTC manpower survey for educational planning was controversial, it provided the most consistent set of data on the stock of skilled manpower in Hong Kong.

The debate between the HKTC and the CRE concentrated on the density ratio of high-level manpower. In the area of technical education and vocational training, the HKTC almost had the full say.

The HKTC did not agree with the CRE Report but did not attempt to veto the Report. It had its own objectives which paid more attention to the well-being of the industries and therefore held very different concept about educational planning.

The later transformation (1982) of the HKTC into the VTC with a new Technical Education and Industrial Training Department as its administrative arm, and which takes over the technical institutes were well planned by the HKTC independent of the CRE. This might explain why the HKTC was not too opposed to the CRE Report, because anyway the HHTC did not feel it would be seriously affected.

III.4. The Board of Education

The BoE's reaction to the CRE recommendations was much less significant than the other two advisory bodies. There are two reasons for this. First, the issues under study by the CRE was very much beyond the scope of the BoE. Second, BoE was very much treated as an "internal" consultative body and did not have any identifiable sphere of influence.

The BoE, however, was more significant in other episodes such as the Overall Review which is discussed in Chapter Five.

IV. Analyses of the CRE

IV.0. Introduction

In the previous sections, the entire episode of the CRE has been described. The description has been mainly based upon analysis of documents, both published and unpublished and can be regarded as "facts". It is the task of this section to *explain* the Episode. We shall present two alternative explanations: the *rational* explanation and *legitimacy* explanation.

In order to reduce the explanations to some manageable size, the explanations will restrict themselves to three specific questions:

Why was the CRE Report not published?

What was the role of the manpower model in CRE?

Why was the CRE review launched?

The reasons for choosing these three questions are obvious. The fate of the CRE Report was the most dramatic point in the entire exercise. However, the fate of the Report is subject to interpretation. Can we say that the UPGC rejected the report? Is that Report dead, or was it virtually adopted as a policy paper? The only thing that is definite is that the CRE Report was not published. Therefore, this is taken as the starting point of the explanations. Moreover, the manpower model was the crucial part of the entire CRE exercise. It is therefore sensible to choose this manpower model as the axis around which the explanations revolve. The answers to these two questions

will inevitably lead one to explain why the CRE exercise was ever started.

In the explanations, interview data will be extensively used. This is an attempt to make sense of perceptions of the "insiders" during the policy-making process. The sources of all these interviews are, as explained in Chapter Two, confidential and are therefore coded. Discussions in this section therefore differ from previous sections in that it deals more with interpretation of facts than presentation of factual information.

IV.1. The Rational Explanation

The *rational* explanation assumes the broad notion of rationality as discussed in Chapter 3. It works under the assumption that the actors in the CRE episode were concerned to produce some policy (See Chapter 3, I.7). The actors may either be *substantively rational* to arrive at some optimal policy, *procedurally rational* to get satisfactory decisions, or as discussed in Chapter 3, *partisan rational* to try whatever means to produce policies that favour their respective interests.

IV.1.1. Why was the CRE Report not published?

The EXCO decision not to publish the Report resulted from the lack of endorsement from the UPGC.

There was obvious disagreement between the CRE and the UPGC. This has been evident in the discussions in the

previous section and was implicitly confirmed in the EXCO discussion that "in the event of publication it would be necessary to explain in detail why so many of the [CRE] recommendations have been changed on the basis of advice from the UPGC" (DSX04 , see I.7.3. of this Chapter). The disagreement between the CRE and the UPGC can be understood at three "levels".

Level 1 The goal: expansion of higher education.

There did not seem to be any disagreement between the CRE and the UPGC about the goal of expanding higher education. In fact, it was the UPGC's "uncomfortable feeling" about the slow growth rate that prompted the Government to launch the CRE review.

The UPGC in general felt uncomfortable with the 3% university growth rate. This was not expressed in paper, in any formal document, nothing of that sort. The feeling made the Governor to raise the 3% to 4%. The UPGC did not have the time to further investigate, and therefore advised the Governor to do a review (ISU12)(similar remarks by ISU03).

This was actually written in the terms of reference of the CRE as the first item to be taken into consideration. It refers to the "advice of the UPGC about the 'uncomfortable implications' of the slow growth rate for universities and the Polytechnic" (See I.2.1 of this Chapter). We can therefore safely assume that the CRE and the UPGC agree in principle that there should be a considerable improvement in the growth of higher education.

Level 2 The approach: "social demand".

The UPGC did not endorse the "social demand approach" which was exhibited in the CRE deliberations. This was

strongly put forward by one informant (ISU04) who was a member of the UPGC at the time of the decision. His opinion was that Topley was planning higher education as if it were mass schooling. He called the CRE recommendations a result of "social demand planning":

UPGC members were quite sensitive about Topley's social planning demand [sic]. UPGC would not like to see the top higher institutions impeded by unsound policy. Implicitly, who won the policy debate would get the money. Therefore, Topley could win, only because he had grand ideas. If you ask Topley what is the difference between policies for higher education and that for mass schooling, he could not answer, he did not know. UPGC had struck Topley a blow. Topley had once been Secretary for UPGC, he left UPGC perhaps he was tired of the elitism of UPGC (ISU04).

This member actually perceived elitism as a basic deviation of the UPGC from the CRE. This conflict of ideas is to some extent confirmed by one of the key figures in the CRE:

In a way, we are coming to the stage of doing mass education at higher education level... It is a demographic issue (ISX08).

Other members of the UPGC shared similar views, although they did not spell out elitism as the banner of UPGC (ISU04; ISU03). As an example, another informant from the UPGC, who participated in the discussion of CRE recommendations, said:

The expansion of higher education [in the CRE Report] was calculated with manpower considerations which the members of UPGC, with their experience elsewhere, had some mistrust. We would rather consider the demand of the students (ISU02).

It is noticeable that although both sides agree to base higher education developments on "student demands", they

interpret the term "student demand" very differently. The "demand of students" in the CRE Report meant demand for quantity. The "demand of students" interpreted by the UPGC was one for quality.

Level 3 The method: a new university?

If "elitism" was really behind UPGC's objection of the CRE recommendations, why was it, as mentioned in the terms of reference of the CRE, that UPGC had worried about the "uncomfortable implications" of the 3% slow growth rate?

Another informant seemed to have answered this puzzle. This informant, another UPGC member during the time of the CRE discussion, said:

UPGC was always of the idea that 3% was a small rate. There had always been a low emphasis on tertiary education. The later increase to 4% included medical [expansions] and meant nothing to non-medical courses. Topley's task was just to reverse the mistakes. The rule of thumb, however, was the establishment of new institutions (ISU03).

This is compatible with the two earlier opinions that UPGC was against too great an expansion at institutional levels.

The bone of contention then, using universities as an example, was whether or not a new university should be established as a means of expanding education. The CRE recommended expansion of university education within the existing universities, by installing a second campus of the University of Hong Kong. The UPGC proposed the establishment of a third university some time after 1990. ISU02 laid out the general principles on institutional limitations:

Expansion of higher education institutions have a number of limitations to be taken into consideration: the physical building, the financial constraints and most importantly the recruitment and training of the staff. Therefore the expansion rate has to be limited to a few percent. Because of this, it has always been the case that the UPGC has to advise the Government to spend less, and it is not always easy to keep this dialogue to the Government (ISU02).

This also explains the UPGC proposal that a new university be considered only after 1990 and not before.

There was also an explicit explanation for the need of a new university:

We found the expansion of the University of Hong Kong on its existing site quite unlikely; expansion can materialised on a remote site and that is inappropriate. Expansion could be done in The Chinese University of Hong Kong, but this is not likely before it has changed its structure to make it less expensive (ISU02).

A more elaborate version of this opinion was put forward by another UPGC member:

The cost [of a second campus] may not be much less than building a third university, and we thought a further expansion of the HKU might change its character. On the other hand, expansion with a second campus [of HKU] might provide us with more or less the same sort of course HKU was running; it would not provide us with the flexibility as we would have with a new university. Flexibility is essential for the 21st Century (ISU12).

After all, both the CRE and the UPGC were in favour of expansion in higher education, but there was marked difference in the interpretation of what is social demand, in weighing quality against quantity. This difference boils down to the debate of whether or not a new university should be established instead of building a second campus of HKU.

This argument was more fairly put forward by another senior member of the UPGC who retired from UPGC after the

CRE episode. He perceived that

Topley's Report was not refuted by the UPGC, but was put into a different perspective by the UPGC... The CRE differed from the UPGC in that it had different projections and different kinds of scrutiny (ISU05).

This view was shared by one government official who specified the difference as that

Topley was of the belief that Hong Kong, like Singapore, was a place where economic needs dictated individual needs. The UPGC believed that individual needs should come before the needs of the state (ISX06).

It is interesting to see how one OECD Overall Review member perceive this difference as a third party (ISOR3):

In my impression, the UPGC was not a very imaginative lot. They seemed to regard higher education as their pet child. They stuck to the 3%, 4% growth rate and did not consider higher education in the context of the social structure. They had a type of immunity from a broader consideration of the entire society. This is perhaps very much the pattern in UK and in Australia.

The rational explanation assumes that both the CRE and the UPGC were rational in their decisions. That is, both of them were concerned with a considerable expansion of higher education. The conflict was therefore a serious difference in approaches or ideologies of planning higher education. Under these circumstances, the UPGC did not endorse the CRE Report. Since the OECD Review was pressing, time was not enough to resolve this disagreement. Hence, nothing could be published as an acceptable policy document before the OECD Review.

The rational explanations may lead to a question of why the UPGC objection was not represented through its members in the CRE. This was explained by ISU12:

The three members participated as individuals in personal capacities. They did not represent the collective view of the UPGC.

IV.1.2. What was the Role of the Manpower Model in CRE

This pertains to a number of questions: Why was the manpower model adopted in the CRE? How did the manpower model affect the final recommendations of the CRE? Given the fate of the CRE Report, what was the position of the manpower model?

In the rational explanation, the reason for using the manpower model was straightforward. As expressed in DSCRE/7, the method was objective because it depended on data of the existing labour force. This was reiterated in the CRE Report (DSCRE/0:63):

The reason for developing a manpower model is to make projections of manpower requirements in the future starting from a basis of knowledge of the activities and qualifications of the present labour force.

For a number of reasons, the HKTC's manpower survey was not used (DSCRE/0:49):

that the findings of the Training Council's surveys are a useful point of reference but that fairly wide confidence limits must be placed on the estimates they provide;

their usefulness in educational planning is limited by their application only to roughly the next five years ahead, whereas significant adjustments in the output from tertiary education may take much longer to achieve;

that they are so far concerned only with engineers and other technical manpower and not with the full range of educated and skilled manpower, and they cannot therefore provide guidance about the total desirable output from the educational institutions.

In reply to Peter Williams' warnings about the pitfalls

of manpower forecasting in a free market economy, the CRE stated in its Report:

although manpower modelling is a precarious activity with many potential pitfalls, it offered a better means of making long-term projections of manpower requirements than any other means available to the Committee (DSCRE/0:63).

The results of the manpower modelling did enter the CRE Report in a rather significant way. The manpower model results were referred to as "requirements of the economy" (Ibid.:75). The increase in the demand of highly educated and trained manpower was mainly a projection using the manpower model. The major recommendations about expansion of higher education was mainly based on this projection. In other words, the manpower model forecasts that there would be

a shift in distribution of employment to industries which require a greater proportion of highly educated manpower;

a change in the occupational structure of industries toward a higher content of professional and technical or administrative and managerial workers, as a consequence of a tendency for manufacturers and providers of services to move up-market.

On two other occasions, the manpower modelling results were listed together with the HKTC survey results to evidence the potential shortfall of supply of craftsmen (Ibid.:98; 103). This led to the recommendation of two additional technical institutes.

On the whole, the manpower model gave the CRE the rational information base upon which recommendations were made.

The rationality which resided in manpower modelling,

however, did not gain the sympathy of the UPGC. As mentioned in previous paragraphs, the UPGC in general had "mistrust" in manpower methods (See VI.2.1 of this Chapter).

The conflicts between the CRE and the HKTC was again one of rationality. The CRE and the HKTC agreed in expanding technical education, but they have different criteria and different methods in policy deliberation.

The HKTC's basic starting point was the well being of the most industries, and later the service industries, which most likely suffers from manpower shortage. As one member of the former HKTC said:

We never claimed that we were doing educational planning. That would be a false claim. What we were concerned were the demands of technical manpower and personnel in the industries. Our manpower survey is a basis, but not the basis for planning (ISVO1).

Therefore, its success lay in the detection of shortfall and the subsequent supply of manpower in the industries, and not in designing a desirable education system. The deliberation of the HKTC was purely led by manpower needs of the economy. With the expansion of the education system and with near universal attendance up to F5, it was natural for the HKTC to worry about serious shortfalls in craftsmen training designed for F3 leavers. Meanwhile, the supply of graduate manpower was not the HKTC's immediate concern.

The CRE's concern was overall planning of education and training. It had to take into consideration both the economic needs and the social demand. Even on the economic

side, based mainly on the manpower model, the entire labour force was taken into account. Under such considerations, the manufacturing industry became only one sector, the sector with a lower technologist-technician-craftsmen ratio compared with other sectors. Therefore, the CRE also concluded that there would be a shortfall of craftsmen, but with a different density ratio. On the other hand, the CRE detected a higher demand for university graduates in the future.

The CRE worked out with its manpower model a density ratio (technologists:technicians:craftsmen) of 1 : 2.6 : 4 in 1986, escalating to 1 : 1.5 : 3 in 1996. The HKTC, with its "employers' opinion" manpower survey and "experience of the industrialists which is not easily expressed in quantifiable terms" (ISU10), found this ratio too low to be acceptable (CSL02; ISV03); and if this were taken as a basis for planning educational provisions, the shortage of craftsmen would be even more severe. This difference was once a subject of heated debate within the CRE. As one informant described:

Most of the [rational] exercises were non-controversial. The manpower model was the only thing that remained highly controversial. It was not compatible with other approaches. It was not a matter of 5% incompatible. It was 5 or 6 times incompatible. There was a heated debate (ISP04).

Nevertheless, in the CRE final Report, the conflict about provision of craftsmen and technicians training seemed to have come to a compromise. Despite the difference in approach and the difference in the calculated requirements,

both the CRE and the HKTC favoured significant expansion in the training of craftsmen and technicians and this was expressed in the recommendations.

However, the conflict between the HKTC and the CRE had led to objections within the EXCO where the industrialists were strongly represented.

IV.1.3. Why was the CRE review launched?

If the above arguments stand, then the launching of the CRE was a natural step in the development of education in Hong Kong. This was reflected in the terms of reference of the CRE in connection with the growing demand for post-compulsory education. As one CRE member remarked:

It followed naturally from the development of education in Hong Kong. We had a white paper for primary education, one for junior education and another for senior education and it was time to have a paper on higher education (ISP04).

This was felt also internally within the higher education sector. The UPGC felt uncomfortable about the slow growth.

This feeling had made the Governor raise the 3% growth rate to 4%. The UPGC did not have time to further investigate, and therefore advised the Governor to do a review (ISU12).

The problem seemed more serious than expected in view of the drastic increase of tuition fees overseas.

On the other hand, there had already been proposals to re-organize technical education and vocational training and the CRE was expected to include this in a comprehensive plan (CSL02).

But why was this policy exercise not carried out by the

normal advisory bodies, viz. the UPGC and the HKTC? One top level official explained:

We.. need an independent body to take the general view about education. In areas like education, we had to handle with great caution, almost uncertainty, as you can see in the field of higher education... This was why there was the Topley Committee (ISX01).

The independence of the CRE is also due to the fact that the policies under examination were cross-sectoral. They ran across higher education as well as technical and vocational education and could not be deliberated independently by the separate sectors.

On the other hand, the deadline of the CRE was pre-empted by the coming of the OECD Review. If the OECD was supposed to review the overall policy, there was a need to fill the blank of higher and technical education with some policy statement (ISP04). In this sense the CRE was a preparation for the OECD review (ISU02), so that the Government might present the OECD panel with a comprehensive range of policy papers running from primary to higher education. This argument may also be used to explain why the Report was rushed out in June, instead of a farther time limit as expected by the Chairman of the CRE in March (See I.4 of this Chapter). It has to meet the deadline before the beginning of the OECD Review.

IV.2. The Legitimacy Explanation

The *legitimacy* explanation provides an alternative to *rational* explanation. The notion of *legitimacy* is discussed at length in Chapter 3. *Legitimacy* can be used to explain the CRE Episode in a number of ways.

For example, the CRE based its recommendations very heavily on manpower modelling, at the same time claiming that it intended to satisfy the social demand for higher education. This inconsistency in approach can be explained away by assuming that there was an intention of expanding higher education and both manpower modelling and social demand only served to legitimate such an intention. That is, the process was to legitimate a pre-determined policy - the fourth sense of *legitimacy* as classified in Chapter 3, II.2.4. Such an explanation, however, is just one of the traditional understanding of "rationalization" of policies.

What is discussed in this section is a different sense of *legitimacy*. In short, the *legitimacy* explanation here assumes that the interactions between the actors in policy-making may not be prompted by a desired policy output, but that the acquisition or defence of *legitimacy* could itself be the "goal". If this stands, then the concern is often in the process rather than the policies *per se*.

In this *legitimacy* explanation, the conflicts, which obviously existed, were not ones of approaches nor of interests, but one of *legitimacy*. The policy-advisory

bodies each acquired or defended its own particular legitimacy to make ("advise on") policies.

As was in the rational explanation, the same three questions are asked and answered, but in a different order:

Why was the CRE Report not published?

Why was the CRE review ever launched?

What was the role of The Manpower Model?

IV.2.1. Why was the CRE Report not published?

In March 1981, when the Chairman of CRE laid out his schedule, he made it clear that

It was the Governor's intention that this view should proceed in consultation with the UPGC, who have a close interest in the subjects covered by the terms of reference (DSCRE/51).

The CRE had noted in the Postscript of its report that although the Chairman had a preliminary discussion with the UPGC in January, 1981, the CRE was not able to test its developed ideas on the UPGC (DSCRE/0:180). Very cautiously, the CRE Report wrote:

While the Committee [CRE] felt that it should indicate its own views, it accepts that a firm decision on these matters should not be reached until the UPGC's advice has been obtained (Ibid).

The CRE's apologetic tone revealed one of the major controversies during the CRE meetings. The issue was: Should the UPGC be consulted before submission of the Report to the Governor-in-Council? (ISU12; ISP04; ISU02; ISU06). ISP04, a CRE member who was not a member of the UPGC, had this description:

The Topley Committee started in November, 1980 and my impression was that there was a tacit assumption that

the UPGC would not mind "intruding its territories", until April [1981], when Bradley, the Secretary for UPGC who was in the Topley Committee, suddenly made a lot of noise about consulting the UPGC. He insisted that he would have reservations over *any* report if the UPGC was not consulted. The three UPGC members more or less held the same stand. To me, it was as if the UPGC was suddenly waken up in April and felt they were not appraised well enough... At one time, things became extremely difficult (ISP04).

The controversy was not only on substantive issues such as the third university, or an Engineering Faculty in the CUHK. Bradley's complaint applied to any report. UPGC consultation *per se* was the issue. In this case, it is not surprising that the UPGC objections were not represented through its three members in the CRE. The three members participated in their personal capacities. What the UPGC was after was not any informal interaction or communication to solve the disagreements. What it required was that it should be consulted in a formal procedure, and that should come from the Governor.

Therefore, the crucial issue was "procedural" and not "substantive", borrowing the terms from Herbert Simon. It was not a matter of whether the UPGC agreed with the substances of the CRE recommendations, but a matter of whether UPGC was procedurally consulted. In other words, the UPGC took the case *politically*.

The situation was confirmed by the UPGC members who participated in the CRE:

The major contribution from the three UPGC members was that they insisted that the UPGC should be consulted before submission of the Report... We did sign the Report with the understanding that the UPGC would eventually be consulted (ISU12).

We once thought that we might walk out, but we didn't (ISU11).

At first sight, if the UPGC disagreed with the CRE recommendations, the disagreement could be carried forward by the three members of the UPGC. Yet the three members, including the UPGC Secretary, signed the Report. One of these members remarked:

You [the researcher] did not ask if I object. I did object. The three members did object....I was away for two months and when I came back home, it was out! We did have input before the report was written. I was prepared not to sign it. If it was not known that they would go to the Governor, we were prepared to make a minority report! They simply hoped they would win, but they lost! (ISU06)

That the UPGC objection was against the *process* rather than the *policies* could further be confirmed by the fact that many of the CRE recommendation which the UPGC had objected *during* the CRE episode were *de facto* adopted by the UPGC *after* the episode (See I.8.3. of this Chapter).

In the end, the CRE Report was submitted to the Governor and then to the EXCO. The UPGC was consulted only after the EXCO discussion (ISU12; ISU02) and, what made the issue even more sensitive, the consultation was hosted by the EXCO, not the Governor. The UPGC took this seriously.

The UPGC was (and still is) non-statutory. Legally the UPGC was only an administrative convenience (ISX09). The UPGC was answerable only to the Governor (Griffiths, 1984). This formed the entire *legitimacy* whereby the UPGC worked. The UPGC members felt honoured as guest advisers to the Governor, but not as part of the Hong Kong Government machinery (ISU01b). The UPGC members regarded their

membership worth the while because they were given the *legitimacy* to deliberate higher education policies independent of the Government bureaucracy and political undercurrents (ISU08; ISU12). They therefore regarded the EXCO letter as an action which might undermine this *legitimacy*. Opening formal communication with the EXCO would erode this *legitimacy* and the UPGC felt its role at stake if it accepted this formal communication.

Then comes the question of why the Government decided to consult the UPGC only after the EXCO discussion, given the overt confrontation within the CRE. The interviews did not provide any consensual answer to this question. There could be several answers.

Answer 1 It was a matter of time.

"Topley did not have time to consult the UPGC before the submission of the Report" (ISU12). On March 27, 1981 the CRE Secretary proposed two alternative schedules for the completion of the Report: arriving at some agreement in mid-July or to adjourn and re-convene in September (DSCRE/51:4, see I.4 of this Chapter). The latter would allow for UPGC consultation:

It is therefore proposed that the Committee's report should be considered by the UPGC during their meeting in September. The Committee could, if necessary, reconvene thereafter to consider whether to modify parts of their report in order to accommodate views expressed by the UPGC (Ibid.)

Apparently, the CRE followed neither schedule. There was a change of schedule and the Report was eventually rushed out in June. One UPGC member who sat on the CRE

(ISU06) was away from Hong Kong and was not even informed of the change. When he came back, the Report was already written.

The Report was rushed out in June and was submitted to the Governor who put the Report forward for discussion in the EXCO. There was therefore no time to wait for official reactions from the UPGC because it would not meet before September.

The question is then: What caused the rush? One easy explanation for the rush was that it had to meet public expectations. When the CRE was appointed in November, it was also announced that it would present its report in six months' time. The change of schedule might be a casual move on the part of the Chairman or the Secretary, but this obtained no sympathy from the Governor. One CRE member recalled:

I do remember Topley once thought of having a summer break and resuming after summer. Most likely, the idea was rejected by the Governor who insisted on the original deadline (ISU12).

This answer is a highly possible reason for the rush, because the later discussion in the EXCO confirmed that there was pressure from the public and the press to have a CRE report (See I.7.3. of this Chapter). If the Government failed to produce a report, it would lose its credibility, or *legitimacy*, among the public. To complete the report according to the announced schedule was then an important factor where the Government upheld its *legitimacy*.

Answer 2 The pressure of the OECD review.

The tight schedule can also be explained by the fact that the OECD Panel was due to pay its first visit in October, 1981. If the Report was to be completed after the September UPGC meeting, it would not be included in the list of policy papers for the OECD review. If this happened, it might be an embarrassment for the Hong Kong Government. One CRE member shared this view:

The Government might feel uneasy that it had done very little in higher education and therefore would like to produce something... as a way by which the Government could restore its credibility and confidence when facing the OECD review (ISP04).

This seemed to be supported by the fact that in the background report (Hong Kong Education System, 1981) produced by the Government Secretariat for the OECD review, the part on higher education policy lacked substantial presentation. Proposals of the 1979 Working Group (see Chapter 1, I.2) which was a government internal group were quite exceptionally quoted as the most recent policy (ISX11).

In this answer, "the substantive recommendations were less important than something to show 'where we stand' in higher education" (Ibid.). The implication is that at that moment, the OECD review had to be seriously faced, and this could only be done at the expense of the UPGC. That is, to produce something on higher education for the OECD review was more important than consulting the UPGC. Therefore, even if it was known that the UPGC might be annoyed, the CRE report had to be rushed out in June. This "credibility"

and "confidence" factors are exactly what we mean by *legitimacy*.

In other words, if there is a blank in the area of post-compulsory education policy, it would significantly reduced the Government's *legitimacy* in hosting the OECD review. To compensate for this, a policy paper was to be produced before the OECD visit. This technically did not fit into the UPGC time-table, and hence offended the latter's *legitimacy* as the virtual policy-maker in higher education.

Answer 3 It was bureaucratic negligence.

In the same March document (DSCRE/51), the Secretary was quite conscious that the UPGC was to be consulted, but he did not seem to realize the political difference between the alternative schedules. He did not seem to realize that producing the final report before or after UPGC's September meeting might make a critical difference.

Anyway, the CRE Secretary did not specify the status of the UPGC consultation. There was no mention whether the UPGC would be consulted before or after submission of the Report to the EXCO. The Secretary might not have even known that the Report would go to the EXCO before the UPGC. The Report went to the Governor and it was the Governor who decided to consult the EXCO before consulting the UPGC. The CRE Chairman might be have been misled by the Governor's promise of UPGC consultation, without noticing the procedural problems when the EXCO discussed the CRE recommendations before the UPGC. Or the CRE Chairman might

have been over-confident and thus underestimated the objection from the UPGC. One CRE member recalled:

After completion of the Report, we held one meeting when the Report was already submitted to the Governor and was due to be considered by the EXCO. My impression was that even at that meeting, Topley was quite optimistic that the Report would soon be released. If you check the newspapers around June [1981], Topley was already "leaking" away some of the bits and pieces of the Report. Obviously, Topley had over-estimated the situation.... (ISPO4).

Even the Governor might have underestimated the UPGC reaction. He might not have regarded consultation after EXCO discussion a serious offence to the UPGC. In fact, it was already very exceptional for the Chief Secretary to write to the UPGC for "endorsement". There was no formal communication between the EXCO and the UPGC, and the EXCO never sought any similar external "endorsement". What the EXCO did was already paying extraordinary respect to the UPGC. However, the UPGC felt this to be unacceptable.

Answer 4 It was a deliberate political move.

The embarrassment at the end of the CRE episode may also be explained as the result of a political battle between the CRE and the UPGC.

The omission of UPGC consultation before submission of the Report was a deliberate move, presumably due to the Governor. Since the CRE Report was submitted to the Governor, it was the Governor who had the discretion to put it to the EXCO or the UPGC as the next step. The Governor apparently chose the former. It was very unlikely that the Governor had not expected the UPGC objection. If the UPGC

objection had been expected, then the omission of UPGC consultation before EXCO discussion was a deliberate political move.

That is, the avoidance of UPGC consultation was a deliberate move to put the UPGC into the hands of the EXCO. In effect, this meant undermining the traditional *legitimacy* of the UPGC, to replace it with some direct communication with the EXCO.

In sum, in the *legitimacy* explanation, the UPGC's objection was mainly not one to the recommendations of the CRE. It objected rather to the procedure that the UPGC was not consulted before the Report was put forward for Government (EXCO) discussion. For one reason or another, the CRE Report was submitted to the Governor who decided to put it to EXCO discussion before UPGC consultation. This was felt by the UPGC as undermining its *legitimacy* for policy-making. This in effect resulted in a failure to secure UPGC endorsement of the CRE Report and this embarrassed the Government. Hence the CRE Report was not published.

IV.2.2. Why was the CRE review ever launched?

If we can push the arguments in the last answer further, the omission of UPGC consultation might well be a part of a larger political move.

This reminds us of a more basic question: Why was the new Seceretary for Education to be established in the first place?

The simple and straightforward answer is that there was

the need to coordinate the fragmented machinery for policy-making in education. Topley himself made this point to the press during the announcement of the CRE exercise:

I think the concept is to look at education as a whole - almost as a seamless garment - with an education secretary for the era that is coming up.

We still have a lot of questions to be decided in education and we want to get a good degree of balance between the different levels, we want to look at all these interfaces, we want to get our access right, the scales right, and the balance between the proportion in the system right so that if you have a Secretary for Education he could sort of overview the whole thing (SCMP, November 19, 1980).

Since the UPGC, the HKTC and the BoE were already legitimate makers (advisers) of policy responsible to the top administration (either the Governor or the Governor-in-Council), the establishment of the Secretary for Education was in effect to insert a new layer between the top administration and the three existing advisory bodies.

There was therefore a coordinating role for the new Secretary for Education to play. To assume this coordinating role, the new Secretary for Education would inevitably need the *legitimacy* which was never there. Thus, the existing *legitimacy* system that worked with the original policy bodies needed to be adjusted.

Although there was no specification in the CRE's terms of reference, the coordinating nature of CRE was implicitly a legitimacy-building exercise for the new Secretary for Education. As a new-comer in the arena, the CRE would inevitably work in the areas where the existing policy bodies (the UPGC and HKTC in particular) used to have full

control. The CRE, in its process to coordinate educational policies, could implicitly establish for itself the legitimacy to coordinate the advisory bodies. This legitimacy would soon be inherited by the new Secretary for Education, which happened to be the CRE Chairman.

This legitimacy issue was also evident in the appointment of the CRE. The formal announcement of the CRE started with the mention of approval from the "Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs" of U.K. (Government Press Release, November 18, 1980; see quotation in I.1. of this Chapter).

The mention of the U.K. approval was extremely exceptional. Although the CRE was "ordered by the Governor-in-Council" (Ibid.), the announcement emphasized the Chairmanship of the CRE which was taken up by the Secretary for Education designate.

Seen in this light, it was a deliberate move for the CRE to lay out higher education policies independent of the UPGC. The UPGC was not too sensitive at the beginning of the CRE exercise and regarded it as a Government exercise within the boundaries of established legitimacy.

The insistence among the UPGC members in the CRE that the UPGC should be consulted was really an "awakening" of the UPGC, and particularly its Secretary, that the CRE might subtly change the status of the UPGC. In fact suspicions had developed among the UPGC members that the UPGC was being downgraded:

I felt UPGC had not got the freedom it used to have.

It was losing its influence over policy issues. It depended on the goodwill of the Governor. I used to go to MacLehose and talk to him in person: "See, we got to do something about this....." (ISU05).

The UPGC objection was not on the substance of the policies. Its objection was neither a mere matter of procedures. It was a battle to restore its *legitimacy* to overseeing higher education.

With this sensitive issue at hand, the omission of UPGC consultation could be a determined move of the Governor so that a new *legitimacy* for higher education policy-making would be granted by the EXCO, or the Governor-in-Council, and not the Governor. If this could be successful, the UPGC's advisory role would be assumed under the Government umbrella. This would pave the way for the new Secretary for Education to take over.

Sensing the implications of this move, the UPGC insisted to the end that, as a matter of legitimacy, it was to be consulted before the submission of the report. Failing that, the UPGC made full use of its legitimacy at hand and refused to endorse the CRE report. This effectively put the EXCO into difficulties. It could be said that in this battle, the UPGC succeeded in restoring its *legitimacy* as the overlord of higher education.

Recollection from the OECD panel members, who visited Hong Kong immediately after the CRE episode in October, 1981, seemed to support the antagonism between Topley and the UPGC. There was evidently an effort after the EXCO decision to restore the *legitimacy* built up by the CRE

through the help of the overseas panel. Two members separately relayed the same incident that during their first visit one of the key figures of CRE once attempted to persuade the OECD panel to say something to support expansion of higher education (See Chapter 5, II.4.). This incident may be viewed with this interpretation: that the CRE had hoped the OECD panel could give it support in its battle against UPGC.

The battle went on even after the CRE. The OECD review, as discussed in Chapter 5, raised the same issue of co-ordination and suggested the setting up of an Education Commission. The UPGC member who made the "downgrading" remark (see quotation on preceding page) actually resigned shortly after the CRE. A local UPGC member opined that the status of the overseas UPGC members have been downgraded since the CRE.

[The UPGC] is now headed by someone of lower status. The local members of the UPGC used to be LEGCO and EXCO members., for example, is now replaced by ... and I doubt if the latter has the same say.... The same happens to the overseas members. If Ted Parkes left the UPGC, there would be no 'Sirs' nor 'Lords' in the UPGC. There used to be Sir John Butterfield and Lord Briggs. Ted Parkes could debate with McLehose face to face. He enjoys even a higher status than Sir Edward Youde back home in U.K. Now it is different. There are also more people from the technical sector (the polytechnics), increasingly more. They are good, but they seem to know little about universities (ISU09).

The Government, eventually succeeded at some later time in putting the Secretary for Education (later the Secretary for Education and Manpower) into direct dialogue with the UPGC (ISU12; ISX09).

IV.2.3. What was the role of the Manpower Model

The *legitimacy* of coordination was also provided by expertise. The CRE possessed the unique expertise through its independent access to cross-departmental information, the sophistication in its technical deliberations and the employment of international experience.

The CRE was not the first one to adopt manpower requirements approach. As mentioned earlier in Chapter 1, both the Special Committee on Higher Education and the 1977 Green Paper attempted to apply manpower forecasting to educational planning. The CRE was special in that it tried to establish its own planning ideology and to support it with its own methodology, based on its own data base.

Unlike previous endeavours, the CRE seldom relied on established data base. It carried out its own extensive consultation, but none of these used the channels originally established, for example, by the Education Department. The CRE summoned whatever evidence it desired. Its representative membership provided it with the *legitimacy* to put its fingers on any sector of the Government bureaucracy and the relevant sectors. In fact, the demand by the CRE for data on the civil service (see II.1 of this Chapter) eventually led to the formation of the Staff Planning Division in the Civil Service Branch in June, 1981 (ECS01). The unique data base possessed by the CRE gave it the *legitimacy* to claim the unique overview of the territory-wide situation.

It was in this context that the CRE carried out three

independent pieces of research of its own: the building of the manpower model, the earnings-education profile and the student preference survey. Comparatively, the latter two were peripheral and the manpower model was the major endeavour in the entire CRE exercise. Out of the 80 Committee papers studied during the CRE, the two reports for the manpower model (DSCRE/36 and DSCRE/62) were by far the largest volumes (58 and 80 pages respectively). It would not be exaggerating to say that the building of the manpower model was the central activity of the CRE exercise.

Therefore, in two senses, the manpower model added to the legitimacy of the CRE to claim overall coordination.

Firstly, it tried to overcome the fragmentation of education policy-making by something that would give overall authority. Here, "overall demand of the economy" was something that the other fragmented policy-makers could not claim knowledge. It legitimates an overall manpower forecasting which involved the entire labour force.

Secondly, it made use of the information base that was not accessible to other policy-makers and deliberated with a level of sophistication denied other policy-makers. In fact, apart from Peter Williams and perhaps Horace Knight, the HKTC Secretary, the farthest CRE members could go was perhaps the query, by Chen Shou-lum, about the technologist-technician-craftsman ratio.

If successful, the CRE could have developed its own planning ideology to which the other policy advisory bodies

had to submit.

If these arguments were valid, it really did not matter whether the manpower modelling was accurate in its forecasting, so far as it pointed to the rough direction of expansion in tertiary education. After all, the fact was that even if all the CRE recommendations were to come true, there would still be a long way before Hong Kong had to worry for over-provision of higher education. In other words, with full respect to the manpower modelling *per se*, a policy of dramatic expansion in higher education could be made by simple intuition. In the short run, the manpower model in the CRE Report legitimates its recommendations. In the long run, it helps to legitimate the coordinating authority of the newly created Secretary for Education.

If this was the case, it is not surprising that both the UPGC and the HKTC felt reluctant to accept the manpower model. The "mistrust" (see IV.1.1 of this Chapter) of the UPGC could be read not only as a difference in planning ideology but also that the manpower model could serve to undermine its *legitimacy*. If manpower modelling could be accepted as the basis for planning higher education, the entire legitimacy of "expert judgement" (ISU04; ISU08) would no longer have the central place in policy-making. The HKTC's criticism of the the manpower model could be interpreted as again a matter of legitimacy. If manpower modelling could replace "employers' opinion survey", then future training policies would be handled by the Secretary for Education who mastered the manpower model and emphasized

"overall needs". There would then be no way to legitimate the employers' own estimate of their needs.

At the end of the day, the failure to publish the CRE Report symbolized the failure of the Government in its coordinating attempt. The policy making of education in Hong Kong remained fragmented. This derivation could well be supported by attempt after the Overall Review to set up an coordinating Education Commission. But that was another episode.

The bottom line was that the manpower model was almost completely ignored after the CRE exercise.

V. Summary of the CRE Review

The CRE Review was a rather exceptional exercise where all the major government branches and policy advisory bodies were involved in deliberating overall policies for post-compulsory education. The exercise tried almost all means available at the time to arrive at policy recommendations using a comprehensive manpower model. The result of the review was rather dramatic. The report was not published, apparently due to disagreement between the CRE and the UPGC.

Research seems to point to the conclusion that the outcome of the CRE episode was caused by interactions among the policy advisory bodies, largely between the CRE and the UPGC, and between UPGC and HKTC to a smaller extent. The

nature of the interactions could be interpreted both ways: either as a matter of difference in rationality, or as a conflict of legitimacy.

Two points are outstanding in the analysis of the episode. First, the legitimacy explanation provides a sound alternative to rational explanations. In the rational explanation, actors in policy deliberation concentrate their attention on the output of the policy-making process. In the particular case of the CRE, it was the difference in planning ideologies and methodologies that caused the conflicts. In the legitimacy explanation, the attention of the political actors was not so much on the policies *per se*, but on the "secondary" concern of whether or not they have the right legitimacy to make policies.

Second, the manpower model, which is typical of rational deliberations in educational policy-making, could play an essential role by providing the legitimacy, by way of the expertise involved, for making policy. Here, what matters is not so much the validity or reliability of the manpower model and its results, but the fact that the user of the manpower model acquires its legitimacy through the unchallengeable sophistication of the model.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE OECD REVIEW (1981-1982)

0. Introduction

The OECD Review, also known as the Overall Review, is the second Episode examined in this study. It occurred almost immediately after the CRE episode. The main body of the OECD review took place in 1981-82. The OECD Review was basically a "third party" consultation in which an OECD Panel conducted an overall review of the education system in Hong Kong. The report of the review (also known as the Llewellyn Report) aroused much controversy, but on the whole its recommendations became the focus of discussion in all matters of educational policy after its publication. All policy developments in the years afterwards claim that they are based on the OECD review results.

The construct, the process, the reporting and the events during and after the OECD review demonstrated vividly the dynamics in the arena of education policy in Hong Kong. As was in the case of the CRE, it demonstrated the interaction among the actors in the policy-making machinery, but it also demonstrated the relation between those inside and those outside the policy-making machinery.

There will be four sections in this chapter. The first section is a delineation of the picture as known to the

public, i.e., the scene as perceived before the research. This is based largely on published materials. The second section is a finer description of the happenings as a result of the research. This includes confidential materials obtained during the research as well as published materials which might have escaped public attention. The aim is to delineate the "facts" of the episode as closely as possible to what both the outsiders and the insiders perceive. A number of policy junctures are identified in this section. An analysis is made in the third section which attempts to explain the policy decisions at the junctures. As has been done in Chapter 4, two separate perspectives will be adopted during the explanations.

I. What the Public Saw

I.1. The Appointment

On June 18, 1981, the then Secretary for Education designate, Kenneth Topley, announced in a press conference that "an international Panel of visitors has been appointed by the Government to conduct an Overall Review of Hong Kong's education system" (Government Press Release, June 18, 1981). Also present at the press conference were Colvyn Haye, the Director of Education, and Q.W. Lee, the Chairman of the Board of Education.

The context in which the overall review was conducted was summarised in the following paragraphs in the official press release:

Mr Topley said the Review would examine both current and proposed education programmes.

"Despite the benefits that have been derived from the growth in school places, there remains concern among educators and parents about whether the education that children are receiving is that best suited to developing their talents and enabling them to contribute fully to the life of the community," Mr Topley explained.

Mr Lee stated that following the completion of various reviews of different areas of education the Board of Education had proposed that a broad look should be taken at the whole of the education system, from an international as well as a local perspective.

Mr Haye said that the Education Department welcomed the initiative taken by the Board since the Review would present an opportunity to take stock of current targets and facilitate decisions about the future direction of education and the pace at which it should develop.
(Government Press Release, June 18, 1981)

People were reminded that the Government's agreement to have such a review had first been announced by the Governor in his address to the Legislative Council in October, 1978 (Ibid.). Topley emphasized that this was not an official OECD exercise, that "the Review had been set in train by the Government in close consultation with officers of the OECD" (Ibid.). He said:

Members of the Secretariat of the OECD have provided valuable guidance and advice on the organization of the Review, on the detailed procedures to be followed and on the selection of the independent visitors who will conduct the Review.

The members of the Panel were announced:

Sir John Llewelyn (Chairman), former Vice-Chancellor of Exeter University and Director-General of the British Council;

Dr Greg Hancock, full-time member of the Schools Commission, Australia and Chief Education Officer, Australian Capital Territory Schools Authority;

Dr Karl Roeloffs, former Head of the Planning Division of the Federal German Ministry of Education and Vice-Chairman of the OECD Education Committee, now Secretary-General of the Federal German Academic Exchange Service;

Professor Michael W. Kirst, Professor of Education, Stanford University, California and former President of the California State Board of Education (Ibid.).

It was also announced that the Panel would be assisted by two Special Advisers: Q.W.Lee representing the BoE and James Mchugh representing the UPGC. Their roles were

to ensure that the Panel had ready access to informed views on Hong Kong education from sources other than official ones. This was in keeping with the spirit of an open forum, which the review was designed to be (Ibid.).

The terms of reference for the Panel were:

Having regard to approved and proposed policies for the development of education in Hong Kong at all levels, to identify the future aims of the education system, to consider the coherence and effectiveness of the service, to identify areas which may require strengthening and to make recommendations on priorities in its further development. In particular, advice is sought on the relationship between the various sectors and levels of education and the place of teachers in the education system (Ibid.).

The methodology to be adopted was also mentioned in the announcement:

The visitors, although independent of the OECD, will follow the well-established practices of the organization in examining the education systems of its member countries. Such reviews have been carried out in many advanced countries, which have welcomed independent views on their education systems.

The concrete procedures as planned were:

- * The Panel would spend about 14 days in Hong Kong in late October and early November, 1981, in order to meet and seek the views of student groups and individuals, parents, academic associations, teachers and government officials on all aspects of education;
- * The Panel would provide a list of questions in early 1982;
- * The questions would be discussed with Hong Kong officials at a series of final review meetings in Hong Kong which would probably take place in April, 1982.
- * The final report of the visitors was expected to be sent to the Government in mid-1982 (Ibid.).

The announcement emphasized the openness of the Review, that it was designed to have "the spirit of an open forum". It placed particular emphasis on the final reviewing meetings:

The final reviewing meetings will provide for a lively forum of questioning and discussion between the visitors and Hong Kong participants in a concluding examination of education policies. To add further objectivity and breadth to this final assessment, overseas representatives specialising in different aspects of education will also be invited to take part

in the discussion. These representatives will be drawn from several different countries (Ibid.).

At the announcement of the overall review, Topley promised that an invitation would be extended "to interested individuals and groups to present their views on any aspect of Hong Kong education for consideration by the visitors" (*South China Morning Post*, June 19, 1981).

This promise was formalised a week later when the Secretary for Education (designate) made a second announcement on June 25, 1981. The announcement invited "written representations on any aspects of Hong Kong education". The representations might be in Chinese or English and "should be as concise as possible". The deadline for the submission was set at September 4, 1981 (*South China Morning Post*, June 26, 1981).

However, there was a additional invitation:

people or groups wishing to appear personally before the panel should make their requests in writing and provide an outline in not more than two pages of the points they wish to discuss.

The deadline for the requests was August 7, 1981 (Ibid.)

It was also announced that the Panel would visit Hong Kong in the period October 25 to November 6, 1981 (Ibid.).

The next public news about the Overall Review was made by Topley on October 2, 1981, in a Lions Club luncheon meeting. He revealed that the Panel would arrive at Hong Kong on October 24, 1981 (*South China Morning Post*, October 3, 1981).

Topley also revealed that the budget for the entire review exercise would be one million Hong Kong dollars

(around US\$200,000 at the 1981 exchange rate) (*Ming Pao Daily*, October 3, 1981).

He answered a number of questions on the legitimacy of spending so much money to invite foreigners to review Hong Kong education. He warned against any "unrealistic expectations" and that "we should not expect formal pronouncements on every last detail of Hong Kong education" (*South China Morning Post*, October 3, 1981).

1.2. The Two Visits

The Panel arrived in Hong Kong and met the press on October 26, 1981. Llewellyn told the press that they had been reading more than 60 written papers that were sent to the Panel members before they came to Hong Kong. These included the written submissions and other background documents (*South China Morning Post*, October 27, 1981). During the press conference, Llewellyn identified three key issues the Panel would examine:

- * the question of setting up a smooth transition through the educational system so that you get the right people as technicians, technologists and craftsmen;
- * the medium of instruction in schools; and
- * the relationship between the education system and future industrial and economic development (*South China Morning Post*, October 27, 1981).

He responded to the question of 1997 (the year when the lease of Kowloon would expire) and said:

We are making the assumption that Hong Kong will continue to be a free society in which the individual student will be given the opportunity to develop his

abilities to the greatest degree and that there will remain for him a free choice of job opportunities (Ibid.).

Llewellyn used an analogy to describe the nature of the

Overall Review:

the individual trees in the forest have all been examined in great care, now we have to see what the forest looks like" (Ibid.).

During that conference, Llewellyn also faced questions that doubted their competence since they were foreigners. There were also suspicions that they might tend to transform Hong Kong's school system into a Western European model. He reportedly emphasized that the Panel could not necessarily solve all the problems that existed:

We can point the way. But the solution to the problems and the implementation of that solution must lie with the people who live here and whose responsibility it is to do this" (Ibid.).

In the two weeks' of the Panel's stay, there were reports that the Panel visited the major policy-making bodies, a cross-sectional sample of educational institutions and met all those who asked for a meeting. There were around 30 non-government bodies who asked for a meeting (Ibid.). These meetings were held on October 30 and November 3 respectively (*Wah Kiu Yat Po*, October 26, 1981; *Wen Wei Po*, November 4, 1981).

In March, 1982, the Panel returned to Hong Kong and held two public plenary sessions on March 29 and 31, 1982. The plenary sessions were held in the Conference Room of the Legislative Council, a sign of respect, and in chair was George Papadopoulos, Deputy Director for Social Affairs,

Manpower and Education, OECD. The sessions drew active participation from representatives of the main educational groups in Hong Kong - some 80 representatives (*South China Morning Post*, March 30, 1982) from non-governmental groups sitting together with top officials in education and members of the top policy-making bodies. This was without precedent in the history of Hong Kong education. The entire sessions were broadcast live to the public through the government radio, Radio Television Hong Kong.

Attending the sessions were also invited representatives from six other countries (*Ibid.*):

Royal Professor Ungku A. Aziz
Vice-Chancellor, University of Malaysia;

Mr Chan Kai-yau
Director of Education, Singapore;

Mr. Ernst Goldschmidt
Under Secretary, Ministry of Education, Denmark;

Mr. James S. Hrabl
Associate Deputy Minister, Department of Education,
Alberta, Canada;

Mr. Akio Nakajima
Director, Upper Secondary Education,
Ministry of Education, Japan; and

His Excellency Mr. Arthur Maddocks
U.K. representative to the OECD

It was only during the session that the non-government participants were told of the "agenda" (*South China Morning Post*, March 30, 1982; Order Paper, 1981). It was again only then they were told that the Panel of visitors had prepared a preliminary draft report as well as a list of questions which would be used as the basis for discussions (*South China Morning Post*, March 30, 1981).

This caused much dissatisfaction with the first session, but this was soon remedied in the second session which was more fruitful. Both pressure group leaders and academics gave good marks to the plenary sessions (*South China Morning Post*, April 2, 1982). The Panel's summary of five "big flaws" received much endorsement, although there were people who were dissatisfied that there was no indication for immediate action (*South China Morning Post*, March 31, 1982).

1.3. The Report

There was a period of silence after the second visit. By the end of 1982, it was rumoured that the Panel had submitted a report but this was not endorsed by the Executive Council and might not be published.

On January 26, 1983, after addressing a luncheon meeting of the Zonta Club, Colvyn Haye, the Director of Education, disclosed to the press that the report on the overall review would go before the Executive Council "within the next three weeks to decide if it should be published". However, according to the report, Haye said that "he was confident the report would be published because of public concern". He declined to disclose details of the report, but under forceful questioning, he revealed that the report had dealt with four major areas: language, simplifying the school system, examination pressure and control and administration of school management (*South China Morning*

Post, January 27, 1983).

The report entitled "*A Perspective on Education in Hong Kong: Report by a Visiting Panel*" was eventually published on May 6, 1983. Against all public expectations, the Government made no indication on adoption of the report. Instead, the public was invited to submit written comments to the renamed Education and Manpower Branch by August 31, 1983, and "no decision will be taken by the Government until public comments have been considered" (*South China Morning Post*, May 7, 1983).

The report admittedly adopted a "political" approach (Perspective, 1982:16) and included very little technical calculations or quantitative presentations.

There are four sections in the report.

Section I is a brief background description laying out the context in which the review was conducted.

Section II is a crucial section which is totally devoted to policy and planning. It gives a rather thorough-going, critical analysis of the existing machinery and proposed the setting up of an Education Commission which would coordinate BoE, UPGC and the newly established VTC.

The Panel suggested that the BoE should be restructured to "include representatives of the major interest pressure groups which at present have no recognised voice in educational governance" (Perspective, 1982:20).

It also suggested that the UPGC should establish an executive group consisting mainly of local members, so as to

cope with the increasing number of institutions. The UPGC could then be renamed Higher Education Planning and Grants Committee (HEPGC) and should be answerable to the proposed Education Commission, meanwhile retaining its privilege of reporting its advice to the Governor (Perspective, 1982:22).

The membership of the proposed Education Commission would then consist of the chairmen of the BoE, HEPGC and VTC, 3 persons of "high standing in the community" and 4 officials from relevant government Branches (Ibid.22-23).

The Panel also proposed that the Education Commission should report directly to the Governor-in-Council and

would have the formal authority and responsibility for advising the Governor on all matters relating to the development and planning of education in Hong Kong and that it would have the power to enquire into such matters, and through its 'official members' to require such information as would be needed to fulfil its functions (Ibid.:24).

Section III consists of 9 chapters pertaining to policies in connection with language in the classroom, sorting and sifting, the kindergartens, the schools, beyond the schools, continuing education, special groups, the teaching service and labour market implications.

In each of these chapters, the Panel addressed very sensitive controversies and made relevant proposals. The proposals in general echoed the sentiments of the vocal pressure groups. We shall not go into the details of these chapters because most of them are beyond the scope of this study.

Section IV is a forward looking chapter on *Prospects and Priorities*. In this concluding section, the Panel

identified five issues as top priorities: language policy, teacher improvement, selection and allocation, post school education and "a standing capacity" for research, policy and development. These correspond to the five "big flaws" summarised while the Panel was in Hong Kong (Perspective, 1982:111-114).

In sum, the Panel made 32 recommendations and these can be found in Appendix J of this thesis.

It was only from the Report that the public realized the whole picture of the process of the review: that 56 written submissions were received before the first visit; that the Panel had visited the major policy-making bodies and once actually sat in the BoE meeting; that the Panel had prepared a draft report after their first visit; that they had discussions with the UMELCO Educational Panel, the UPGC, the education officials and the invited experts from the six countries about the draft report (Perspective, 1982:App II, III, IV and V).

The education community immediately became divided over the published report. The non-government groups in general hailed the report. The groups felt that the report echoed most of the points raised by the public but not taken seriously by the Government. The Government and government officials in general kept a low profile and their silence was taken as a sign of disagreement. The division was highlighted by an open split in opinions among the Legislative Councillors on July 13, 1983.

I.4. The LEGCO Debate

The Unofficials, i.e. the unofficial members of the LEGCO, led by Fr. Patrick McGovern, sought to give the Government "a gentle nudge" to get on with the OECD review report and "to make sure that it does not just lie on the shelves gathering dust, as has been the fate of other reports" (*South China Morning Post*, July 13, 1983). They therefore proposed the following motion in the LEGCO:

"That this Council receives with approbation the report *A Perspective on Education in Hong Kong* and commends it to the Government as a basis on which continuing improvement of education in Hong Kong should be implemented" (Hong Kong Hansard, 1983-84:18).

The Government, on the other hand, was resolutely opposed to being pinned down "at a time when we are still seeking public opinion" (*South China Morning Post*, July 13, 1983). Topley reportedly admitted that the Government had not made up its mind (*Ibid.*). Topley therefore proposed an amendment to the motion:

"That this Council receives with approbation the report *A Perspective on Education in Hong Kong* and commends it to the Government as a valuable contribution to the consideration of future policy on the development of Education in Hong Kong" (*Ibid.*).

A split was likely, with the Unofficials antagonizing the Officials. There was likely to be a 24 versus 23 situation if voting took place, with the Unofficials on the winning side. "This unexpected turn of events", reported Halima Guterres of the *South China Morning Post*, "believed to be unprecedented in the history of the Council, is likely to lead to another rare occurrence for the Council - a

division in the voting" (Ibid.). The Unofficials therefore decided to meet the press after the voting.

It was under this pressure of the press report that the voting took place. It took four "gruelling " hours for the eight Unofficials to speak against the amendment before the acting Governor, Sir Philip Haddon-Cave, called for a recess. After the recess, Topley withdrew his amendment and all the Officials eventually voted for the Unofficials' motion (*South China Morning Post*, July 14, 1983). The press referred to this as "a dramatic, last-minute reversal of position" (Ibid.).

The entire Unofficial group held a press conference after the LEGCO meeting to clarify their stands and made a 24 point statement of their unanimous views. In general, the 24 points endorsed the Panel's views and pressed for implementation (*South China Morning Post*, July 14, 1983).

Despite the fact that result of the LEGCO debate confirmed the status of the Panel report, Topley's successor, Neil Henderson, remarked later in November that "the overall review contains not a single HK\$ sign, nor does it relate its ideas to the human and material resources required to carry them out" (*South China Morning Post*, November 10, 1983). He added in a rather sour tone that

in the overall review, we have a sweet-shop full of 'goodies' for all - even including a few acid-drops for some - but gorge them all at one go, we cannot, without the most dire consequences to our digestive system (Ibid.)

Henderson said that the Executive Council would be

consulted on the implementation of the "acceptable" strategies proposed by the OECD review report. He further hinted that the idea of an Education Commission could be a problem area. He said that

it could be counter-productive to have an Education Commission whose introduction interferes with co-ordination rather than improves it,

and that the Government is carefully considering "the feasibility of smoothly interfacing a commission with the existing consultative machinery" (Ibid.). It is noticeable that in so saying, Henderson was echoing Francis Tien, Chairman of the Vocational Training Council (VTC) which was one of the bodies supposed to be coordinated by the proposed Education Commission (Ibid.)

On the same occasion, Henderson disclosed that his Branch (Education and Manpower Branch, the former Education Branch renamed) had received the volume of comments on the overall review which contained probably more words than "either the *Bible* or the *Complete Works of Shakespeare*". This was being analysed and would be presented to the Executive Council by the end of 1983 (Ibid.).

1.5. The Education Commission

On February 22, 1984, there was a report on the press that on the day before, the Executive Council had failed to reach a decision on the establishment of an Education Commission as proposed by the Panel. The crucial issue, as reported, was whether or not this Commission should seek to

coordinate the existing policy advisory bodies such as BoE and UPGC (*South China Morning Post*, February 22, 1984). The problem with the proposed Commission was

that a commission, as proposed by the panel of education experts led by Sir John Llewellyn, would have meant the creation of an all-powerful body with members of the highest calibre who had the authority to by-pass the EXCO entirely, the supreme decision-making body, and report directly to the Governor.

The establishment of such a commission would be something of a constitutional anomaly and would raise some awkward question for EXCO.

If EXCO was to approve the establishment of a commission of so much clout would it mean, for example, that its own advice was no longer needed on all things educational?

A compromise solution might be to set up a committee with highly respected members that would report to EXCO and be charged with the responsibility of co-ordinating all educational matters.

But might it not be construed as another cog in the machinery?

(*South China Morning Post*, February 22, 1984)

The failure to reach a decision was quite unexpected and it was reported that even the Board of Education had to cancel its meeting which had anticipated EXCO decisions.

On March 7, 1984, the Government announced that an Education Commission was to be established according to one of the major recommendations of the OECD Panel. The Education Commission was given six months to present its report. Q.W.Lee was appointed the Chairman, but the members were yet to be appointed (Government Press Release, March 7, 1984).

On the same day, March 7, 1984, the Education and Manpower Branch issued "*A Compendium of Public Comments on*

The Report by a Visiting Panel: A Perspective on Education in Hong Kong". The *Compendium* was based on a total of 554 comments made by 305 individuals and organisations, including the newly elected District Boards and education interest groups. The comments included 176 written submissions, 226 news reports and comments given in forums, seminars, speeches, etc., and 112 educational editorials or feature articles, totalling 2,280 pages (Hong Kong Hansard 1983/84:18).

The compendium aroused another wave of concern, when the non-government groups felt that there was a bias when the compiler tried to present a balanced picture while there was in fact a majority inclination (*South China Morning Post*, March 8, 1984).

On March 29, 1984, the Government announced the appointment of the other members of the Education Commission. It comprised seven educators together with other "community leaders". This included also the chairmen of the three high-level advisory bodies: BoE, UPGC and VTC (*South China Morning Post*, March 30, 1984).

This is the point of history beyond which this study will not go.

II. What the Research Finds

II.1. Background to the Overall Review

As early as 1978, the BoE raised the necessity of an overall review of the education system. There are a number of versions of how the idea first started. One version says that it grew out of the private school issue which gave rise to a subcommittee of the BoE and this subcommittee suggested that there was a need for an overall review (CSB02). A second version attributes the idea of an overall review to the deliberation of the *Report on Sixth Form Education* submitted to the Government in 1978 and released to the public in 1979 (ISP02). A third version describes the idea of an overall review as a result of a debate between Y.T.Li, the chief planner in the government Education Department, and Joyce Simons about the anomalies in the school system and the "art of control of the school system" (ISB01; ISU11). The different versions, all supported by considerable evidence, seem to suggest that there was a consensus within the BoE that there ought to be an overall review. This is further confirmed by the interesting fact that an overwhelming number of BoE members each claimed to be the initiator of the idea.

The proposal did not seem to receive sympathy from the Governor. The proposal was put aside for some time.

Our first proposal was actually thrown back. The Government seemed to oppose the idea very much. I

cannot remember, but at least two or three times, our proposal was rejected (ISB01).

There was apparently some tension between the BoE and the Government on the issue of an overall review. Then things came to a turn in June, 1978, as one of the BoE members recalls:

Then in June, when I was waiting in the airport for the flight, MacLehose was seeing his wife off on the same plane. MacLehose told me: "I am going to see Q.W.Lee tomorrow. You are going to get what you want" (ISB01).

The Governor first announced the possibility of an overall review when he made his annual speech to the LEGCO on October 11, 1978. He said:

On the advice of the Board of Education, I propose to initiate a wide-ranging review that would cover the whole of the educational system, its methods and its objectives. It is proposed this should be conducted primarily by persons from abroad with great expertise in education, though certainly with local participation (Hansard, 1978/79:24).

This was further recorded in the Annual Summary of the Education Department:

the Board of Education recommended an overall review of the entire education system by a mixed group of overseas experts and local residents, with the aim of considering the coherence and effectiveness of the education service and advising on priorities of its long term development. This recommendation was accepted and the Government's decision to initiate the review was announced by the Governor in his speech to the Legislative Council in October, 1978 (Education Department, 1980: 4).

Ever since, the Overall Review was regarded as an exercise mainly taken care by the BoE (BoE) (ISX01).

The membership of the review team was the next issue that took time to decide.

At that time, Jack Cater came in and there were various permutations and combinations [about the membership]. I

can remember that for a long time, each BoE meeting actually ended up with the question: Any news about the overall review? (ISB01).

Different alternatives were thought of about the reviewer: a government committee, an internal independent body or an overseas team. It seemed that most of the BoE members agreed that it would not make much sense for insiders to look at the system. They therefore favoured overseas, impartial personnel (ISX07).

As far as an overseas team was concerned, should that be from UK, as had usually been the case, or should that be sought somewhere else? Incidentally, Q.W.Lee, then the Chairman of the Board of Education, came across an old acquaintance, Arthur Maddocks, who had once been Political Adviser to the Hong Kong Governor and who was then UK representative to the OECD. Maddocks advised that Hong Kong might follow the OECD methodology of country reviews where the OECD carried out overall reviews of education as a service to its member countries. The BoE adopted this suggestion (ISX07).

The British Delegate to the OECD put forward a request to the OECD to help the Government of Hong Kong to review its education (ISOR5). However, there was one technical problem: Hong Kong was not a member of the OECD. Lee went to Paris to discuss this issue personally with Ronald Gass, the Director of Education of OECD and George Papadopoulos, the Deputy Director. It took a while before they came to an agreement that the OECD would arrange something along the OECD review format, but Hong Kong would pay for the exercise

(ISX07).

The OECD format for country review usually consisted of an international panel of visitors. The panel members were independent individuals approved by the government of the country under review. The views represented were their own and not views of the OECD. After an initial visit, the Panel would produce an interim report. This gave no definite results, but raised questions for discussion. Government reactions were then sought and there was usually a confrontation meeting. The usual format of the confrontation meeting was for the ministers, civil servants and advisers to sit on one side, the visiting panel on the opposite side, with representatives of some 20 countries sitting behind the panel. A report of the confrontation meeting would then be published and used by the government for internal policy formation (ISOR3; ISOR2; ISOR5).

Although the review was eventually on its track, the Hong Kong Government's attitude toward the review was not entirely positive (ISX01; ISX07; ISX08). Anyway, it went ahead.

II.2. Membership of the Visiting Panel

The Hong Kong Government proposed to have as Panel members someone from U.K., someone from Australia, someone from North America and preferably someone from Europe (ISOR2). One interpretation of this choice is:

The idea at that time was that there should be someone

from UK for some understandable reasons; someone from the Hong Kong Region which we could suppose they meant the Far East; and two else: two people who were more distant from the culture by which Hong Kong was being influenced (ISOR5).

Papadopoulos, without consulting anyone else, appointed Greg Hancock to be the Rapporteur of the Panel (ISOR2; ISOR4; ISOR5).

Greg Hancock was basically an administrator in Australia. He was Chief Education Officer of the Australian Capital Territory (i.e. Canberra) Schools Authority. He was once Commissioner of the Australian Commonwealth Schools Commission and a Senior Fellow of the CERI (Centre for Educational Research and Innovation) which is an OECD establishment (Perspective, 1982:3). He was involved in the Australian review. He spent two years in Paris working with the OECD as the Rapporteur in its review of education in Denmark (ISOR2; ISOR4; ISOR5).

Papadopoulos then contacted Sir John Llewellyn (ISOR2). John Llewellyn was a retired person when he was appointed Chairman of the Panel. It was generally believed that his appointment was largely a political deliberation to include in the team a non-government, highly reputed, British element (ISOR4). He was formerly Director-General of the British Council, Vice-Chancellor of Exeter University and Chairman of the New Zealand University Grants Committee (Perspective, 1982: 3). Incidentally, he was a neighbour and a very good friend of Edward Youde who was later appointed new Governor of Hong Kong, just after the Overall Review report was completed (ISOR2).

Llewellyn recommended Karl Roeloffs (ISOR2). Karl Roeloffs was the Generalsekretar (Secretary General) of the Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst (DAAD, German Academic Exchange Service). With its headquarters in Bonn, DAAD is the counterpart of the British Council in West Germany and was in charge of all overseas academic exchange programmes. He was once Director of Educational Planning in the German Federal Ministry for Education and Science and had started as a German Grammar School Headmaster. He was once member of the OECD Education Committee and had participated in a number of OECD country reviews including the well-known OECD-UK confrontation meeting, 1975. He participated as an individual member in the OECD review of the Australian education system in 1975. He also once participated in a comparative review of science policies in UK and Federal Germany. He was obviously an old hand in the OECD reviews (Perspective, 1982:3; ISOR3; ISOR2; ISOR4). Another reason for his appointment was that he spoke fluent English (ISOR2).

Michael Kirst, the fourth member of the Panel, was believed to be the last to be recruited (ISOR2). He came into the Panel when the format was set (ISOR4). He was introduced by Hancock who once cooperated with Kirst in a book on US-Australia comparison of education policy (ISOR4). Kirst was Professor of Education and of Business Administration at Stanford University. He published and edited a number of books on education policy in the 1970s

(ISOR4). He was once President of the California State Board of Education; Staff Director and Chief Counsel of the US Senate Select Committee on Employment, Manpower and Poverty (Perspective, 1982:3). At Stanford, he was identified as basically a policy analyst and a politician in the education circle (CSHW; CSSY). Before coming into the Panel, he was not known to either Llewellyn or Roeloffs.

The selection of members was made entirely by the OECD. The OECD did ask the Hong Kong Government for endorsement. The Hong Kong authority respected and accepted their choice and declined to interfere, so as to make the exercise more impartial (ISX07). Effectively, the Government had no influence in the selection of the members of the Panel. In fact, the Government, with hindsight, somehow regretted that it had not intervened. One retired official remarked,

I thought [we] should not say too much about the membership of the panel, so that they would not feel that the Government was manipulating. Now I think [we] should have run the risk (ISX08).

From the outset, Llewellyn decided not to be paid and the other members followed suit. The Hong Kong Government would pay all the expenses. It paid for the air fares and the accomodation and an amount of *per diem*, and that was all (ISOR2; ISOR5).

There was, however, also the question of whether local members should be included in the Panel. The BoE decided that there should be no local members. The reason was that local members would tend to view things with the usual eyes and the BoE preferred to leave the review to "strange eyes"

(ISX07). Instead, it was arranged that two Special Advisers should assist the Panel. Q.W.Lee was appointed not only because he was Chairman of the BoE, but also as the architect of the entire review. James McHugh acted as someone from the UPGC. He was an ex-Principal of a U.K. Polytechnic (ISOR2). The two Special Advisers were supposed to acquaint the Panel with the local scene (ISOR2).

McHugh came to Hong Kong at the same time the Panel arrived (*South China Morning Post*, October 21, 1981), but he was not very much involved in the events that followed. Lee, on the other hand, proved extremely helpful to the Panel (ISX07; ISOR2; ISOR5).

II.3. Before the Visits

The appointment of the review Panel was formally made in April, 1981. There were different stories about the period between this date and the Panel's visit. For example, it was rumoured that the Secretary of Education, Topley, was once in trouble. Others relate this to the difficulties of the CRE report, but none of these receives adequate evidence.

Llewellyn at one point did not agree with Papadopoulos on the format of the review. Papadopoulos wanted the Panel to present a report "that nothing would be put forward in a very prescriptive way". Llewellyn did not agree and wanted to spell out whatever they might feel. In the end they agreed to stick to the OECD format as far as possible and

would retain the maximum degree of flexibility (ISOR2, ISOR4).

The Government Secretariat immediately prepared a background report which was completed in June, 1981. The report, entitled *The Hong Kong Education System*, was prepared by the Education Department with Peter Lam (from the Education Branch) and John Winfield (from the Education Department) as the chief compilers. The thick volume was by far the most comprehensive account of the education system of Hong Kong. This comprised a main report of eight chapters and a large section of appendices (Government Secretariat, 1981). The background report was highly commended by both G.W.Lee and the Panel, the latter remarked in its letter of transmittal to the Secretary of Education:

Your background Report is valuable both for its substance and for the fact that it probably hastened the process of policy clarification: the very spelling out of policies can in itself be an exercise in formative evaluation (Perspective, 1982: 5-6).

This background report, however, was not known to the public until the final report of the overall review was published in 1983. The Panel was also given the Topley Report and was asked to comment on it (DSX01; DSX02). The Panel replied that since it was meant to be an overall review, it was not appropriate to comment on any particular sector before the completion of the entire review (DSX02).

The Government announced the launching of the overall review on June 18, 1981.

II.4. The First Visit

Upon the arrival of the Panel for its first visit in October, 1981, the Government hosted a cocktail welcome party in which all those who submitted representations, with few exceptions, were invited. In effect, most of the pressure groups were present. This was taken as an unprecedented recognition of the status of these pressure groups. In fact, some resentment occurred among the non-pressure groups who were not invited, such as the professional Association for Science and Mathematics Education (CST01) and the school sponsor Tung Wah Group of Hospitals (CSC02). The Panel denied having anything to do with the invitation list (CST01).

The first thing Llewellyn did when he arrived in Hong Kong was to put forward two questions to MacLehose (then the Governor) and Haddon-Cave (then the Financial Secretary) respectively (ISOR2).

The question for MacLehose was: What assumptions should be made about 1997? (1997 was the shorthand for the resumption of Chinese sovereignty over Hong Kong in the year 1997.) Llewellyn anticipated an assumption that no matter who would govern Hong Kong after 1997, Hong Kong would still be a free society. He took this as the only assumption that would make sense to the review. The advice given to the Panel was that "it would be unwise to contemplate what would be the implications of 1997". The Panel hence adopted the assumption as anticipated (ISOR2; ISOR5). Llewellyn made

this point during the press conference on October 26, 1981 (see I.2 of this Chapter).

The question for Haddon-Cave was: What kind of financial envelope was the Panel supposed to work within? The reply was: "We don't work things out like that! If a programme makes sense and is accepted with a good plan, we will find the money for you." (ISOR2) Another version of the reply was made by Henry Ching, then the Deputy Financial Secretary: "We have lots of money and you can ask for anything you like" (ISOR4). The Panel members found this "both amazing and amusing" (ISOR2; ISOR5).

Right on the first evening (October 25, 1981), the first time the Panel members actually met, the Panel went ahead to figure out the chapter headings as tentative guidelines for the visit. They identified three major areas that would be given top priority. These were the three points that Llewellyn made on October 26, 1981 to the press: technological manpower needs, language of instruction and future economic development needs (see I.2 of this Chapter).

This was followed by three days of intensive visitation of institutions. The institutions were chosen at the Panel's request. The Panel, for example, requested a visit to the best and the poorest private schools. They also requested visits to the universities and the polytechnic, and so on. Each evening, after the visits, the Panel worked for three or four hours (ISOR2). The list of institutions they visited is in the final report (Perspective, 1982: App IV).

On the fourth day, the report began to take shape. Some of the chapter headings had changed (ISOR2).

During the visit, the Panel held extensive discussions with nearly all sectors of education. The Panel spent two full days (October 30 and November 3, 1981) meeting people who asked for a meeting. In each of these meetings, Roeloffs and Llewellyn sat in one group and Hancock and Kirst sat in another. In each case, a secretary was provided by the Education Branch (CST01; CSH01; CSC01).

During the first visit, the Panel did not perceive intended intervention from the Government, except on one or two episodes:

[...]. perhaps had hoped that we would give him additional support. ... But we have really disappointed him, at two points:

One was the timing. hoped that we could present something to the Executive Council on one or two points [before we left] - a new university, expansion of the Polytechnic, Baptist College - and pressed us to give recommendations on these selected points, for quick legitimization of government policy. We refused.

Two, wanted us to put emphasis on the expansion of higher education. We did not. Higher education was not even one of our priorities. We found the priorities we have chosen more pressing (ISOR3).

Right from the beginning, MacLehose told me not to touch CUHK. I said that was what I could not promise.

One episode was that one evening, rather late after our visits,, with three or four of his men, came to the sitting room next to my bedroom, which we used as our office. He said: "Before you leave, you have to leave something substantial on these three questions." The first one was higher education expansion and I have forgotten the other two. I said: "...., I can't do that that. We are doing an overall review and results can only be found in the final report." was apparently very angry. I said: ".... calm down. There is really nothing I can do now." rushed out of the door

without a word. (ISOR2).

After the first visit, each Panel member was given the task of writing a certain part of the report. They were given ten days, at the end of which each of them sent what he had written to the other three. A telephone conference was then conducted which lasted for two hours. This produced the Draft Report (ISOR2; ISOR5).

II.5. The Draft Report and the Second Visit

The Draft Report was submitted in March, 1982. This was never published.

The title of the Draft Report was *Chinese essence: Western science. A Perspective on Education in Hong Kong, 1981* (Ibid.).

The Draft Report was in the form of 12 chapters plus 7 appendices (Ibid.).

Chapter 1: "The Review in Context" started with a subsection on "West meets East". Chapters 2 to 9 were on different aspects of Hong Kong education: language in the classroom, the teaching service, kindergartens, schools, beyond schools, continuing education, special groups, and sorting and sifting. Chapter 10 and 11 were devoted to broader issues: labour market implications and governance and management. The last chapter was a prospectus (Ibid.).

The whole idea of a Draft Report was to put forward something as an open draft, to provoke discussions and to base the final report on these discussions. At one stage

the Panel even suggested open discussion of the Draft Report but decided to put forward questions in the plenary sessions instead:

The Panel did at some stage ask for public discussion of the open draft, but the officials felt that it might be risky and the Panel appreciated their point. The officials fear that public discussion might never get pass the draft and any change in the final report might not be recognised. Meanwhile, the Panel itself was not confident about the open draft. ..Therefore, instead, a number of questions were put forward to the plenary sessions and that became the agenda items. It is true that the initial impressions usually matter more. That contributes to the withholding of the open draft for open discussion (ISOR5b).

The second visit took place in late March and early April of 1982. The activities during the second visit involved mainly discussions based on the Draft Report.

A meeting was held with officials of the Education Department (ISOR2). The Chinese officials were mostly negative about the Draft Report, although Michael Leung, the Deputy Director of Education, did not speak a word (ISOR4). The general comment was that the Panel did not really understand what was happening in Hong Kong. Colvyn Haye, the Director of Education, played the role of a middleman and tried to moderate (ISOR4).

A meeting was also held with the UPGC. This was described as "very civilized" (ISOR2). Nothing dramatic seemed to have happened (ISOR5b).

A meeting was held with the BoE. There were heated debates. The debate was actually between the Panel and two or three Board members, particularly Alan Brimer, Professor of Education in HKU. Brimer accused the Panel of lack of

knowledge of Hong Kong and were just repeating what everyone had said (ISOR2; ISOR5b).

The Panel also discussed the Draft Report with the representatives of the six countries (see I.2 of this Chapter).

Upon the second visit, the Panel asked Topley to arrange for further visits it desired. All the requests were met. They also asked for facilities of plenary sessions and these were arranged (ISOR2).

The climax of the second visit was the Plenary Sessions held on March 29 and 31, 1982. The Panel did not anticipate the enthusiastic participation from the floor. Papadoupoulos, who was the Chairman of the Sessions, was unprepared during the first Session and had to handle the situation "*impromptu*" (ISOR1a). The second session turned out to be much more successful.

Before the Panel left Hong Kong, its members sensed from a lunch meeting with MacLehose that his attitude was not too positive. "He said in a typical British humorous way that the report might be dumped into the South China Sea" (ISOR4).

II.6. Completion of the Final Report

As decided by the Panel (ISOR2), the Draft Report was finally revised only after the Plenary Sessions. Here Q.W. Lee gave his input, mainly on the wordings and the appropriateness of the report in the Hong Kong community

(ISOR2, ISOR4, ISOR5a, ISX07). Under Lee's advice, the Panel decided to give up the philosophical statement in the introductory chapter. One informant explains:

The Panel was interested in the controversies, and tried to focus on the analyses of these controversies. In this case, the introductory chapter which carried more value problems might divert the attention of the public. We were not particularly unanimous [on this point], but on the whole, the Panel did not want the attention to the practical points be diverted by debates on things carrying value problems (ISOR5b).

The Panel also decided to change the order of the chapters, because the Panel "came to understand that structure was the main problem and coordination should be given the first priority" (Ibid.). The other chapters were also to be re-written to stress the practical aspects.

We had the feeling that they [the Government] wanted the final report to be action-oriented, to be sort of practitioner's report and we felt there were points in their view (Ibid.)

The Panel members went away and each amended his own sections. This was done in the period from May to October, 1982. The amended versions were sent to all the other members. A second telephone meeting was conducted where Hancock tape-recorded the entire meeting. Eventually, the members agreed to details on the final report. Hancock took up the task of piecing the sections together. In order to be exact in the nomenclature, facts and figures, John Winfield from the Education Department was sent by the Education Branch to Australia while the final report was being written up, to make sure that "it would not contain serious mistakes" (ISOR5a). Hancock did the final report on

floppy disks and this was sent to Llewellyn for editing, "to pick out some of the Australian and American colloquial expressions (ISOR2). The Englishmen in the Hong Kong Government were apparently quite cynical about the English in the draft:

Some of the Panel members turned out to be unable to write English. asked if we could re-write the report because no one would pay attention to the report if people don't understand the English. In the end, Llewellyn had to re-write the whole report and his wife helped very much (ISX08).

Llewellyn's wife, a professional editor, did the editing and proof reading. The edited Final Report was then sent to Hong Kong (ISOR2; ISOR5a; ISX08).

The Final Report was completed in October, 1982. Apart from minor changes in the wording, there were several major changes when compared with Draft Report:

- (a) The original 12 chapters were divided into four sections with a change of order of the chapters, as shown in Table 5.1 on the next page.
- (b) The draft Chapter 1 was completely reformed. The first two sections, which had touched upon the historical and political development of Hong Kong, disappeared all together and was replaced by a five-paragraph description of the background.
- (c) The second last draft chapter on *Governance and Management* was to a large extent re-written to become Section II: *Policy and Planning* in the final report.
- (d) The chapter on *Sorting and Sifting* was almost totally re-written.

Table 5.1 Draft and Final Report: a comparison
 (Source: *DSOR1; Perspective, 1982*)

<u>Draft</u>	<u>Final</u>
Chapter 1	Section I
The Review in Context	The Review in Context
	Section II
	Policy and Planning
	Section III
Chapter 2	
Language in the Classroom	1. Language in the Classroom
Chapter 3	
The Teaching Service	2. Sorting and Sifting
Chapter 4	
The Kindergartens	3. The Kindergartens
Chapter 5	
The Schools	4. The Schools
Chapter 6	
Beyond the Schools	5. Beyond the Schools
Chapter 7	
Continuing Education	6. Continuing Education
Chapter 8	
Special Groups	7. Special Groups
Chapter 9	
Sorting and Sifting	8. The Teaching Service
Chapter 10	
Labour Market Implications	9. Labour Market Implications
Chapter 11	
Governance and Management	
	Section IV
Chapter 12	
Prospectus	Prospects and Priorities

(e) The last chapter of *A Prospectus* was very much reduced and re-written to emphasize the *Priorities*.

(f) The original Appendix I (*Questions Arising*), which was meant to provoke discussion, was removed. Four appendices were added: the main stages of the overall review; government expenditure on education; school performance at public examinations and a chronological sketch of educational provisions in Hong Kong.

The Panel members' view was that the changes did not seem to reflect any substantial difference and certainly was not made under Government pressure (ISOR2, ISOR3, ISOR4, ISOR5).

II.7. Publication of the Final Report

There was complete silence after the Panel submitted the Final Report in November, 1982.

The Panel made clear from the very beginning that they would like the Report to be published and they were made to believe that the report would be a public report (ISOR2; ISOR4; ISOR1). In the very first announcement in June, 1981, it was made clear that "the final report of the visitors is expected to be sent to the Government in mid-1982" (Government Press Release, June 18, 1981). Yet, the Government did not actually promise that the report would be published (ISOR5b). Anyway, months passed and no one knew the whereabouts of the Report.

At this point, Edward Youde replaced Murrey MacLehose

as Governor of Hong Kong. Youde happened to be a very good friend of Llewellyn as they lived in the same suburb of London, Wimbledon (ISOR2; ISOR4). Before Youde went to Hong Kong, Llewellyn showed him the Report. They spent three or four hours on that. Youde seemed to endorse the Report and said he could "see nothing to which the Government should say no". The Panel knew this and they pinned their hope on the new Governor. Llewellyn further recommended that he saw the setting up of the Education Commission as most important and if that were to come about, particular attention should be paid to Q.W.Lee (ISOR2; ISOR4).

The new Governor made his first policy speech on October 6, 1982, five months after he assumed office. The OECD review was mentioned briefly in only a few lines:

The Panel conducted two very successful public plenary sessions in Hong Kong earlier this year in which they pointed to major areas of concern. These included the need to simplify our complex educational system and to improve our ability to formulate policy and plan new developments. The Panel's recommendations will be carefully considered by the Government (Hong Kong Legislative Council, 1982/83:19).

Still there was no sign that the Report would be published. The Panel had some discussion over the telephone about the delay. Llewellyn sent a letter to Topley to express their serious concern about the publication of the Report. The replies were: "We had to check with His Excellency!" "His Excellency is considering!"

By the end of 1982, an academic in HKU who was also associated with Stanford University brought back the unpublished Report. The copy was soon photocopied and

circulated widely among the non-governmental groups. Some newspapers started disclosing and even commenting on some of the key issues in the Report which was still unpublished and unknown to even high-powered bodies such as BoE, UPGC or even LEGCO (*Sing Tao Jih Pao*, passim.).

On November 26, 1982, in a general meeting of the Association of Heads of Secondary Schools, Topley, as the guest speaker, made unusual remarks about the Panel members. The school principals gathered that the Secretary for Education and Manpower was not happy with the OECD review.

Colvyn Haye's remarks in January, 1983 was the first time the public ever learnt that there was a Report and that the Report was not even forwarded to the EXCO (*South China Morning Post*, January 27, 1983). Haye disclosed that the Report would be forwarded to the EXCO in three weeks' time, i.e. in mid-February.

On April 9, 1983, the EXCO made a number of decisions:

- (a) that the Final Report should be published;
- (b) that the Government should seek and research the views of the public and
- (c) that the Government should produce a compendium of the views and further recommend whether or not there should be an Education Commission (DSX05).

There was a further question of whether the report should be referred in whole, or in part to the proposed Commission for consideration; if not, whether the report and the views of the public should be referred to another body or handed through established channels (DSX05).

The Report was eventually published on May 6, 1983. The public was given until August 31, 1983 to submit their views in writing (Government Press Release, May 6, 1983).

On that occasion, Llewellyn received a telex from Youde:

"Report accepted! ...

Congratulations!"

II.8. The LEGCO Debate and After

Then came the dramatic confrontation between the Officials and the Unofficials in the LEGCO, on July 13, 1983. Thereafter, Topley retired as Secretary for Education and Manpower (a new name for the post) and Neil Henderson, who used to be the Commissioner of Labour, took over.

In the policy speech delivered on October 5, 1983, the Governor hinted that

The recommendations which have attracted most public comment and debate are those in respect of the language of instruction in schools; the abolition of the Junior Secondary Education Assessment; the incorporation of kindergartens into the aided sector; better teacher training; and the expansion of opportunities for higher education (Hong Kong Hansard 1983/84:24).

Presumably, these were the priorities pre-selected by the Government. By pointing to the financial implications, he seemed to hint that the recommendations would be implemented.

The report, together with public comments thereon, should be submitted to the Executive Council for decision before the end of this year. The financing of any improvement to our system of education will need to be carefully considered, but I believe that the people

of Hong Kong attach great importance to education, and are prepared to pay for improvements (Hong Kong Hansard 1983/84:24).

In the following debate on November 9, 1983, Henderson disclosed details of the comments received:

The position now is that these comments have been received though some of the more weighty responses were not received until September or early October. Not I think, Sir, that anyone has any doubts about the overriding interest of our people in education, but if one did, the sheer volume of comments that this report has stimulated would soon convince. We have received a total of 544 comments from 305 organizations or individuals. These included 176 direct written submissions, 226 news reports of comments made in seminars, and public speeches and 112 editorials/articles in all, totalling 2,280 pages. Probably more words than contained either in the Bible or the Complete Works of Shakespeare! (laughter) (Hong Kong Hansard 1983/84:191)

Henderson more substantially elaborated on the point of finance made by the Governor:

The timing, priority and budgetting of implementation plans are extremely vital. It is as well to bear in mind that the Overall Review contains not a single HK\$ sign, nor does it relate its ideas to the human and material resources required to carry them out. (Hansard 1983/84: 191)

It was in this same meeting Henderson made his remarks about the "goodies" in the OECD review and the counter-productiveness of interfacing an Education Commission with the existing consultative machinery (see I.4 of this Chapter).

Almost at the same time, Philip Haddon-Cave, the then Chief Secretary remarked when he met the Hong Kong Observers (a political commentary group) that it would be better if the Panel had not been invited (CSW01).

II.9. The Establishment of the Education Commission

On February 21, 1984, the EXCO discussed the OECD report. This led to the headline report in the South China Morning Post the next morning. The discussion focussed on (a) the compendium of views responding to the OECD review Report and (b) the establishment of an "Education Policy Development Committee".

Item (a) seemed to be non-controversial, but (b), according to the report, did not secure the necessary agreement. The advantages of establishing an Education Commission as *proposed* would have a number of advantages: "additional coordination and research"; to "help coordinate the work of BoE, UPGC and VTC"; to "improve community involvement in educational planning and decision making"; to achieve "awareness by the BoE, VTC and UPGC of each other's work" and this "would be of value to their own planning"; and would allow the Secretary for Education and Manpower to have "more outside advice in shaping educational policy". The disadvantages would be "including the potential for delay and adding to bureaucracy" (DSX05). However, the Government's disagreement to the proposed model of a Commission was quite apparent:

The administration considers that the theoretical model proposed is unlikely to function in practice as smoothly as envisaged (Ibid.).

A number of reasons were given which led to the summary:

While initially having impressive status and public relations value, the Commission constituted as in the report would for the aforementioned reasons soon show its shortcomings and might well fail to live up to

public expectations (Ibid.).

Three options were therefore put forward to the EXCO: (1) an Education Commission as proposed, (2) a strengthened Education and Manpower Branch and (3) an advisory committee with the suggested title of Education Policy Development Committee (EPDC)(Ibid.)

The idea of a strengthened branch was not given much weight. One of the reasons was that "it would be difficult also to show the public the merit of this option". Much was said however, about the weaknesses of the first option (the proposed Education Commission) and the strengths of the third (EPDC).

The major difference between the EPDC and the proposed Education Commission was that (a) the EPDC would "provide the Governor through the Secretary for Education and Manpower consolidated advice and would not, as proposed, report directly to the Governor; (b) the EPDC would co-ordinate but would not seek to subordinate or change the existing advisory machinery and therefore, unlike the proposed Commission model, the BoE, the VTC and the UPGC would remain directly answerable to the Governor and (c) the Branch would service the Commission but would not, as proposed, be incorporated in the Commission as its Secretariat (DSX05).

The EPDC would be non-statutory, which was opposite to what the BoE and the Director of Education proposed (DSX05).

The whole OECD review Report, excluding the establishment of the Education Commission, would be referred to the

EPDC and the EPDC would report to the EXCO.

In the case of the EPDC, there was also the dilemma of whether the Chairman should be the Secretary for Education and Manpower, an Official, or an Unofficial, as proposed by the OECD review Report. (DSX05)

It did not seem that the meeting came to a consensus. The *South China Morning Post* reported the next morning:

The Executive Council yesterday failed to come to grips with the Llewellyn report on education and it took the unexpected step of deferring a decision until next week (*South China Morning Post*, February 22, 1984).

On March 7, 1984, some two weeks after the dramatic EXCO meeting, the Government announced the establishment of an Education Commission (Government Press Release, March 7, 1984). The Commission would report to the "Governor-in-Council"; it would be serviced by the Education and Manpower Branch and would have the Secretary as its Vice-Chairman; and the Commission would "coordinate but not direct the work of the three major advisory bodies on education" (Ibid.). Neil Henderson, during the press conference, further clarified that the BoE, the VTC and the UPGC would "retain their rights of reporting directly to the Governor" (*South China Morning Post*, March 8, 1984). One thing that the press release did not mention was that: the Commission was non-statutory.

It is clear that this Education Commission was actually the EPDC as discussed in the February 21 EXCO meeting! Although the government announcement did not make it clear, the *South China Morning Post* was sensitive enough to

identify that "this represents an important departure from the spirit of the Llewellyn formula" (*South China Morning Post*, March 8, 1984).

The dilemma on the Chairmanship was apparently solved by making Q.W.Lee, an Unofficial, the Chairman. Q.W.Lee had long been involved with educational policy-making and his reappointment to the EXCO in 1983 was believed to be closely related to the OECD Review.

The announcement said that the members were yet to be appointed, but the membership was exactly in line with the Llewellyn proposals with the reinforcement of educators (Government Press Release, March 7, 1985). A compendium was also compiled and published on March 7, 1984, as was resolved by the EXCO in April, 1983.

On March 29, 1984, the Government announced the membership list. Five educators were carefully selected to achieve the maximum representation (*South China Morning Post*, March 30, 1985).

III. Explaining the OECD Review

In this section, the OECD Review will be analysed from two perspectives: the rational perspective and the legitimacy perspective.

The analysis will first identify the critical junctures in the episode. These are the points that require explanation. The main body of the analysis will then try to provide explanations for the junctures, using two different frameworks of thinking as has been done for the CRE Review. In all these explanations, reference will be made largely to the same actors as are identified in Chapter 4.

III.1. The Critical Junctures

The first question was: Why was the OECD Review launched? Why was it advocated by the BoE rather than by others? What was the reason behind the Government's reluctance to accept the BoE proposal and why was it eventually accepted? The OECD review took place at the moment when the fate of the CRE review was still not clear. Was the overlap in timing a mere coincidence? Or was it part of a consistent process?

The second question pertains to the methodology adopted by the OECD Panel. Why did the Panel adopt the so-called "political approach"? What were the assumptions behind this methodology? What was the implication of adopting this methodology in the Hong Kong review and what was its impact

on the policy arena?

Thirdly came the Report. Why was the publication of the Report delayed? It was the Government which endorsed the OECD Review, but it was the same Government which delayed the publication of the Report. Was it a change of mind? Or was it a sign of Government's reluctance which had been hidden from the outset?

The fourth juncture was the LEGCO debate. The LEGCO debate in July, 1983 did not seem to link itself directly with decision-making about the OECD Review. However, it demonstrated the role of the LEGCO and the relationship between the Officials and the Unofficials. What then caused the latter to 'revolt' and the former to surrender?

The establishment of the Education Commission is the fifth point of concern. A dissection of the government hesitation at this point may lead to a better understanding of the inter-relationship between the different bodies within the government structure and on the rationale of government decisions.

The analyses that follow will concentrate on the following questions:

Why was the OECD review launched?

Why did the OECD Panel adopt the "political approach"?

Why was the publication of the Report delayed?

What was behind the LEGCO debate?

*What was the issue behind the establishment of the
Education Commission?*

III.2. The Rational Explanation

As was with the case in explaining the CRE review, the *rational explanation* assumes that the basic concern of all actors were the policies. They all try to strive for some goals in terms of policies in education. Conflicts arise because they have different goals, or means to arrive at the goals, or when there are basic interest conflicts that are not easily compromised.

III.2.1. Launching of the Overall Review

Education consumed the largest percentage of the government budget. Education had also grown into a huge enterprise. However, for historical reasons policies for different sectors of education had been deliberated by fragmented bodies. There was therefore a need for an Overall Review, to weave the fragmented policies into a co-ordinated framework (ISX07).

The idea was initiated by the BoE (ISX01, ISX07). The BoE was particularly sensitive about this fragmentation, because its members spanned the largest sector in education. One BoE member opines:

The BoE was always conscious that our policy had been dealing with piece-meal and we need to see if the money was spent wisely. Frankly speaking, the Education Department was at that time in charge of everything from kindergarten to tertiary education. It had too big a territory. It was under these circumstances that the BoE proposed an overall review of the system (ISX07).

The BoE saw that such an overall review would better be done through "strange eyes" (ISX07) because a local

committee would easily be preoccupied by the existing frameworks and might not have the international perspective necessary for the overall review.

The idea did not receive sympathy from the Government. The argument for the government reluctance, in hindsight, was that

Unlike the Topley review or the UPGC, the OECD review lacked continuity. It was advocated by a few people in the Board of Education - Q.W.Lee was particularly keen on this, but the Government was reluctant to let loose policy matters to a group like that. With only very short visits, things can only be reviewed in a very superficial way where a small but articulate group spoke on yet very sensitive issues (ISX01).

The OECD Panel was appointed in April, 1981. This was the moment when the CRE review was still underway and it was optimistically envisaged that the CRE would be completed by mid-July as scheduled (DSCRE/51). The OECD review starting in October would then fit very well into the time schedule when policies at all levels of education would be available.

III.2.2. The review methodology

As typified by the CRE review and earlier policy-making processes, education policies had been formulated on carefully prepared "rational analysis" (e.g. the manpower model in the CRE review). Whether such analyses actually determine the policies or not, they provided some objective basis for educational policy-making.

The methodology adopted by the OECD Panel was distinctively different. From the outset, the OECD Panel did not start from any "rational analysis". It regarded "rational" exercises such as that carried out by the CRE as

a "juggling of figures" (ISOR3). As was summarised in the Report, the Panel classified this approach to educational planning and policy-making as "technical planning" which they identified as the "first generation" educational planning. This was distinctively different from the "third generation" which was "pluralistic and participatory" (DSOR1). Here it seems worthwhile to quote at length the following which expressed the basic disagreement of the Panel with the Hong Kong Government's approach to educational planning and policy-making:

It is worthwhile to consider what is meant by the forward planning of educational development. While there is still a strong attachment in government circles to what might be called 'technical' planning - for example, of trying to assess manpower requirements and making consequential adaptations to the system - there is a fortunate drift away from an allegedly value-free and mechanistic view of education-as-investment for both individual and society. Instead, we see a move towards the more 'political' approach of collating materials, testing options and implementing action in terms of increasingly explicit sets of values.

The Government's Plans and Forecasts appear to be examples of this second generation approach which assumes that value statements about various positions can be expertly mapped and that stock can be taken of a range of feasible options. Overseas, as well as in some quarters in Hong Kong, the now serious doubts about the validity and utility of this concept of planning is giving rise to the formulation of a third generation approach - involving a move away from the stating of definite objectives in favour of pointing out broad directions....

We feel that strenuous efforts should be devoted to raising the level of parent and community involvement in policy-formation (especially at the school level) and to engage as much expertise as can be marshalled (not only from within the bureaucracy) in planning....

We had conversations with people who expressed to us the dilemma of educational policies directed towards

social cohesion and control being juxtaposed against those aiming at individual and minority-group freedom. The legitimacy of this tension seems to have been acknowledged in the virtual explosion of panels, committees and working parties, participatory devices that have been foreign to the local scene until recently. Despite the trend towards participatory governance, the technocratic planning techniques still being employed continue to cause problems (Perspective, 1982:16-17)

Similar remarks are readily found in OECD documents, particularly in those related to the Re-appraisal of Educational Planning project (see, for example, Kogan, 1980:8).

In the Panel's view, the Hong Kong Government's approach was technocratic and causing problems because it was not client-centred (Perspective, 1982:17, para II.8).

Their faith in pluralistic and participatory approaches naturally led them to adopt a pluralistic and participatory approach in the Overall Review. Thus came the methodology described earlier.

III.2.3. Delay of the Report

As a consequence of the "political approach" the Report was a reflection, sometimes a pure reflection, of the opinions expressed by what the Panel identified as the "clients". Thus the most vocal groups such as the Education Action Group were given the most heed.

In the Government's eyes, this was entirely inappropriate to policy-making in Hong Kong. Furthermore, the Government was totally unprepared for such an approach. One key informant from the Government remarked:

I did not realize that the OECD had changed. I had read

many of the OECD reports, but not their recent ones. I read their Japanese report, Australian report which were tidy, rational. I did not read their reports on Greece, Norway which used a different approach. I was not updated of the OECD (ISX08).

Thus Topley expressed his disappointment in the Association of Heads of Secondary Schools (see II.7 of this Chapter) and Henderson cynically described the Report as "a sweet-shop full of 'goodies' for all" (see I.4 of this Chapter).

On the other hand, the Panel regarded this as a success. They appreciated very much the method as well as the outcome of the Review:

The intensity of public participation was outstanding. We had some 280 meetings with all the educational groups. Participation of public groups in the plenary sessions was again impressive.

That was rather unusual, in almost all the other OECD reviews, review reports normally turned out to support government policies, e.g. Australia, Germany, and so the governments found them useful (ISOR3).

The Panel even consciously went beyond education and envisaged:

Any move towards greater participation in education decision making and policy formulation would add to existing pressures for the democratisation of the territory's government generally (Perspective, 1982: 18, II.11).

And it was convinced that

Given what the education enterprise is about, its governance and management should be a model of public administrative theory and practice (Perspective, 1982: 15, II.1).

This presented a challenge to the existing administration. It went beyond differences in methods and outcomes. It actually reflects a difference in the ideology of policy-

making.

A senior member of the Government who was in charge of educational planning, was sharp in pointing out: "It is really a matter of choice. Had we invited UNESCO instead, the result could be completely different" (CSL03).

It was not surprising that it was not only objected to by the Governor and Topley, but also objected to by Brimer, Professor of Education and member of the Board of Education, and even the UPGC where the majority was from overseas. They were familiar with the Hong Kong scene and believed that the mode of policy-making in Hong Kong should be very different from those in the West, let alone the "participatory" approach to which was often paid only lip service even in the West.

If we take this view, it is not surprising that the Government was reluctant to publish the Report. Even when the Report was published under pressure, the Government found it difficult to fit its implementation into the existing political framework.

III.2.4. The LEGCO Debate

If the above explanation is valid, then the Legco debate becomes a matter of course.

In this issue, the Unofficials were largely led by Fr McGovern and Joyce Bennett. Fr McGovern was a senior member in the Catholic Diocese and was in the Catholic Board of Education. Bennett had long been well known for her liberal thoughts in education and her critical attitude towards the

government Education Department (CSW01). She whole-heartedly supported the OECD review Report. In their viewpoints, it was the narrow-mindedness of the Government that went against the Report.

The environment at that time was that the published Report was warmly received by the public. Reactions among non-government bodies were overwhelmingly positive. On the other hand, the Government made absolutely no comment about the Report. Most of the Unofficials would find no reason for not supporting the Report.

The Officials, who were antagonized by the OECD Panel right from the beginning of the exercise, felt reluctant to show an endorsing attitude and commit the Government to fully implement the Report. They felt, very much the opposite of the Unofficials, that the report was merely a narrow-minded reflection of pressure group opinions and a broader basis should be sought for policy formulation.

The whole thing therefore evolved into the dramatic confrontation between the Officials and the Unofficials.

The resolution of the confrontation was achieved by a concession of the Officials, as Topley made clear in his concluding speech, that

It has now been made clear that the motion is not meant to exclude consideration of the public consultation which is continuing. It is not claimed that the Report is the only basis for the formulation of policy, nor is it suggested that the Government must proceed tomorrow to implement the recommendations of the report as a fixed blueprint (Hansard, 1983/84:1126-27).

III.2.5. The Education Commission

As is clear from the Report, the Panel saw the establishment of the Education Commission as of prime importance. The idea was a consequence of the finding that

There is a pervasive feeling that the responsibility for and knowledge about what is happening lies elsewhere; but no-one is sure where this is, or who holds the master plan (Perspective, 1981:16).

The education system seems to be over-administered in terms of minute bureaucratic surveillance of regulations yet under-planned in terms of strategic goals and the know-how to attain them (Ibid).

In concrete terms, there was the need to have a body to coordinate the three existing policy advisory bodies: BoE, VTC and UPGC. The proposal coincided with the Government's concern on fragmentation, which led subsequently to the creation of the new Secretary for Education and his Branch.

However, the proposal was administratively undesirable. As was explained in the relevant document and vividly reported by the *South China Morning Post* (see also I.5 of this Chapter) the establishment of the proposed Education Commission would (a) add a "cog" to the existing policy-making machinery; (b) present a constitutional anomaly to the EXCO and (c) discourage the existing advisory bodies who then had to submit themselves to the new Commission. One unpublished document had the following criticisms about the proposed Education Commission:

The Commission, or indeed any other body which is juxtaposed upon and seen to be superior to the three existing bodies, which incorporate the Education and Manpower Branch as its Secretariat and reports directly to the Governor would be cumbersome in operation by introducing another step in the consultative process (DSX05).

The Government's reluctance was further reinforced by the objection from the existing advisory bodies. The UPGC, in particular, emphasized that (a) coordination is the function of the Government and not of an advisory body and (b) coordination is an impossibility in modern education systems. It said in its recommendation:

There is no quarrel with the need for coordination, but we have grave reservations about the degree of co-ordination that can be exercised or should be exercised by an advisory body. Coordination and assignment of priorities ultimately involve executive decisions and the taking of executive decisions is not properly the role of an advisory group. Furthermore in our view it is not appropriate for overall government priorities to be determined by anyone other than the Government, using the established machinery. ...

On a more philosophical note, we cannot commend the establishment of an Education Commission which derives conceptually from out-moded educational theories of the 1960s when it was believed for a time by some exponents that a common philosophy could be applied to both kindergarten and post-doctorate research (DSU02).

Under these circumstances, the difficulties in implementing the idea of the proposed Education Commission had put the Government away from the idea. The eventual establishment of the revised version of an Education Commission was a compromise between the proposal and the *status quo*.

III.2.6. Summary of the rational explanation

In short, the rational explanation sees the different actors in the episode as "goal conscious". Their primary concern was to arrive at some desired policy in education.

The launching of the OECD review was based on the genuine need for overiewing the fragmented policies and

policy-advisory bodies, with the hope that a third-party with the expertise of the OECD would provide the most objective recommendations. The OECD Panel, however, adopted a pluralistic and participatory approach where public opinions were regarded as the norm for policy decisions. This deviated significantly from the existing policy mechanism of Hong Kong where technical deliberations formed the basis for decision-making. The Government therefore found it difficult to follow. The popular groups, on the other hand, naturally supported the Report which reflected their views. This conflict came to a head in the LEGCO debate between the Officials and the Unofficials. With reluctance, the Government accepted the Report and tried to resolve the basic conflict by setting up a Education Commission which is a compromise between the proposed Commision and the existing policy-making machinery.

III.3. The Legitimacy Explanation

The legitimacy explanation assumes that the primary concern of the actors might not be the policies per se. The different advisory bodies might find themselves in the position of defending their own *legitimacy* which gave them the authority to contribute to educational policy-making. The OECD review, just like the CRE review, emerged as a foreign body in the arena of *legitimacy* and in effect disturbed the original order of *legitimacy* and hence aroused vigorous interactions.

Before we proceed to answer the five questions at hand, it might be useful to examine some of the characteristics of the OECD review.

III.3.1. Characteristics of the OECD review

The OECD Panel was basically an external consultant. This has to be studied with care.

On the one hand, the nature of the OECD reviews determined that the Hong Kong review Panel was to be independent and impartial.

Firstly, in the OECD convention, the country reviews are not used to endorse government policies. Rather it is designed to help the host government identify problems not easily seen by the government itself. The government may or may not agree with the results of the overall review. In fact, the UK confrontation meeting in 1975 was famous for the disagreement between the review Panel and the Department for Education and Science (OECD, 1975; Department of Education and Science, 1975). Anyway, from the outset, the review Panel was not obliged to follow government lines. That is, it was *impartial*.

Secondly, as initiator of the Hong Kong review, the BoE's intention was to present the Hong Kong case to some "strange eyes" and it agreed that it would not make much sense for insiders to look at the system (see II.1 of this Chapter). Therefore, the BoE started with no intention to use the overall review to endorse existing policies.

Thirdly, the Panel from the outset took itself as a

free agent. They deliberately decided not to be paid and took this as a guard against government intervention (see II.2 of this Chapter). In the Panel members' own words, "We insisted in the integrity to act as free agents so that government manoeuvre would be practically zero" (ISOR4).

Therefore, the OECD Panel viewed itself as a *free agent*, independent and impartial.

On the other hand, right from the beginning, the Government made much effort to publicise the Overall Review. This gave the community a strong sense that the Review was going to be a public exercise. The public invitation for representations and meetings, the wide publicity of the Panel's extensive visits, and the plenary sessions, all confirmed this impression.

Meanwhile, the Panel was committed from the very beginning to producing a public report. Although this was not known to the public, the Panel members all had in mind that they were doing something public.

As a result of both the government publicity and the Panel's commitment, it was tacitly understood that the Overall Review was a *public review*.

If we combine the two aspects, the OECD Panel was special in that it was not only answerable to the Governor or the Government, but also answerable to the public. It was therefore not supposed to be advising the Government alone, but Hong Kong as a whole. This is the basic difference between this Hong Kong review and other OECD

country reviews. Elsewhere, a panel was invited by the government which was supposed to be elected and representing the citizens. Although the Panel was invited by the Government, it was deliberately set up to be essentially not only a Government consultation; it was a *third-party consultation*. As an actor in this political episode, the OECD Panel was a third-party consultant.

Viewed from this angle, the OECD Review was basically an episode of the triangular relationship among the Government, the public and the third-party consultant.

We can now proceed to explain the five junctures.

III.3.2. Launching of the Overall Review

We can examine this from two angles: the insistence of the BoE and the acceptance by the Governor.

The BoE insistence That the BoE initiated the exercise was politically explainable. The BoE was a body of shrinking territory. Following the loss of the Technical College (which became the Polytechnic) to the UPGC, it is going to lose the Technical Institutes to the successor of Hong Kong Training Council. When the OECD Panel was being appointed, discussions were underway in the CRE Committee that Baptist College, Lingnan College and Shue Yan College which were registered with the Ordinance of Post-Secondary Colleges would be taken away from the Education Department.

The declining image of the BoE was not only because of its decreasing sphere of influence, but also of its status in terms of policy-making. Although the BoE was established

by the Education Ordinance and was supposed to advise the Governor in all matters of educational policy, it had never been really influential in policy-making. The 1973 Green Paper was a BoE endeavour, but it was this very Green Paper which was almost completely revised by the Government Secretariat when it appeared subsequently as White Paper (see Chapter 1, I.1.2). Thereafter, the BoE had virtually become an advisory body for the Director of Education rather than for the Governor, although nominally the Director of Education was only the Vice-Chairman. It discussed matters of administration rather than matters of policy.

This was also an observation by the OECD Panel:

Our understanding is that there is little capacity or corporate willingness [within the BoE] to address principles or long-term development planning (although it was put to us that in recent years references to the Board have been more to do with details of administration than with general policy) (Perspective, 1982: 20).

Meanwhile, the BoE was in charge of the largest sector of the education population. The school system was always the most crucial part of the entire education scene. It was highly sensitive to changes in the other sectors (viz. technical education and higher education). Under these circumstances, it was legitimate for the BoE to think of an overall review of the system, to look into the expanding territories of the other policy advisory bodies; so that before its role further declined, it could justify its own position in the policy-making arena. In other words, the BoE sought to strengthen its legitimacy as a genuine policy-making body, and this legitimacy could be provided by an

overall review.

This justification was not likely to be achieved by local members of the education community who, in one way or another, had their involvements in different established interests. The impartiality of a third-party consultant will best provide the legitimacy required by the BoE. The OECD, as an established international organization in the business, provided a useful means in this respect.

The Governor's acceptance The Governor, MacLehose, was not happy at all with the idea of an overall review. He did not believe that anything useful could come out of such a short review. The following quotation is still true:

Unlike the Topley review or the UPGC, the OECD review lacked continuity. It was advocated by a few people in the Board of Education - Q.W. Lee was particularly keen on this - but the government was reluctant to let loose policy matters to a group like this [the OECD Panel]. With only very short visits, things can only be reviewed in a very superficial way where a small but articulate group spoke yet on very sensitive issues (ISX01, also appears in III.2.1. of this Chapter).

Why then did MacLehose, to start with, approve the idea in 1978 and appointed the Panel in 1981?

One immediate explanation is that the BoE's proposal was irresistible because it tested the Government's sincerity in improving education. One key informant sees the BoE as follows:

It was not easy to resist the pressure brought about by the BoE. The BoE has been there for twenty or thirty years, but has done very little if not nothing (ISX08).

Hence, although the BoE was not terribly influential, the Government had to pay respect. If the proposal were

rejected, the Government would not be able to hold its credibility among the BoE members who were representative of the major sponsors of the school system. In other words, refusal of the proposal might cost the Government a loss in legitimacy. The above statement of the senior official illustrates this point.

However, it is not fair to assert that the Governor was totally passive and reluctant in launching the OECD review. If we look back into the years before the Overall Review, we should find that MacLehose was good at third-party consultations. As mentioned earlier in Chapter 1, III.2), the T.K. Ann Commission and the Rayson Huang Committee are well-known examples of third-party consultation. There could be similar exercises in other sectors. As far as education is concerned, the Overall Review was the third major exercise as third-party consultation in the "MacLehose Years".

Third-party consultation was a device which placed the Governor in an impartial position over any dispute between the government bureaucracy and the public, thus winning credibility from all parties and providing the Governor with legitimacy for his authority.

If legitimacy provides acceptable arguments, then it was the process rather than the output of the consultation which was more important. The concern, both on the parts of the BoE and the Governor, was more on the consultation *per se* than the results from the consultations.

The negative interpretation is that carrying out such a

consultation is a purpose in itself. Whether the consultation actually contributes to policy-making is of secondary importance. As one veteran OECD member observed, "that the government is willing to hear does not necessarily mean it is ready to listen" (ISOR1a).

The argument may be extended to explain the timing of the OECD review. The OECD review was not meant to pre-empt CRE results. Rather it was the timing of the CRE that was political. There were at that time published policy statements on primary, junior secondary and senior secondary education. Technical and higher education was absent on the list. The Government found it necessary to put forward some policy statement in these areas before the OECD review actually started, hence the CRE. One of the informants opines:

The BoE had succeeded in initiating the OECD review. The Government might feel uneasy that it had done very little in higher education and therefore would like to produce something. The substantive recommendations are less important than something to show "where we stand" in higher education. So, the Topley Committee could be regarded as a way with which the Government wished to restore its credibility and confidence when facing the OECD review (ISP04).

Although the OECD Panel was not expected to endorse government policies, a lack of policy statement would put the Government in a totally passive position. If that actually happened, it would undermine the Government's credibility among its citizens and damage its legitimacy in its future policy-making.

In fact, one may notice the unusual case in the

background report (Hong Kong Education System, 1981) where specific government policies on higher education were missing. A substitute was the 1979 Working Group which was only a tentative set-up within the Government (Ibid.:96-101).

The same argument may explain the haste in producing the CRE report (ISP02) and the eagerness of the Government to obtain some quick statements from the Panel about higher education (See II.4 of this Chapter).

III.3.3. The review methodology

The adoption of a "political approach" is partly a change of trend in the OECD practice, but is not entirely an OECD convention. The Hong Kong review was in fact quite different from the other OECD reviews. As one of the old hands in OECD reviews pointed out, and was echoed by another member of the Panel:

There are at least two points where the Hong Kong review is outstanding. Firstly, OECD reviews usually focus on some specific area of education. For example, transition from school to work was the theme of the Australian review; compensatory education was the theme of the US review. The Hong Kong review was an overall review. Secondly, the intensity of public participation was outstanding. We had some 280 meetings with all the educational groups. Participation of public groups in the plenary sessions was again extremely impressive (ISOR3)

As described in an earlier section (see II.1 of this Chapter), the normal practice in OECD reviews was to hold confrontation meetings between the visiting panel and the hosting officials or policy-relevant personnel. On the whole, such reviews were governmental affairs, the objective

of the reviews was to help the governments in their policy deliberations.

The special feature of the Hong Kong review could be explained in two dimensions.

Firstly, faced with such a huge review but with only limited time and knowledge, the Panel was forced to adopt some quick method to establish its legitimacy. In a way, the suspicion of the Government about the validity of such a review was not without justifications (see II.1 of this Chapter). It was quite impossible for the Panel to carry out a comprehensive rational analysis of the situation in the short period of time, even if they wished to. It remains to be explained, however, why the review exercise should be confined to such short visits.

Meanwhile, the Panel discovered that the system had already tolerated a whole series of rational planning exercises:

When we were given the documents, we found that there existed a series of standing reviews. The UPGC has been there for a long time. The Topley Committee had a comprehensive plan. We found that all these were quite instrumental in approach. So if you put all these pieces together, you have an enormous shopping list (ISOR4).

It would be extremely difficult and totally unwise to compete with these rational deliberations. As a matter of fact, with the exception of Karl Roeloffs, the Panel members' experience in these technical analyses was limited. Under these circumstances, there was actually little choice left to the Panel to design the methodology. If this was the

case, then the following quotation could be read as a frank statement:

We decided at the moment when we arrived that we had no other choices. There was no other frames of reference on which we can rely (ISOR4).

At this point, the Panel adopted the "political" or "participatory" approach, which is quite popular at least in the literature of educational planning. The label serves to legitimate a convenient approach which would otherwise be identified as cheap. The "political approach" provides a legitimate alternative and was quickly adopted when there was not much choice.

The adoption of the "political" and "participatory" approach was also reinforced by a second reason. There was a tacit assumption among the OECD Panel members that Hong Kong was a colony where people's voice was "suppressed". Seeing things in this light, the OECD Panel member felt that it was their responsibility to dig out what was suppressed and speak out for the "oppressed" majority. Subconsciously, the Panel believed that anti-establishment opinions should be given more attention. The following supports this view:

The entire philosophy of the overall review, and of the Panel, was unanimously that the audience we were going to address should be parents and citizens and 97% of these were Chinese. Therefore we thought the public meetings were very important in framing our ideology. The EAG (Education Action Group), for example, might not have high influence on the Government, but had high influence on us, that they infringed the formal power. We listened very carefully to citizens in general, rather than the organized citizens. ...(ISOR4)

In sum, the Panel adopted the "participatory" approach which gave them immediate multifold legitimacy: (a) It would

provide a decent alternative to tedious technical analyses. (b) It would fit very well into the prevalent notion of "third generation" educational planning. (c) It could maximize the collection and hence representation of the "suppressed" views.

It is therefore not surprising if the Report turned out to be a collation of criticisms rather than a balanced view. The former was what the Government felt about the Report.

However, the Panel was not worried at all by the Government's disappointment. In fact, the Panel to some extent regard Government's disappointment as a sign of their success. As Michael Kirst, a member of the OECD Panel, remarked in the CIES (Comparative and International Education Society) Conference at Stanford in 1985:

The Hong Kong review had the special feature that the third-party provided legitimacy for the popular group, but not for the government. This was rather interesting.

Some of the Panel members actually took this as an achievement, something that signified their "dignity" that they did not toe the Government line. In a sense, this was a matter of their prestige and they took this more seriously than what came out of the report. That is, it is again a matter of legitimacy. One member of the Panel remarked:

We threw all our professional reputations behind the report. The Government could ask anything, but we could say "no"! We insisted on the integrity to act as free agents so that government manoeuvre would be practically zero. It is hard to believe that a tenure professor at Stanford [referring to Michael Kirst] would try to appease the Hong Kong Government. We were not even constant OECD members (ISOR4).

If we follow the above argument, the following quotations

immediately become enlightening:

Topley accused the Report for being unduly critical. I said there was no point that we should not be critical (ISOR2).

I had thought that John Llewellyn was a British noble and he would follow the government line. Amazingly, he was a complete free agent. ... It was rather amusing to see how the Governor was confronted by John Llewellyn (ISOR4)

Such remarks can easily be accused for being emotional, but might well explain the actual motives at the time. The emphasis of integrity and impartiality could have easily but subconsciously reinforced the anti-government and anti-establishment tendency in the approach.

It was then not surprising that the Panel went as far as to include the following in the final Report:

Any move towards greater participation in education decision making and policy formulation would add to existing pressure for the democratisation of the territory's government generally (Perspective, 1982:18).

Such an advocacy from a foreigner was rather unusual in the international scene. In fact, a staff member of the UNESCO EPP (Education Policy and Planning) Division, on an informal occasion, criticised the above paragraph as an "interference of internal affairs" (CSR01).

In sum, the third-party position and the OECD label provided the Panel with adequate legitimacy to assume its status, but did not automatically serve to legitimate the approach it adopted. The "political" and "participatory" approach came to the rescue and gave the Panel the most convenient legitimacy to produce some weighty result given limited resources and time.

III.3.4. Delay of the Report

The above analysis may also explain the delay in the publication of the report. In handling a report full of "undue criticisms" (ISOR2), the Government faced a dilemma. On the one hand, the Government saw the report as an unbalanced picture which denounced all that the Government had done in education. Publication of the report might disgrace the Government. On the other hand, the OECD Panel was quite popular and had given much credit to the Government's openness. If the Government rejected the report, it would undermine the legitimacy which had just been built up.

In particular, one primary explanation for the delay of the publication of the report was that its proposal for of a coordinating Education Commission disturbed the legitimacy structure. It is not surprising that the major policy-advisory bodies expressed their reservations and even resentment towards the OECD review Report.

BoE The BoE initiated the overall review, and was glad to see some coordination so that the BoE would stand on equal footing with other policy advisory bodies. However, the BoE had not expected that the Panel would propose the Education Commission which in effect would subordinate the BoE and insert a new layer between the BoE and the Governor. The Education Commission, as proposed, would undermine the legitimacy granted to the BoE by Ordinance. Therefore in its comments of the OECD review Report, the BoE emphasized

that "the BoE, the UPGC and the VTC should maintain direct access to the Governor" (DSX06). Similar views were put forward by the HKEA (Hong Kong Examinations Authority) and the UMELCO (Unofficial Members of the Executive and Legislative Councils).

The BoE, the HKEA and the UMELCO Education and Manpower Panel support the establishment of the Education Commission. The BoE and UMELCO Panel further considered that it should be statutory. However, the point is made that the BoE, the UPGC and the VTC should remain autonomous and not subordinate to the Commission which should co-ordinate and serve as a forum for mutual consultation but not direct their work. The HKEA feels that the subordinate role will discourage the existing bodies and affect their performance (DSX05).

The Director of Education supported the view of the BoE (Ibid).

UPGC The most significant resistance perhaps came from the UPGC:

The UPGC has grave reservations and is of the view that the establishment of the Commission should create difficulty in recruiting people of the right calibre to the UPGC and that assignment of priorities and decision should be the function of the Government, not of a commission (Ibid).

The UPGC was virtually answerable only to the Governor. The Knights and Lords in the UPGC held direct dialogues with the Governor and this might serve as an incentive to their services which were otherwise unrewarded. The legitimacy of the UPGC lay in the personal trust from the Governor. The proposed Education Commission would break this "kinship" and would undermine the legitimacy upon which the UPGC members served. This point was overtly made in the UPGC's reaction to the OECD review report:

The UPGC is able to take this planning role upon itself because it has available to it through the overseas academics and their connections an extra-ordinary breadth of academic expertise which is given willingly and generously in the service of Hong Kong. Overseas members give this assistance willingly because they feel that the advice is directed to and appreciated by the Governor. There is little likelihood that the members of the newly proposed HEPGC would feel such a personal commitment in reporting to an Education Commission (DSX07).

HEPGC, the Higher Education Planning and Grants Committee, was the name proposed by the OECD Report for a re-defined UPGC (Perspective, 1982:22).

Such comments presented a threat of quitting which was even more powerful than any direct attack.

In fact, in its reaction to the OECD review report, the UPGC even challenged the legitimacy and competency of the proposed Education Commission:

The UPGC disagrees with the fundamental premises upon which the Education Commission is to be based, and at a more practical level it doubts the capacity of a commission composed largely of part-time non-experts to act as a surrogate for the Government in this wide and costly area of public spending (DSX07).

In this context, the UPGC's charge that coordination and priority setting should be the function of the Government and not of a Commission is more an argument on legitimacy than one on philosophy. What the UPGC actually said was that the legitimacy of coordinating and priority setting should lie with the Government, and not with any advisory body.

The EXCO From the legitimacy point of view, the EXCO's rejection was natural. The proposed Education Commission would in fact be directly responsible to the Governor in all

matters of education policy. This would mean by-passing the EXCO and as a matter of course the EXCO would not allow this to happen. One Exco member made it clear: "If the Commission were to direct the three bodies, and were statutory, what would then be the place for the EXCO?" (ISX04)

Under these circumstances, despite the public support for the Report, the Government felt the pressure of opposition from the high-level advisory bodies against the idea of an Education Commission. Unfortunately, the establishment of the Education Commission was the very first thing to which the Government had to respond before any of the other recommendations could be considered. If this key-issue presented unsurmountable difficulties, implementation of the Report recommendations would become almost impossible. If only from this point of view, it was natural that the Government was reluctant to publish the Report. Should the Report be published, the implementation would face foreseeable objections from within the policy-making machinery.

The Government was therefore in another dilemma: It might choose to face the public objections once and for all by not publishing the Report; or it might choose to ease the tension first by publishing the Report, but had to face serious objections from the advisory bodies in the long run.

With hindsight, this dilemma seemed to be intrinsic and was inevitable. As one OECD official remarked: "Once the Government accepted the Overall Review, it accepted also the

risk of being criticised" (ISOR1b).

The Government gained overall legitimacy by its openness to conduct a third-party consultation, but it faced heavy loss of legitimacy if the existing advisory system broke down.

The dilemma was virtually an accounting of legitimacy. If the Report were rejected, then the whole exercise would be devalued and there would be a bankruptcy of legitimacy. If the Report were accepted, the acceptance would mean an overhaul of the policy-making machinery that would undermine the normal Government policy-making mechanism. Both ways, the Government would lose legitimacy.

If this explanation reflects the truth, then the eventual publication of the Report reflects the Government decision (largely the EXCO decision) to treasure the legitimacy created by the conduct of the OECD Review and to minimize the loss of legitimacy due to the proposed co-ordinating Education Commission.

There could also be a secondary political factor for the delay in the publication of the Report. This happened at the point of history when there was a change of Governor. Edward Youde replaced Murray MacLehose. Discussion about the OECD report took place at a point of "double honeymoon" for the top administrators when firstly there was a change of "boss" and secondly the new "boss" was too occupied by Sino-British negotiations. The Chief Secretary Haddon-Cave was in actual power and it was believed there was a tendency

to overturn what MacLehose had advocated. Participation and consultation, which were highly rated by MacLehose, might not be favourable among other top officials and therefore might not be getting the same momentum it used to get.

The LEGCO debate

If the above argument holds, then the Legco debate was a natural consequence.

The Government dilemma in the publication of the Report involved not only a conflict between the third-party "experts" and the existing advisory bodies; but also a conflict between the "insider" and the "outsider" of the policy-making machinery.

Insiders here refer to those who were members of the top policy-advisory bodies. As is seen in the earlier discussion, most of the "insiders" saw the Report as a threat to their existing legitimacy, although they might not have objections to the particular recommendations.

The outsiders included the Unofficials who were not involved in educational policy-making. They were the most powerful outsiders. In the education arena, they had no political legitimacy to defend and hence their attention focussed on the particular recommendations which were quite appealing in their own right.

The different foci led to opposite attitudes towards the Report. This eventually led to the unprecedented LEGCO debate.

A careful study of the Hansard reveals that even among

the "united front" of the Unofficials, the insiders and the outsiders showed marked difference in their speeches. The outsiders enthusiastically pressed for implementation of the report; the insiders evaded direct comments on the report, but took the opportunity to show that they were not toeing the Government line.

The unprecedented unity among the Unofficials was also facilitated by the imminent problem of the future of Hong Kong in 1997. While the appointed Unofficials used to feel satisfied with their loyalty to the Government, the 1997 issue urged them to present themselves as answerable also to the public. It was at the time when Sino-British negotiation was about to start. The Unofficials would be in a very awkward position. In any case they were not considered as part of the British Government, but that they were appointed and not elected made them illegitimate even as representing Hong Kong. If they could not make themselves seen to be representing the Hong Kong people, they would immediately be identified as mere puppets of the "British" Hong Kong Government. This would put them in an extremely difficult position when they were still supposed to be policy-makers of Hong Kong, at least in the years before 1997.

In other words, the unofficial LEGCO members were in a legitimacy crisis. In addition to their legitimacy which came from Governor's appointment, they need now to acquire a new type of legitimacy which came from popular support. The Overall Review debate gave the Unofficials a very good opportunity to identify themselves as separate from the

Officials, without causing serious harm to the Administration.

In all these, Topley's role was interesting. The speeches seemed to hint that everyone in the LEGCO was glad to see Topley in difficulties. This personal element certainly added colour to the episode as apparent in the many jokes, stories and even fairy tales told during the debate (Hong Kong Hansard, 1983/84:1081-1127). It seemed that the Unofficials had used the attacks on the "Toleysian stroke" (Ibid.:1124) as an opportunity to gain their own legitimacy as "responsible" Councillors. Anyway, Topley was near retirement and could do no harm to anybody. The result of the debate apparently made the Unofficials gain enormous legitimacy for their future role in the LEGCO.

This argument could be further carried forward to reveal the more complicated side of the story.

In the short term, the LEGCO debate was a demerit for the Government. It was naturally interpreted that Officials in the supposedly highest policy-making body did not go along with the public opinion and even the Unofficials in the LEGCO had to revolt. The fact that the Unofficials did revolt, and that the revolt was reported as setting a precedent, created a sort of "legitimation crisis" for the Hong Kong Government. Along this line of argument, the victory of the Unofficials added to the "crisis".

However, if we look into the broader context, the debate occurred at the moment when the future of Hong Kong

was the focus of concern and the Hong Kong Government was eager to democratize the political structure. Although the split in the LEGCO challenged the existing system, the victory of the Unofficials *de facto* demonstrated that the Unofficials were able to "represent" public opinions and the Officials could submit themselves to the Unofficials.

This in the end was a credit to the Government and legitimated the status of the Unofficials as spokesmen of the public, although they were not elected by the public. After all, the Government gained legitimacy in that the existing political setup was not an autocracy. Haddon-cave's (see II.8) decision by the end of the debate, in a hindsight, was a right move to gain legitimacy for the Government and Topley became the scapegoat. The absence of the Governor in person actually put the Government in a more advantageous position to gain in the legitimacy game. After all, the Governor did not submit himself to pressures in person. It was Topley, not even Haddon-Cave, who made the "surrender" conclusion.

The Education Commission

The publication and acceptance of the Report pressed the Government to act positively towards the Report. Failing to do that would lead to a new legitimization crisis. Thus the Government fell into what could be called a "legitimation trap" where the compensation of one legitimization crisis immediately leads to the rise of another legitimization crisis.

If anything were to be implemented according to the Report, the first inevitable step would be the establishment of the Education Commission. However, as is discussed at length in II.9 of this Chapter, the proposed Education Commission was a challenge to the legitimacy of the existing policy-making setup. The OECD Panel proposal in fact suggested that the Education Commission could by-pass the EXCO and oversee the other advisory bodies. Both the EXCO and the existing advisory bodies, UPGC in particular, felt this to be intolerable (see II.9 of this Chapter).

The wisdom of the EXCO members then created the idea of setting up an Education Commission in name, but replacing the substance by what was originally proposed as the Educational Policy Development Committee (see II.9 of this Chapter). On the one hand, the public would see this as the very crucial step that the Report was being implemented. On the other hand, it retained the legitimacy for the EXCO and other policy-advisory bodies to maintain their status in policy-making. The whole idea was to satisfy public aspirations and to restore the existing legitimacy system.

In the actual deliberation, a number of designs were significant. Firstly, the Education Commission was answerable to the Governor-in-Council which guaranteed that the Education Commission would not by-pass the EXCO. Secondly, the Education Commission was appointed with a very strong Chairman and comparatively weak members (ISU09), so that the Education Commission might be respected but would not be threatening. The appointment of Q.W.Lee as

Chairman gave every party confidence. His experience in education and his status in community would impress the public that this was a very high power commission. His Chairmanship made the Panel feel relieved that the Education Commission was in the hands of someone they trust. In fact, Llewellyn recommended G.W.Lee to Youde as the right person (ISOR2; see II.7 of this Chapter).

If the Education Commission worked out well, it would then take up the responsibility of implementing the Report, or in fact decide on whether or not to implement the recommendations. The Education Commission then faced the responsibility that would otherwise be faced by the Government. This thus saved the Government from the legitimization trap. The legitimization crisis, if there is any, was then passed on to the Education Commission. This was a stroke of genius in the legitimacy game. One top official at the time had a very good summary:

My contribution to the OECD review was to devise the Education Commission and to put it in the position to study the Report. This was at that time the only way to go round the difficulty (ISX08).

The retention of the name "Education Commission", in this context, was a "disguise" device. Although Government people did not deny that the Education Commission as established was not the one as proposed by the OECD Panel (ISX09; ISX08), this was never made clear in the public. In the end the "Education Commission" was the "Education Policy Development Committee" proposed in the EXCO as an alternative to the Education Commission proposed by the OECD Panel. It

wore the clothes of its opponent. The Government announced its establishment with the following sentence:

Following careful consideration of the Llewellyn Report, an Education Commission is being set up to co-ordinate, consolidate and give advice on education policy in Hong Kong (Government Press Release, March 7, 1984).

On the whole, the public, including the most vocal groups, hailed the establishment of the Education Commission, without noticing that this was *not* the Education Commission proposed by the Panel. It was only in 1986 when the Education Commission was found lacking the power to co-ordinate that the public began to realise the significance of the difference.

It was rather amusing when it was revealed during the research that even the Panel members did not realize that the Education Commission was a disguised version and was substantially different from what they had proposed.

Thus, the Government successfully solved a legitimacy problem.

Summary of the legitimacy explanation

The legitimacy explanation sees the Overall Review episode as largely a battle in which the actors fought to increase or compensate for legitimacy for their authorities in policy-making.

The OECD review was initiated by the BoE which felt its own position declining and would like some third-party to re-assure its legitimacy. The launching of the Overall Review by an OECD team was a credit to the Government in

terms of legitimacy. The review demonstrated the open-mindedness of the Government in inviting an established, impartial third-party to conduct a public review. This credit in legitimacy, however, was gained at the cost of a risk in legitimacy brought about by criticisms that might disturb the existing legitimacy system. Such a risk materialized as a crisis in legitimacy when the Panel established its legitimacy as the spokesman of the anti-establishment vocal groups. It produced a very critical Report, implementation of which would mean a major overhaul of the existing legitimacy for educational policy-making. This immediately invited strong objection from the existing legitimate policy-makers such as the EXCO and the UPGC, and was made severe by the LEGCO split where the Unofficials gained their legitimacy (as spokesman of the public) at the expense of the Government's legitimacy.

The Government was forced to face a legitimacy dilemma. It might lose the legitimacy gained through the openness of the review (by refusing to publish the report), or it might undermine the existing legitimacy system (by publishing the report and accepting its recommendations). Either ways might led to further crises of legitimacy ahead. There was obviously the beginning of a series of legitimacy traps. The dilemma caused the delay in the publication of the report and the controversy in the seting up of the Education Commission. The legitimacy dilemma was eventually resolved by setting up a disguised Education Commission which

preserved the existing legitimacy of the establishment, while serving as a surrogate for the Government to face the legitimacy problems ahead.

Summary of the OECD Review

The Chapter analyses the OECD review episode in three stages. The first stage collates all the facts readily perceived by the public. The second stage tries to weave complex research findings into a consistent picture of what happened both on the front- and the back- stages. Analyses are then made from two perspectives: the episode as interactions between rational actors and as an account of legitimacy conflicts between the actors.

In the rational explanation, the assumption is that the actors were primarily concerned with the production of policies. The conflicts that occurred during the OECD Episode were then due to different perceptions about policy and policy-making.

In the legitimacy explanation, however, the assumption is that the production of the policy was not so much the primary concern as the legitimacy of respective actors in maintaining their authority and influence in policy-making. The conflicts are ones of legitimacy which each actor was to acquire, or defend.

Both perspectives lend themselves to consistent explanations.

CHAPTER SIX

CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSIONS

0. Introduction

As pointed out in Chapter Two, this study seeks to discover rather than confirm theory, to generate rather than to test hypotheses. This final chapter explores whether theories have been discovered or hypotheses generated.

The preceding chapters have attempted to explain the two policy-making Episodes using the two different models. The first section of this chapter attempts to replicate briefly these two models to interpret three more policy events. This attempt is to ensure that the use of legitimacy model in parallel to the rational model is not unique to the two Episodes chosen for this study. The overall objective is to hypothesise that the notion of *legitimacy*, as depicted in previous chapters, is worth pursuing as an alternative to other conventional models.

The rest of the chapter is devoted to further developing the notion of *legitimacy*, by comparing and contrasting it with other existing theories. This section concludes with a discussion of the specific implications of the notion of *legitimacy* to Hong Kong.

I. The Explanations Generalized

As explained in Chapter 2, theories "discovered" in ethnographic types of research are not to be generalized by statistical inference. The success of ethnographic case studies does not lie in applying the theories generated to the "full population". Full population generalization is impossible and unjustified. However, the theories generated can be enriched by their applicability to other cases of similar nature. If one is forced to use the language of the conventional "hypothesis-testing" paradigm, applying the discovered "hypothesis" to a larger number of cases will help to justify the claim that what is discovered is a worth-while hypothesis.

It is therefore useful to see the extent to which the two explanations used in this study can be applied to other policy events in Hong Kong education. The three cases chosen in the following sections are again policy events of territory-wide implications. They occurred at more or less the same time in history. They are: (a) the unexpected introduction of nine-years free compulsory education in 1977, (b) the issue of course duration at the CUHK and (c) the adoption of manpower surveys in the planning of vocational training in the years 1973 to 1984.

I.1 Introduction of 9-years Compulsory Education

As is mentioned in Chapter 1, the Hong Kong Government produced a Green Paper on senior secondary and tertiary education in November, 1977 (Senior Secondary, 1977). However, the publication of the Green Paper was pre-empted by an unexpected announcement by the Governor on October 5, 1977 to phase in 9-years compulsory free education. There was apparent inconsistency in the policy-making process. The following is an attempt to explain this inconsistency by the two models used earlier.

I.1.1. The rational explanation

There had long been pressure to provide universal education beyond primary schooling.

In 1972, when MacLehose made his first policy speech in the Legislative Council, "the provision of 3 years secondary education for all in the 12-14 year age group" was anticipated as one of the major goals of social policies (Hong Kong Hansard, 1972/73:7). In 1973, the Board of Education, which was charged with the duty of producing a Green Paper, had included in its terms of reference "the Government's objective of providing three years secondary education for all in the 12-14 year age group....." (Report, 1973:ix). The subsequent White Paper specified the target date as 1979 (Secondary, 1974:3).

The 1977 Green Paper was based on the Report of a cross-departmental Working Party which made the assumption that universal education would eventually be provided to all

pupils of age 12-14 (DSX09).

Taking all this into the framework of a continuous process of policy evolution, the announcement of *compulsory* and *free* education was just a matter of time. The following time-line may help to summarise the picture:

1972 MacLehose Speech	9-years education for all
1973 Green Paper	9-years education for all
1974 White Paper	9-years subsidized education for all
1977 Working Party	9-years universal education
1977 Announcement	9-years free-compulsory education

Hence, the claim that there was an inconsistency in policy is unjustified.

1.1.2. The legitimacy explanation

The introduction of universal 9-years education was a stated policy and the final arrival of 9-years free and compulsory education was only a matter of time. However, a closer look at the policy-making process reveals that the announcement was made when all the policy advisory bodies were totally unprepared. And this was rather abnormal in Hong Kong.

The Board of Education, during its deliberation of the 1973 Green Paper, argued for 9-years universal education, but against 9-years compulsory education (CSB02). This led to the stated target in the 1974 White Paper that "subsidized", but not "compulsory" and certainly not "free" education, be provided for every child for nine years.

The working party report prior to the 1977 Green Paper (DSX09) did not go further than that. In any case, there was no sign that this was to be implemented in the near future. The Governor's announcement was therefore extraordinary. It was a move that was not scheduled. It was a surprise to almost everyone. Even members of the Board of Education learnt the news from the radio. It is confirmed in the research that MacLehose in fact consulted only two persons, Topley, the Director of Education and Q.W. Lee, Chairman of the Board of Education (ISX01). The research also reveals that the decision was made under international pressure:

There was always the policy of providing education for all. There was little problem of making this free. The question was whether we should make it compulsory. You know when education policy was being made, there were social as well as political considerations. By ILO standard, the lowest legal labour age was 15; by that time ours was 14. There was the possibility that we might be accused of exploiting child labour and this was dangerous to Hong Kong's reputation. It was for the sake of international rapprochement that the Governor felt some change had to be made. This was to [resist] the pressures at the time which were adverse to Hong Kong's international credibility (ISX01).

The OECD panel made it specific in their unpublished "Open Draft" that it was the EEC that was exerting the pressure:

It has been suggested to us that the rapid succession of policies to extend the limits of free and compulsory education was not unrelated to conditions attached to securing of trading rights with the European Economic Community (Chinese, 1982:para 1.24).

All these suggest that the sudden announcement of compulsory education was prompted by reasons that were not generated from policy deliberations within Hong Kong. As

one key informant recalled:

The Board of Education had long been arguing for universal education, but never thought compulsory education was desirable. It was MacLehose who made it compulsory, and he made it free in order that it might be compulsory. He wanted to show the EEC that Hong Kong was no longer making use of child labour (CSB02).

There was in fact a debate on whether it was necessary to make it free. One informant recalls:

It was interesting that all the expatriates argued that if it was compulsory, it had to be free; while all the Chinese argued that even if it was compulsory, you could still make people pay (ISX11).

This is further confirmed by another key informant:

When MacLehose launched 9-years compulsory education, Haddon-Cave said it could be compulsory, but not necessarily free. My immediate reaction was that if it was compulsory, it had to be free. MacLehose did not utter a further word and made it free (ISX07).

Hence, MacLehose's decision was made when Hong Kong, because of her minimum labour age set at 14, was losing its legitimacy to compete with other countries on equal footing. While the reason for compulsory education is yet to be justified (e.g. Tyack, 1976; Boli et al., 1985), there is a "culture" in the international community that year 15 should be the minimum labour age. Hong Kong's opponents' concern was not the well being of Hong Kong children, but to make use of Hong Kong's low labour age to legitimate putting Hong Kong in an unfavourable trading position. With the usual assumption that compulsory education cannot be made overnight, the opponents felt quite safe that Hong Kong would not be able to comply with this rule of game. Under these circumstances, MacLehose's decision to launch 9-years compulsory education gave Hong Kong the immediate legitimacy

to fight back and hence restored Hong Kong's position in international negotiations.

I.2. Course Duration of CUHK

The two universities in Hong Kong followed very different curricula which differed in duration. The normal length of an undergraduate degree course in HKU was three years and that for CUHK was four. In addition, the matriculation requirement for HKU was geared to an Advanced Level Examination which took place two years after the students' completion of Form 5; while the CUHK matriculation was geared to a Higher Level Examination which took place one year after Form 5. What added to the difficulty was that in most subjects, the two examinations followed separate syllabuses whose overlap was minimal. Students therefore had to opt for either the A-Level or the H-Level courses. To play safe, most prospective students sat for both examinations (doing one course by self-study) and had to make the very difficult decision at the end of the first year when they were offered a place in the CUHK. There was therefore social pressure to stop this confusing situation.

While the 1977 Green Paper was being deliberated, there was a suggestion for CUHK to change its course duration from three to four years. This was recorded in the Working Party Report:

The CUHK has a basic four-year course; and HKU a three-year course. This is therefore important in financial terms, because a CUHK graduate automatically costs

about 30% more than a HKU one. ... It has recently been proposed that there should be common two year sixth form curriculum leading to a common university matriculation examination. It may be appropriate thereafter for the Chinese University to consider moving to a 3 year undergraduate programme, though any such development should come about as a voluntary response by the University to the changes in the sixth form curriculum, rather than be imposed on the University for reasons of economy (DSX09:98).

This started the well-known "four-to-three" controversy. This point was put forward in a more subtle form in the published Green Paper when it referred to ways of expanding university student enrolment:

It would be possible for a further increase to occur in the number of students provided with a university education, without causing these student population targets to be exceeded, if the Chinese University were to decide to reduce its undergraduate course (except in the Medical Faculty) from four to three years, the same course length as obtains at the University of Hong Kong, following the proposed development of a common two-year sixth form course (Senior secondary, 1977:39).

This immediately aroused a storm of protest that the Government was forcing the CUHK to conform to a British system, that it was a reactionary move to substitute "general education" by "specialized education", that the Government was interfering with the University's autonomy. There were protests in the press; there were campaigns in the campus which came to a climax when the students launched a sit-in demonstration. The anti-"four-to-three" campaign received much support from the educational pressure groups who identified CUHK with "Chinese education" (i.e. teaching using Chinese as the medium of instruction) and linked the CUHK campaign with the "use-of-Chinese" campaign.

The Sixth Form Report produced by the BoE in 1979 again

attempted to solve this problem. It gave three alternatives to streamline the matriculation procedures. This was not popular because any move towards streamlining was taken as pressure upon the CUHK to change its course duration from 4 to 3 years, because it would be unlikely that HKU was going to change its course length to 4 years.

However, in 1980, the new Vice-Chancellor of CUHK, Ma Lin, announced that "the issue of 'four-to-three' is now over".

The reason for Ma Lin's announcement is not clear. A number of key informants said that Ma Lin in fact went to MacLehose who promised to drop the idea of converting CUHK courses to three years (ECH01, ECF01). Some informants even said that the Governor specified that the "four-to-three" issue would not be raised again in seven years, which happened to be the term of service for Ma Lin.

That MacLehose did make the promise seemed to be supported by events that occurred thereafter. At the very early stage of the CRE, the Committee received a letter from the Governor, as one of the CRE members recalled:

There was a student rally in the CUHK almost immediately before the first meeting of the Topley Committee. [...] Right after that, Topley read a letter from MacLehose telling us to assume the duration of courses [in the universities] to be unchanged (ISPO4).

In fact it was documented in CRE papers:

After taking further advice from the Executive Council, the Governor wrote to the Chairman of the Committee on 9 December, 1980 instructing that for the purpose of the report and its recommendations the Committee should assume that the length of courses and arrangements for intake of undergraduates currently in force at the two universities will continue (DSCRE/0:1).

The CUHK issue was perhaps the only "government intervention" identifiable by the OECD review Panel. One member of the Panel made this remark:

Right from the beginning, MacLehose told us not to touch CUHK. I said that was what I could not promise (ISOR2).

This was felt by all the other Panel members. (In fact the OECD Panel did argue against the 4-year programme in the CUHK, see Perspective, 1982:69).

Moreover, most of the UPGC members interviewed expressed the feeling that there was an understanding within the UPGC that any move to change the course duration of CUHK would not be endorsed by the Government.

However, even after 1980, the anti-"four-to-three" campaign was sustained. The public was still under the impression that the CUHK was under pressure to cut its length of courses. There were also strong gestures from members of the CUHK that they were fighting a battle against "four-to-three". This in fact led to the "provisional acceptance scheme" by which the CUHK would admit students provisionally after they have completed their fifth form. The whole issue lasted until November, 1986 when HKU announced its intention to change its basic courses into four year duration.

Was there such a pressure and such a battle? If there was, where did it come from? There can be no doubt that it was politics that was underlying the issue, but what exactly was the politics?

There could again be two possible explanations.

1.2.1. The rational explanation

The Green Paper proposal would considerably change the nature of CUHK's courses which was embodied in a model of four years with a foundation year. This was proposed by the "First Fulton Report" which led to the foundation of the University. The change of course duration would disrupt the traditions of the University and would cause unnecessary detriment to the development of the University. Reduction of course duration would also inevitably lead to unfavourable re-structuring of the staff. The University therefore fought to resist the proposed change. This was well expressed in Ma Lin's speech in a Congregation in 1980:

From the very beginning, the Report by the Fulton Commission had embodied a historic conviction and expectation of its time: the Commission not only proposed a university of international standard, but also that it should be a four-year institution using Chinese as the principal medium of instruction (Chinese University, 1980:6).

MacLehose appreciated the difficulties and accepted that it was after all the Government which had founded the four-year course structure. Hence, MacLehose felt morally obliged to guard the CUHK against intervention and therefore on several occasions (the CRE, the OECD review, the UPGC) adopted very exceptional measures to "decree" that the various policy bodies should avoid proposing a reduction of course length in CUHK.

MacLehose, however, did not manage to stop the OECD Panel who, just like the 1977 Working Party, felt a

reduction of course length in CUHK would improve the efficiency and consistency of the education system.

Because of the adoption of the OECD report after the LEGCO debate, the CUHK again faced the "four-to-three" pressure and hence had to revive the battle.

1.2.2. The legitimacy explanation

The CUHK found it difficult to accept the Green Paper proposal of reduction of course length, not only because of administrative and staffing difficulties, but more importantly because it would become a sign that its autonomy was being undermined. This was particularly unacceptable because CUHK had since its establishment identified itself as a Chinese institution. Conforming to a three year degree course, which was practised in HKU and was taken as British, would undermine its *legitimacy* as a "banner" for Chinese education.

This stand of the CUHK posed considerable pressure on MacLehose, for if he continued to endorse the Green Paper proposal, he would easily be identified as an imperialist who was moving to "oppress" Chinese education. For two reasons, this had become particularly sensitive. First, there was at that time the Chinese education movement which merged with a "use of Chinese" movement, both had grown into an anti-government movement. Second, the "1997" issue (the return of the sovereignty over Hong Kong to China) was moving ahead and the outcome was unclear. The CUHK issue, originally economic in nature, might cause adverse political

effects to the Government's image. In other words, the CUHK issue was putting the Government's *legitimacy* at risk. As one informant remarked:

My impression was that in the 1970s MacLehose was keen on "getting it done". The coming of the 1997 issue of course changed the situation and we can feel the top officials distancing themselves from the issue of [CUHK's] course duration (ISP04).

In these circumstances, MacLehose had to submit to the requests from Ma Lin, as a way of restoring the "legitimacy" by showing that the Government was not dominated by colonial attitudes.

However, MacLehose's decrees were not made public. This is understandable, because otherwise he would be admitting that Government had indeed had the idea of forcing the CUHK to change its duration. Opponents of "four-to-three" made use of this secrecy and kept on campaigning as if there were still the pressure for "four-to-three". Pressure group leaders and leaders in the CUHK would welcome the maintenance of this "phony" pressure. The pressure helped to keep up an anti-colonial spirit and to legitimate the CUHK's leadership image in Chinese education by adding to it a vague colour of anti-colonialism.

The OECD's revitalizing the "four-to-three" issue gave the public the false image that it was expressing what the Government would wish. This gave the CUHK a further opportunity to confirm its legitimacy in resisting government "oppression". It also gave the CUHK the opportunity to launch the "provisional acceptance scheme" which attracted students of better quality and put the CUHK

in a privileged position.

If the legitimacy arguments stand, then the concern of all relevant parties is not only the course duration *per se*. It was the anti-colonialism movement that was built up which was behind the real pressure.

I.3. Manpower Survey for Vocational Training

Hong Kong has a long history of manpower surveys to assess the needs of vocational training. Meanwhile, Hong Kong has long been well-known for its *free-market* economy. The most enthusiastic advocate of free-markets, Friedman, uses Hong Kong as the model of a free market economy (Friedman and Friedman, 1980). Hong Kong's labour market is characterised by its adaptability, flexibility and substitutability (Report, 1979). All these present the worst environments for successful manpower forecasting.

This poses an interesting question: Why is it that manpower forecasting, which is most unfavourable in a free market, is practised in the free market of Hong Kong.

A small scale research was carried out in 1985 to trace the entire process of planning in one industry, viz. the Building and Construction Industry (Most industries carry out bi-annual surveys), to understand the actual process of forecasting and the use of manpower forecasting in actual course planning. Two interesting points were discovered. The first pertains to the forecasting process and the second to the planning process (for details, see Cheng, 1985b).

The forecasting method adopted, as is the case in other industries, was the "employers' opinion survey". In this case, a full population survey was carried out. The data were used together with the stock of data in previous years. A family of curves were arrived at using an "adaptive filtering method" (Building, 1984) which gave heavier weights to more recent data. It was then up to the Training Board, which comprises the major employers in the industry, to select the most appropriate curve for projection. This was done on the basis of experience and expert judgement of the Board members. During the 1983 exercise, the industry was still in its most severe recession due to the uncertainty of Hong Kong's future. The mathematical model produced a family of pessimistic curves. The Board was much more optimistic and eventually arrived at a projection which did not lie in the mathematically produced family.

The question is, if the curves were not regarded as reliable (and they were not), why should the mathematical model be used in the first place?

The small scale research also examined closely the planning of intake in 1984 and found the following for the craft courses in Building and Construction:

planned number of graduates for 1987	1,800-2,100
original planned intake for 1984	
(allowing for 50% dropout)	3,600-4,200
planned intake for 1984	
(as readjusted in 1983)	2,000
actual intake in 1984	1,000

That is, the courses are only able to recruit one quarter of the required manpower. The original planned intake for 1984 was based on the 1983 forecast. It took into consideration a normal drop-out rate of 50%. The adjustment made in 1983 was based on the low intake in that year, indicating that the original plan was unrealistic. According to the normal drop-out rate, the actual turn out in 1987 would only be 500!

The second question is, therefore, if the intake is anyway led by the demand of the applicants rather than the demand of manpower, what was the use of manpower planning.

There could be two sets of answers to the two questions.

1.3.1. The rational explanation

It is true that manpower forecasting is most unfavourable in a free market economy, but it is also true that no country can entirely avoid manpower forecasting. Although it cannot produce accurate projections, it does take stock of the existing situation so that there is a baseline for future policy formulation.

In concrete terms, the Hong Kong forecast in 1983 for

Building and Construction gives a very typical case where mathematical forecasting has to be complemented by judgemental projections. There is in fact no clearcut distinction between "objective" and "judgemental" forecasts. If more could be understood about the Board members' "experience", it would be more likely to operationalise and quantify this "experience" and incorporate it into mathematical manipulations. In other word, it is not that rational forecasting was unreliable, but that the mathematical model was not rational enough.

In connection with the planning of intakes, the discrepancy exhibited in the 1984 intake pointed to (a) the danger of craftsmen shortage in 1987 and (b) the inadequacy of measures to attract young people to the industry. These are very useful information for the industry. Such information would not have come forth if there was no manpower planning.

1.3.2. The legitimacy explanation

The provision of training facilities needs some apparently rational base to rely on. The mathematical model provided the VTC the legitimacy to plan its training courses. Whether the mathematical model is accurate or reliable is a secondary matter. It has the prime importance of giving people the confidence that planning of vocational training is based on objective needs; it is impartial and is not arbitrary.

Although the 1983 forecast in Building and Construction

assumes that it was personal experience that provides more effective forecasting, it does not automatically lead to the conclusion that forecasting can be done purely by personal experience. It is not that the persons cannot yield accurate projections, but that forecasting would then become a purely personal and hence political game.

Therefore the "adaptive filtering technique" survived. The method may require improvement, but the adoption of the method does not depend on the accuracy of the method. It is the process and not the product that matters.

Similar arguments apply to the case of intake planning. The forecast figures provide the legitimacy to plan courses in an "objective" way. Or else, course planning, which has serious implications in staffing and resource allocation, will soon become highly political. Whether the plan can be fulfilled or not is of secondary importance. Although the discrepancy between the planned and the reality in fact caused troubles of staff reshuffle and resource re-allocation every year, the planning methodology involved the least personal elements and all parties felt comfortable.

I.4. Other Possible Explanations

Rationality and legitimacy do not exhaust the possible explanations of policy-making processes.

One of the alternatives is a *personality model* where many of the decisions during policy-making are attributable to interpersonal relationships and in particular the parti-

cipants' feelings towards some particular person or persons.

This model came up strongly during the research, but did not receive adequate evidence to apply it to all junctures of the two Episodes. In particular, the fate of the CRE was seen by many informants as a result of the personal dislikes of some particular key figure. One informant remarked:

Don't you see that it is obvious that the failure of the Topley report was due to people's dislikes of..... You do not know how he was disliked by people. Although it would not be spelt out in public, such factors play very important roles in the political arena (CSP01).

A number of informants did present this bad feeling. Much of this was either implicit or explicit in the records in Chapter 4 and will not be repeated. One retired EXCO member confirmed:

When you come to Topley's report, you have to bear in mind that the UPGC members didn't like During the CRE, ... held a meeting with the UPGC. He tried to be funny, but that really annoyed the UPGC members. They found him rude, impolite, knowing nothing about higher education, and so forth. In fact they wrote to the Governor to complain (ISX10).

In fact, the UPGC members' disfavour prevailed in all the interviews and can easily be sensed from the report in Chapter Four.

A second alternative is the rather popular *political model* which tries to explain policy-making as a process where the actors compete for policy outcomes favourable to their respective interests. This did not come out very strongly during the research, perhaps because in the early 1980s, the policy advisory bodies in Hong Kong were still seen as answerable to the Governor, or the "Government", and

not to parent interest groups. Members of such advisory bodies treasure their status as government appointees more than as representatives of group interests.

However, in a number of places, the *political model* does lend itself to sensible explanations. As an example, the HKTC could be seen as representing industrialists. They were keen to defend their own interests of remedying manpower shortages. As another example, some informants expressed the view that many of the overseas UPGC members "have their own axe to grind" (ISU01; ISU05), that their enthusiasm might be prompted by personal interests: Chinese studies, Hong Kong connections and, after all, "most of them get into a more senior position back home after being a member of the Hong Kong UPGC" (ISU01).

Nevertheless, these are mere fragmented "opinions" and did not motivate a serious pursuit of the model.

Still another alternative is the *organizational model*. In educational policy-making, the organizational model tends to look into bureaucratic causes that lead to policy outcomes. Again some evidence emerged during the research that can explain one or two incidents.

The Education Commission proposed by the OECD panel, for example, was seen by the EXCO as an odd "cog in the existing policy-making machinery", as "cumbersome in operation" (see Chapter 5, II.9). This can be explained as a matter of bureaucracy. The EXCO admits that "there is no quarrel about the need for co-ordination" (Ibid.), but this

goal is not supposed to be achieved in an overhaul of the existing machinery. It is the structure and not the function that is under consideration.

At some point, even the UPGC was viewed as a bureaucracy. The OECD panel viewed the UPGC as "not a very imaginative lot", "satisfied with the 3% growth rate" (see Chapter 4, IV.1.1). There were views that although the UPGC was not a bureaucracy, the UPGC Secretariat, and the Secretary in particular, held all the information and played the role of a key bureaucrat (ISU01b; ISU02; ISU05).

The above discussion is to illustrate that analyses of the Episodes using the two models do not deny other alternative explanations. However, the notion of legitimacy does seem to be a strong alternative to all conventional models. This is further elaborated in the next section.

I.5. An Interim Summary

Policy-making processes can be explained using *multiple perspectives* and among this a *legitimacy* notion emerge as an alternative to other conventional models. This *legitimacy* explanation is viable not only in the specific Episodes selected for this research. The discussions in this thesis have at least provided grounds to say that the notion of *legitimacy* as adopted in this study is worth pursuing. The rest of the chapter will therefore be devoted to further discussion of this notion of *legitimacy*.

II. Legitimacy as an Explanation

Much is said about *legitimacy* in Chapter 3 and it is not the intention here to repeat it. What follows are attempts to further elaborate the notion of *legitimacy* adopted in this study by comparing it with other relevant theories. Four aspects will be discussed: (a) the notion of *legitimacy* adopted in this study as compared with other senses of legitimacy in the literature; (b) *legitimacy* as a kind of conflict; (c) the notion of *legitimacy* as placed in a framework of rationality and (d) *legitimacy* in educational policy-making in Hong Kong.

II.1. The Fifth Sense of Legitimacy

To recall is said in Chapter Three, there could be four senses of *legitimacy* as applied to education policy: the curriculum to legitimate the State (e.g. political education); the education system as an instrument to legitimate the State (e.g. credentialism); a "justified" process to legitimate the State; and a "justified" process to legitimate education policies.

The results of this study seem to add to the list a fifth sense of legitimacy: that is, a "justified" process for political actor to legitimate his own position as a policy-maker. This could be regarded as an extension of the third sense above. The political actor can be the State

or the government bureaucracy, but can also be any person or organization in the policy-making arena.

When we apply the *legitimacy model* to the CRE episode, the tremendous effort spent to build the manpower model was not only meant to tackle manpower problems. Rather, it also provided the Government with the *legitimacy* to co-ordinate the fragmented policy-making machinery. Similarly, during the OECD episode, the invitation of overseas consultants, the subsequent "political approach" (popular consultations), the plenary sessions where all pressure groups attended, and so on were not necessarily meant to yield "good" or desired education policies, but to justify the Government as a *legitimate* open-minded policy-maker.

It could be loosely argued that these exercises served to legitimate the State of which the government bureaucracy was a proxy. But this is nothing new.

What research results of this study strongly suggest is that legitimacy is not only the concern of the State or the Government, but is a general matter of concern of all actors (in this case the advisory bodies) in policy-making. The following examples are retold to highlight this point.

There is little evidence that the UPGC refuted the Topley report on the grounds that they strongly disagreed with the recommendations. In fact, they endorse many of the recommendations afterwards. There are strong signs, however, that the UPGC did not think they could function in the way they worked (i.e. by the *legitimacy* of "judgement by

expertise" and by direct dialogues with the Governor) if they accepted manpower modelling as a basis for policy deliberations and submitted itself to some government machinery).

The OECD panel found difficulties in legitimating their mission as one of expertise, because most of the jobs that could possibly be carried out by a traditional expert (e.g. manpower calculations, students demands) were readily there; and more sophisticated deliberations would be prohibited either by the short time available or by the limitations in their competency. The only alternative left was then to carry out an "opinion survey" with the conceptual support of a "second" or "third generation" planning approach.

In both cases, the legitimacy established by and for a new actor (the CRE; the OECD Panel) seriously affects the existing legitimate functioning of other actors (the UPGC; the "Government"). Conversely, the refusal to accept this legitimacy (the UPGC rejection of the Topley Report; the Government reluctance to publish the OECD report) led to dramatic outcomes (the non-publication of the Topley Report; the delay of publishing the OECD Report and the LEGCO debate).

II.2. Legitimacy Conflicts

The conventional theories of a conflict often base their arguments on either value differences, competing economic interests or contrasting political ideologies. All

these conflicts are visualised in conflicting policy alternatives, or policy outputs. The results of this study tend to suggest another type of conflict: conflict of legitimacy. One actor's legitimacy could undermine another's. The legitimacy conflict differs from the other conflicts in that the conflict lies in the process and not the product of policy-making.

The underlying explanations are:

(a) Different actors in policy-making operate upon different kinds of legitimacy visualized in different forms. For example, other things being more or less equal, the CRE worked upon the legitimacy provided by manpower modelling; the UPGC on "judgement by expertise"; HKTC on "employers' opinion survey" for assessing manpower needs; and the OECD panel on "participatory planning".

(b) They are different because legitimacy is a matter of credibility, belief or culture. It has to do with the client of the policy-making. Different clients grant different kinds of legitimacy. The CRE was supposed to face the public; the UPGC was answerable only to the Governor; the HKTC was answerable to the industrialists in the training boards; and the OECD panel was to face peers in the international community of educational planning.

(c) Hence, as a consequence of (b), the different kinds of legitimacy normally may not exist in the same arena. The UPGC, for example, might feel very comfortable with the legitimacy of "expert judgement" if they were only answerable to the Governor and were looking after a few

institutions, but felt very uneasy when they were to face an open comprehensive planning to be scrutinized by the public.

As one UPGC member expressed:

Topley likes to be involved in public debates. When I was in Hong Kong or back in UK I never talked about the UPGC,... UPGC has always been working under a different kind of communication. We work behind the scene in strict confidentiality. I doubt if UPGC can go on with this kind of communication, under the same rules of confidentiality (ISU05).

The HKTC, as another example, was quite happy with their "employers' opinions survey" to estimate manpower shortage, but were unprepared to participate in a game of comprehensive educational planning. One informant who was with the HKTC started his interview by this remark:

I have to make it clear from the very beginning that we never claim we are doing educational planning. The entire purpose of our manpower survey is to forecast manpower shortage to serve the industries. I repeatedly argued for this point during the Topley Committee, but no one seemed to understand. Therefore, our manpower survey was unfairly criticised (ISV01).

The OECD reviews did not encounter similar difficulties elsewhere, because normally they dealt with only one specific area and did not normally interfere with the overall legitimacy in that country (the 1975 review of England and Wales could be a marginal exception, see OECD, 1975 and Tenth Report, 1976). One informant remarked:

OECD reviews were usually focussed on some specific area in education. For example, transition from education to work was the theme for the Australian review; compensatory education was the theme in the US review. The Hong Kong review was an overall one (ISOR3).

The legitimacy difficulty had in fact reinforced the participatory flavour of the OECD visit:

We tried to make the legitimacy as great as possible, and sometimes we even changed our original design. The plenary sessions, for example, were not in our original plan (ISOR4).

Hence, the degree to which the OECD review undermined the existing government legitimacy was rather abnormal, as one of the Panel members admitted:

The Hong Kong review has the special feature that the third party provided legitimacy for the popular group, but not for the government. This is rather interesting (see Chapter 5, III.3.3).

It could be said that *legitimacy* exists in each of the policy-advisory bodies as part of its sub-culture. It is an order of life that its members feel comfortable with, a set of rules of the game that is recognised as "rational", and a matter of integrity that makes its members feel offended when it is trespassed against.

(d) Conflicts of legitimacy are more apparent when the different sub-cultures are to be co-ordinated or are required to co-operate, i.e. when the different actors have to face the same client, or work under the same rules of game.

The UPGC refused to follow the CRE formula or else they would have undermined their own legitimacy. The OECD panel did not commit themselves to the risky game of "figure juggling" (ISOR3) because after all they might find themselves less knowledgeable than the local experts. The OECD panel put the Government in trouble because they had established a new type of legitimacy through their "participatory approach" which was nonetheless popular. The

EXCO found the idea of an Education Commission unacceptable, because

If the Commission were to direct the three bodies [i.e. UPGC, VTC and BoE] and were statutory, what would then be the position for EXCO (ISX04).

(e) There is little evidence from the study that *legitimacy* in this sense is a matter of intention, let alone of conspiracy. The legitimacy for policy-making evolves over time as a sort of "sub-culture" without being noticed. The policy actors did not start with the aim to gaining or defending *legitimacy*. They feel the need for *legitimation* only when there is a crisis, that they cannot possibly assume their authority of policy-making unless their "formula" for making policies is re-assured. This is a kind of "second level" or "hidden" objective which does not exist naturally in the means-end paradigm. This invites re-examination of the notion of rationality.

II.3. Legitimacy as Rationality

If the actors are after all "rational" in acquiring or defending their *legitimacy*, is the *legitimacy model* not just another version of the *rational models*?

Let us briefly recall examples in the study for illustration.

Suppose the legitimacy explanation stands. When manpower modelling and forecasting were employed in the CRE, the primary concern was not manpower supply and demand which was supposed to be the primary function of the process. The

concern was the *legitimacy* of co-ordination that is provided by the impartiality, objectivity, science and so on of the process. Once the process is smoothly carried out, the actor feels satisfied because legitimacy is achieved. There is a "second-level objective" which is not visible in the primary function of the process.

Again, suppose the legitimacy explanation stands. When extensive public consultation was conducted by the OECD panel in its "participatory approach", the primary concern was not citizen participation which was supposed to be the primary function of consultation. The concern was in the *legitimacy* that the panel was independent of the Government. Such a *legitimacy* was provided by the democratic flavour and participatory procedures in the process. What such a process would produce was not given much attention. There was again a "second-level objective" that was not apparent in the primary function of the consultation processes.

There are two issues that merit attention. First, the notion of a "second-level objective" and second, the "process consciousness".

II.3.1. "Second-level objectives"

The above examples suggests that the objective of the actors in a *legitimacy model* is not the production of any preferred policy as is in the case of *substantive rationality* or *political rationality*. They are not even aiming at second-best "satisfactory" policy solutions as is the case in *procedural rationality*. They aim at the

acquisition or maintenance of legitimacy which is not visualized in the stated policy goals (e.g. manpower needs, social demand) nor in the primary function of the procedures (e.g. manpower modelling, citizen participation).

Legitimacy per se is an objective. This objective of course serves higher level aims such as authority of a government or the status or influence of an actor, but the primary objective during the policy-making process is *legitimacy*. Whether the CRE wanted to co-ordinate the fragmented policy-making machinery, or to expand higher education, the concern during the policy-making process was to establish its legitimacy of having a say in overall policies. The OECD panel in fact paid little attention to what was proposed in their report as a matter of education, nor was that the primary concern of the Government.

We may re-define *rationality* to include this "second-level objective". Then, the *legitimacy model* can be re-named as "*legitimacy rationality*" and can be compared with the other three models defined in Chapter Three (See I.7).

Table 6.1 Objectives in the Models

	Concern during policy- making	Objective
Substantive Rationality	Policy output	Policy output
Procedural Rationality	Policy process	Policy output
Partisan Rationality	Policy output	Policy output
Legitimacy Rationality	Policy process	Legitimacy

II.3.2. "Process consciousness"

The above table also re-iterates the point in Chapter 3 that the three earlier rationality categories are all concerned with the policy output - to get an optimal solution or a satisfactory solution. They are all "output-conscious" or "goal-conscious".

In "legitimacy rationality", the actors are primarily "process-conscious" or "procedure-conscious".

If actors in the *legitimacy model* are "procedure-conscious", is that not just another version of Simon's *procedural rationality*? The answer is no. The argument here is that although actors in procedural rationality attend to the process, their objective is to arrive at consensus in the process so as to produce some "satisfactory" policy output. In the *legitimacy model*, (a) the actors do not aim at consensus in the process and (b) in fact their primary aim is to acquire or maintain their preferred policy process.

There are two dimensions: the concern of process and the consensus in process.

In *legitimacy rationality*, the actors aim at acquiring and maintaining their respective forms of legitimacy, but do not aim at consensus among different actors.

This brings us back to Table 3.1 in I.7 of Chapter Three. In this model of *legitimacy rationality*, there is an opportunity that the actors may in fact agree in their final goals (e.g. both the UPGC and the CRE might like to expand

higher education), but they cannot come to terms because of the conflict in legitimacy. This is then a case of "goal consensus, process conflict". However, it has to be qualified immediately that this is not always the case. Legitimacy conflicts do not automatically imply goal consensus.

The figure on the next page is an attempt to include this *legitimacy rationality* in a framework which also contains the three rationality models defined in Chapter Three.

11.3.3. An interim summary


The above discussions are an attempt to systematize the various models encountered during this study and to identify the position of the *legitimacy model*. There are two significant points in the framework discussed.

First, it reminds people of the process dimension of policy-making. The process itself may independently influence the policy-making process. This can be regarded as an extension of Simon's procedural rationality to cases where there is no consensus in the process.

Second, it reminds people that the substance of the policy produced may not always be the primary objective of the policy-maker. Legitimacy could well be the primary concern and this may again have prime influence on the process as well as the result of policy-making. This can be regarded as an extension of Habermas' notion of legitimation to cases where the object of legitimation is not only the

State.

Figure 6.1 Models of Extended Rationality



II.4. Legitimacy and the Government of Hong Kong

It sounds appropriate to end this thesis with some remarks on the significance of the legitimacy concept in Hong Kong.

Hong Kong is a British colony and

[the] Governor is the symbolic representative of the Queen's sovereignty over Hong Kong and exercises by delegation the powers of the royal prerogative (Miners, 1986:73)

II.4.1. *Legitimacy crisis*

That Hong Kong is a colony and that the Governor is appointed by the Queen of Britain mean that there is an in-built *legitimacy crisis* in the Hong Kong polity.

As a rather developed capitalist society, there should be no doubt that Offe's contradiction of accumulation and distribution exists. However, if legitimacy is regarded as a kind of belief, climate of opinion or culture, Offe's contradiction is not the main contributor to *legitimation crisis* in Hong Kong. Hong Kong has achieved in the past decades a very rapid economic growth. Distribution is not so much a concern partly because of the corresponding expansion of social welfare, partly because of the cult for efficiency at the expense of equity, but more importantly because of the contrasting economic and social failures exhibited by Mainland China next door during the Cultural Revolution. Hong Kong is thus said to enjoy "prosperity and stability" and the citizens seem to accept the *status quo*. There is little visible *legitimacy* problem in this respect. In fact

it could be argued that the Hong Kong Government has gained some "legitimacy surplus", because it is seen as "efficient" in Offe's terms (see Chapter 3, II.1.4.).

However, a *legitimacy* problem does arise because of the non-democratic polity. It was only in 1982 that elected District Boards were established and 1985 saw the first elected members in the LEGCO. Even then, decision-making in major policies were made only in the EXCO whose members were entirely appointed by the Governor and whose meetings were confidential. This non-democracy has been identified, particularly by the intellectuals who are increasingly influenced by Western ideas, as a symbol of colonialism. Citizens in general still regard the situation as a case of "Chinese ruled by the British".

Therefore, the Government is always in a *legitimacy deficit* because it does not possess the necessary *legitimacy* which would otherwise be coming forth through election. In these circumstances, the Government has always been extremely careful to secure popular support in each and every step of policy-making. The situation is very different from the case in a Western democracy where the administration is extremely keen at soliciting support before elections but can afford to neglect citizen support between elections.

II.4.2. Expertise and consultation

In general, *expertise* and *consultation* are the two major political means which the Government employ to secure

popular support or, in Habermas' notions, to compensate for the *legitimacy deficit*. This is not surprising, as the legitimating functions of *expertise* and *consultation* are well established (see Chapter Three), but these have particular significance in Hong Kong because they provide almost the *only* political means of acquiring legitimacy.

In the Hong Kong context, *expertise* is provided by a sophisticated information base and a team of competent experts. In education, such an information base and expert team contributed to the manpower deliberations during the CRE exercise and to the earlier exercises in 1977 and 1979 (see Chapter One, III.3.3.). One may even date the use of such tactics back to 1964 when the Hong Kong Government was quick to take up the Harbison and Myers model (1964) (see Chapter One, III.3.1.). The strong basis of *Expertise* has provided the Government with the impartiality which helps the Government to shake itself off any accusation of colonial bias, and is particularly effective in a Chinese community which traditionally respects rationality more than democracy. *Expertise* is more respectable in Hong Kong than it is elsewhere in a modern Western state. This may explain why Hong Kong has become "a planners' paradise" (see Introduction, 2).

Consultation plays an equally important role. In the colonial context, the general mentality is still intrinsically anti-government. Consultation improves communication between the Government and the citizens and very often the

latter feel satisfied at being heard. Consultation also provides the Government with a kind of "feedforward" which makes the Government feel more confident in promulgating or implementing policies. As is mentioned in Chapter One, consultation in education is extensive. This is a general policy across all sectors of public administration. Without such consultations the Government lack the means to demonstrate that it is representing and not oppressing the people. This explains the over 360 official advisory bodies established by the Hong Kong Government.

Third-party consultation, which is a mix of expertise and consultation (see Chapter Three, II.4.4.), is used quite often by the Hong Kong Government, particularly in the area of education. As mentioned earlier in Chapter One (III.2), the T.K. Ann Commission and the Rayson Huang Committee proved effective in placing the Governor in an impartial position and placing the government bureaucracy and citizens on an equal footing. The large proportion of overseas membership in the UPGC is a type of standing third-party consultation. Without such membership, the Government would always be in embarrassment when it faces competing demand from the different institutions. Given all these, the invitation of Peter Williams to the CRE and the conduct of the OECD review were part of this tradition. The participation of overseas consultants in policy deliberation can easily be regarded elsewhere as an infringement of sovereignty, but has become a credit to the legitimacy of the Hong Kong Government.

Expertise and consultation hence have their special

functions in Hong Kong. They serve to legitimate a Government which is not created by election.

What the research findings strongly hint at is that the acquisition of legitimacy through expertise and consultation has developed into a culture which concerns not only the Government. In this case, *expertise* and *public opinion* serve as the major means by which political actors in Hong Kong seek to legitimate themselves. When policy actors are not representatives elected by their constituencies, when they are appointed by a government which lacks legal means to legitimate itself, what can serve better than *expertise* and *public opinion* as admission tickets to the club of policy-making. This underlies the legitimacy lessons told by the two Episodes in this study.

II.4.3. Looking ahead

However, the polity in Hong Kong is changing. 1985 saw the first elected members in the LEGCO. When votes at an election have become essential means of legitimacy acquisition, the role of *expertise* and *consultation* becomes subtle.

The future of *expertise* and *consultation* may not be optimistic. The respect for *expertise* and *consultation* has been possible only because "Hong Kong is a virtual autocracy" (Griffiths, 1984:547). The Government was obliged to rely on these for legitimacy. "The result is a wholly undemocratic but exceptionally receptive management system" (Ibid.). The change of legitimacy may increase the emphasis

on political powers and reduce the reliance on "rational" and impartial expertise or day-to-day consultation. The change in *legitimacy* is prompted by a process of democratization, but may reduce the receptiveness of the Government to its client citizens. Just at the moment when this thesis is being finished, one elected LEGCO member (incidentally an educator) has proposed a reduction of the number of consultative committees. This is by no means surprising. For an elected member, his *legitimacy* does not come from consultative committees which to him are "structurally clumsy" (*Ming Po Daily*, December 29, 1986).

These are mere speculations, but are nevertheless not totally unrealistic in the light of the findings of this study.

III. Concluding Remarks

As is mentioned at the beginning, the study does not seek to solve policy problems and is unlikely to be ever on the policy agenda. The concept of legitimacy in explaining policy-making processes proves to be a worthwhile hypothesis and lends itself to further research and theory building. To the writer, the concept of legitimacy was "felt" rather than "thought out" during the ethnographic research. Those who are not in the same position may not share the same feeling. However, *legitimacy* as an alternative explanation will certainly help to achieve a better understanding of the policy-making process.

POSTSCRIPT

When I started the Ph.D. programme in October, 1983, my desire was to understand the role of technical planning in policy-making. However, the study has enabled me to tour a number of unexpected territories: policy studies, state theory and research methodology. Of these, some areas have particularly impressed me: Claus Offe's discussion of legitimacy, Herbert Simon's classification of rationality, Graham Allison's multiple perspective approach, Carol Weiss's notion of enlightenment, and various writers on ethnographic research.

It is a real learning process. The end product of this process is not so much a claim of mastery of any particular discipline, but rather, an opening of my mind to the splendid spectrum of perspectives and a deviation from monolithic interpretation of the social world. Such an opening and a deviation, I am convinced, are essential to both Hong Kong and China.

At this moment when this thesis is being finished, what comes to my mind is what I wrote at the back of my M.Ed. dissertation. It is the Chinese saying, now with a different, perhaps better, translation:

"Learn and you'll discover your poverty in knowledge".

Much is yet to be learnt. Let this Thesis mark another starting point.

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APPENDIX G

List of published documents reviewed (in chronological order)

- 1963 Statement on Government Policy on the Re-organization of the structure of Primary and Secondary Education
- 1963 Report of Education Commission (Marsh-Sampson Report) (Green Paper)
- 1965 Education Policy (White Paper)
- 1966 Special Committee on Higher Education: Interim Report
- 1968 Special Committee on Higher Education: Second Interim Report
- 1970 Hong Kong 1970: Address by His Excellency the Governor Sir David Trench to the 1970-1971 session of the Hong Kong Legislative Council on 1st October, 1970 (Pamphlet)
- 1971 The Final Report of the Industrial Training Advisory Committee (ITAC)
- 1972 Speech by the Governor Sir Murray McLehose at the Legislative Council on October 18, 1972. Hong Kong Hansard, 1972-73.
- 1973 Report of the Board of Education on the Proposed Expansion of Secondary Education over the Next Decade (Green Paper)
- 1974 Secondary Education in Hong Kong over the Next Decade (White Paper)
- 1975 First Report of the Hong Kong Training Council (October 1973 - March 1975)
- 1976 University & Polytechnic Grants Committee of Hong Kong Special Report: October, 1965 to June, 1976
- 1976 Report of the Special Commission on the Certificated Masters (T.K. Ann Report)
- 1977 Report on Technical Manpower Demand and Supply 1977-82
- 1977 Senior Secondary and Tertiary Education: a development programme for Hong Kong over the next decade (Green Paper)
- 1978 Interim Report of the Committee of Inquiry into the Precious Blood Golden Jubilee Secondary School

- 1978 Final Report of the Committee of Inquiry into the Precious Blood Golden Jubilee Secondary School (The Rayson Huang Report)
- 1978 The Development of Senior and Tertiary Education (White Paper)
- 1979 Report of the Board of Education's Committee on Sixth Form Education
- 1979 Report of the Advisory Committee on Diversification
- 1980 University and Polytechnic Grants Committee of Hong Kong: notes on procedures
- 1981 Seventh Report of the Hong Kong Training Council (April 1980-March, 1981)
- 1981 The Hong Kong Education System (Overall Review of the Hong Kong Education System)
- 1982 A Perspective on Education in Hong Kong: report from by a visiting panel
- 1982 First Report of the Planning Committee for the Second polytechnic
- 1983 Report of Consultant on Technical Education (The Helmore Report)
- 1984 Report on Demand for and Supply of Technical Manpower in the Major Industries
- 1984 Education Commission Report No. 1

Also:

Education Department Half-yearly Statistical Summary
(Various years)

Education Department Annual Summary
(From 1970-71 to 1983-84)

University and Polytechnic Grants Committee of Hong Kong
(From 1978-80 to 1983-84)

Hong Kong Government Civil and Miscellaneous Lists
(From 1967 to 1985)

Hong Kong 1981 Census Main Report (2 volumes)























